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Abstract 
Accounts of corruption in conflict-affected areas are often dominated by a focus on the fragility 
of public sector institutions. In the last decade, this focus has been challenged by an emergent literature 
which instead frames corruption as an informal means of order-making during conflict, and by the study 
of the ethnicisation of corruption through conflict. In this thesis, I contribute to this emergent literature 
by analysing the local dynamics of conflict-induced change in corruption in Nepal, eleven years after 
the end of the 1996-2006 Maoist conflict. I do so through a constructivist grounded theory approach, 
one which has not previously been applied in the study of this relationship. Through this new case and 
approach, I expand the emergent body of theory on this relationship in three ways: First, I demonstrate 
long term change in corruption at the sub-national level under conditions of stability, and in a context 
not polarised by ethnic divisions. Second, I demonstrate the multiple concurrent dynamics of conflict-
induced change in corruption in the long term, across the four theories of this relationship present in the 
literature. Finally, I explain the changing nature of this relationship over time, spanning the conflict, 
transition and expectations for future change.  
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Chapter One: Introduction 
The majority of states deemed most exposed to corruption by international indices have a recent 
history of armed conflict (Andvig, 2008; Kaufmann & Kraay, 2018; Transparency International, 2017). 
Explanations of this overlap most frequently centre on the fragility of conflict-affected states, with 
conflict argued to weaken oversight in public sector institutions and undermine the rule of law (Cheng 
& Zaum, 2011). Simultaneously, corruption is itself widely framed as a driver of fragility through its 
effects on democratic and liberal economic institutions and capacity to fuel inter-group grievances 
(LeBillon, 2003). Concern over this vicious cycle of corruption and conflict through fragility has led to 
anti-corruption becoming a central component of western-led peacebuilding (Johnsøn, 2016). 
Whilst the focus on fragility still dominates, the last decade has seen the growth of alternative 
explanations of conflict-induced change in corruption. Contemporary accounts of this relationship 
include the use of corruption as a means by which populations adapt to the effects of conflict on 
livelihoods (Baaz & Verweijen, 2014; Looney, 2008), elites engaging patronage as a means of 
integrating their rivals (DeWaal, 2009; Day & Reno, 2014) and the stratification of corruption 
perceptions along communal divides (Orjuela et al, 2016; Smith, 2014a). These developments reflect 
the growing study of informal systems of order-making in conflict and the non-rationalist determinants 
of corruption (Cheng & Zaum, 2008; Lindberg & Orjuela, 2014). This has led to a diverse but 
increasingly fragmented theoretical landscape on conflict-induced change in corruption.  
In this thesis, I present new empirical evidence on conflict-induced change in corruption from 
Ghorahi, a city in Nepal’s western Terai,1 and use this to refine the theoretical landscape on this 
relationship. The evidence I present is the outcome of a constructivist grounded theory study I conducted 
in 2017. Across two phases, I conducted extended interviews with political party representatives, 
members of the media, non-governmental organisation (NGO) and community representatives, and 
those working in a range of small businesses in the city bazaar. The dataset I developed through this 
consists of 4,748 coded statements from 89 respondents, detailing how the conflict and corruption are 
 
1 The Terai is the area of Nepal located between Himalayan foothills and the southern border with India. In 
general, the country is often described as divided between the mountain (himal), hill (pahad), and plains (terai) 
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experienced and perceived by those in Ghorahi. From this dataset, I show that the conflict has impacted 
the perception and experience of corruption in three ways: 
 First, the conflict led to the corrupt enrichment of a group of mid-level elite actors from the 
Maoists’ Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA) and promoted these elites to amongst the main beneficiaries 
of corruption in the city. This corruption dynamic is rooted in the Maoists’ demands for donations and 
the capture of lands during the conflict, which together violate socially-contingent standards of 
legitimacy and fairness. These standards are informed by the comparisons those in Ghorahi draw to 
changes in everyday life during and after the conflict, the values they associated with the Maoists in 
initiating the conflict and the relative fortunes of the Maoist elites to the former rank and file of the PLA. 
This persists despite the transition of the Maoists into mainstream party politics, and is the most 
prominent component of conflict-induced change in corruption present in this case.  
Second, the closure of political space and the pressure that the conflict exerted on everyday life 
supressed exposure to routine forms of corruption. However, the instability of local government and the 
re-opening of political space during the transition led to the development of what those in Ghorahi see 
as a corrupt elite network between bureaucrats, business and political parties – including the post-
conflict Maoist party. This corruption dynamic has been exacerbated by instability in the central level 
governance system during the transition, which is seen by those in Ghorahi to have undermined the 
opportunity to challenge corruption as Nepal transitioned to a democratic republic. Owing to the depth 
of connections engendered in the conflict and transition, this corruption dynamic continues to be evident 
despite the holding of local and federal elections in 2017. 
Finally, the conflict led to changes in the social and attitudinal determinants of corruption. Most 
directly, the conflict led to the short term legitimisation of black market activity amongst a subset of 
small business owners in the city. This effect is bound to the period of crisis, and has not created long 
term changes in the nature of corruption. Alongside this, the conflict changed how those in Ghorahi 
view the vulnerability of historically marginalised rural populations to corruption. The often violent 
actions of the Maoists against those who historically held power in rural areas and the changes to the 
governance system which occurred as a result of the conflict are seen by this urban population to have 
empowered rural peoples to challenge everyday forms of corruption. This impact of the conflict 
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underlies a sense of optimism about the future change in routine forms of corruption, accelerating 
historic changes in the empowerment of marginalised communities.  
By exploring these elements of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi, this thesis 
responds to the following four limitations of the literature on this relationship: First, the literature on 
conflict-induced change in corruption has primarily developed through analysis of cases of state 
collapse, western-led peacebuilding interventions and ethnic conflict. By contrast, Nepal’s 1996-2006 
conflict was resolved by a domestically-led peacebuilding process in which the central state was 
transformed but far from collapsed, and was not principally stratified along the ethnic divides analysed 
elsewhere (Von Einsiedel et al, 2012). Through analysing conflict-induced change in corruption in this 
distinct context, I add empirical nuances to the theories of change in the literature, and demonstrate the 
transferability of these theories beyond the types of cases in which they were developed.   
Second, the literature has developed through studies of ongoing conflict and conflict to post-
conflict transition in which violence and instability are ongoing. This reflects the influence of demands 
for information to inform international peacebuilding and conflict resolution in driving academic 
analysis of conflict-induced change in corruption. By contrast, I analyse this relationship eleven years 
after the end of widespread armed group violence in Nepal, and in an area of the country not affected 
by the isolated instances of violence seen since 2006. Through this distinct type of case, I show how 
effects borne out of conflict continue to influence corruption in periods of relative stability, and argue 
that a history of conflict should be more routinely included in the analysis of determinants of corruption.   
 Third, much of the literature focuses on the dynamics of conflict-induced change in corruption 
in central governments. This reflects the influence of the study of peacebuilding and statebuilding in 
driving academic analysis of this relationship (Cheng & Zaum, 2008), and the emphasis on international 
comparison in the corruption studies literature (Andersson & Heywood, 2009). Further, whilst the 
emergence of a literature which goes beyond the focus on the exploitation of fragility have led to some 
diversification, this has often been only to the level of armed groups and elite-led networks of corruption. 
By contrast, I analyse conflict-induced change in corruption at the sub-national level, with a focus on 
the experiences of a heavily conflict-affected population. Through this, I demonstrate population-level 
effects of armed conflict on the level and nature of corruption.  
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 Finally, there are limits on how corruption has been conceptualised in the literature on conflict-
induced change. Most commonly, scholars engage the narrow and prescriptive definitions of corruption 
which still dominate the broader study of this phenomenon – typically some variation on the ‘misuse of 
public office for private gain’. Because of its reliance on a division between the public and private realms 
and the focus on self-regarding behaviours, definitions of this type lead analysis towards exploitative 
corruption in the public sector, to the exclusion of other forms. At the other extreme, works critical of 
these prescriptive definitions are often vague in defining the boundaries between corruption and 
legitimate forms of informal exchange. In contrast to both, I engage a constructivist conceptual 
approach, under which corruption is defined through the experiences of those interviewed, and develop 
this iteratively through the use of grounded theory.   
 In combination, these four limitations mean that far more is known about the short term effects 
of conflict on exploitative corruption in the public sector than about this relationship in other contexts. 
The last decade of academic research demonstrates that there is much to this relationship beyond this, 
but has also led to the fragmentation of the literature across diverse theories of interaction, which are 
typically examined in isolation. By examining the sub-national dynamics of conflict and corruption in 
Nepal during a period of stability, and through the application of a methodological and theoretical 
approach not previously applied to this relationship, I demonstrate that there are multiple concurrent 
dynamics of conflict-induced change in corruption, and that these effects persist in the long term. 
Further, I show that these effects differ over time, with some being confined to the conflict, and others 
emerging well into the transition. Given the limited attention to conflict-induced change in corruption 
in the long term at the sub-national level in the literature, and the fragmentated body of theory on this 
relationship, this represents a significant contribution to the growing body of work on this subject. 
 In addition to contributing to an emerging academic literature, this thesis is also relevant to 
policy and practitioner audiences, and to a broad range of audiences in and connected to Nepal. For anti-
corruption policy and practitioner audiences, this thesis contributes to debates on the causes and 
dynamics of corruption at the micro-level. It does so by unpacking the everyday experience of corruption 
in a new sub-national context, and by highlighting the judgements and norms by which corruption is 
understood by affected populations. For Nepali audiences, this thesis demonstrates and explains the 
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connection between two issues of major political, media and public concern: the legacies of the 1996-
2006 Maoist conflict and the causes and scope of corruption in the post-conflict period. It does so among 
a peripheral urban population outside of the Kathmandu Valley, the experiences of which have been 
comparatively neglected by academic research in this context.  
 
1.1 Structure 
 The main body of this thesis is comprised of nine chapters: In Chapter Two, I argue that the 
literature on conflict-induced change in corruption expresses four main theories: [1] the exploitation of 
the fragility of the public sector; [2] the use of corruption as an informal means of imposing order; [3] 
conflict economies, comprising the set of informal economic activity which emerges through conflict; 
and [4] social change, the principal form of which is ethnicisation. In setting out this theoretical 
landscape, I show how the latter three of these theories emerged out of critiques of the first, and situate 
this thesis in this emergent segment of the literature focused on alternative theories of this relationship. 
Following this, I discuss the limitations and critiques of this literature introduced above, and link these 
to the focus of this thesis on long term conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi.  
 In Chapter Three, I set out the constructivist ontological approach and subjectivist epistemology 
I use to analyse conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi. I justify these positions by discussing 
the limits of the most widely engaged definition of corruption - the misuse of public office for private 
gain - and of the alternative ‘universal’ definitions which have been proposed in response to these 
critiques. Drawing on the growth of alternative approaches within the corruption studies literature, I 
argue that corruption is best approached as a social construction, determined by human agency. I couple 
this ontology with a subjectivist epistemology, which locates knowledge in the interaction between 
researcher and researched. This epistemology is particularly well suited to the sub-national level of 
analysis undertaken in this thesis and the contestation which exists around corruption.  
 In Chapter Four, I discuss the constructivist grounded theory approach which I engage to study 
conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi. I justify this approach by discussing the nature of the 
challenges inherent in conducting research around armed conflict and corruption, the focus of this thesis 
on developing and refining existing theories of conflict-induced change in corruption, and the 
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compatibility of constructivist grounded theory with the ontological and epistemological approach I set 
out in Chapter Three. Following this, I discuss the decisions underlying my focus on Ghorahi, the logic 
of the two stage approach to fieldwork which I implemented in this context, the adaptations I made to 
this approach whilst in the field, and the ethical considerations relevant to this thesis. Finally, in closing 
this chapter, I reflect on the positionality of those involved in my fieldwork.  
 Chapter Five is the first of four chapters in which I discuss the outcomes of my empirical 
analysis. In the first part of this chapter, I introduce how my respondents experienced the conflict and 
transition in general. This includes the impacts of conflict on everyday life, their relations with the 
Maoists and security forces, and the transformation of the Maoists into mainstream party politics 
following the conflict. Reflecting the theoretical approach to corruption set out in Chapter Three, I then 
discuss how my respondents understand and experience corruption. Here I discuss the Nepali 
terminology associated with corruption, the experiences common to the respondent group, and the 
dividing lines between corrupt and legitimate behaviour. This chapter forms the context for the 
discussion of conflict-induced change in corruption, which I set out over Chapters Six to Eight.  
 In Chapter Six, I discuss the first component of conflict-induced change in corruption in 
Ghorahi, which centres on the corrupt transformation of the mid-level Maoist elite during and after in 
the conflict. Here, I discuss experiences of demands for donations from Maoist cadres during the conflict 
and the capture of lands by the Maoists, and the link that the respondents draw from this to the public 
displays of wealth of the mid-level Maoist elite since the conflict. Far from purely a reflection of 
financial abuses, I show that this corruption dynamic is rooted in socially-contingent standards of 
legitimacy and fairness. This includes the comparison that those in Ghorahi draw between their own 
lifestyles and those of the Maoist elite during the transition, the fragmentation of the Maoist movement 
after the conflict, and reflections on the motivations of the Maoists in initiating the conflict. Together, 
this constitutes the most prominent influence of the conflict on contemporary corruption in Ghorahi.  
 The second component of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi, which I set out in 
Chapter Seven, concerns changes in the governance system as a result of the conflict and transition. 
Here, I show that the conflict led to the closure of political space and the scaling back of local 
government activity in Ghorahi. When combined with the pressures that the conflict inflicted on the 
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everyday life in the city, I show that the conflict suppressed routine experiences of corruption in local 
government services. However, I go on to show that the re-opening of political space during the 
transition, combined with the protracted reforms to local government, has led to the development of a 
corrupt elite network between political parties, bureaucrats and business. This has persisted despite the 
holding of local elections in 2017.  
 The final component of conflict-induced change in corruption, which I set out in Chapter Eight, 
focuses first on corruption as a form of coping. Here, I show how the impacts of the conflict on the 
respondents’ livelihoods led some to engage in otherwise unacceptable clandestine trade. Whilst 
legitimate to some, this trade was widely seen by those not involved as a corrupt black market. I show 
that these competing constructions reflect differences in the directness with which different respondents 
were exposed to livelihood challenges, their level of connectedness to the Maoists and security forces, 
and reflections about the benefits obtained. I further show, however, that these dynamics are contained 
within the conflict, and have not resulted in the long term transformation of corruption.  
 In contrast to the short term effects of clandestine trade on corruption, in Chapter Eight I also 
set out the long term impacts of social change on corruption. To do so, I explore the link between the 
actions of the Maoists in the conflict and the perceived vulnerability of historically marginalised rural 
communities to corruption. Here, I show that the conflict accelerated the otherwise incremental gains in 
the empowerment of these communities and has resulted in a perception that the rural communities are 
increasingly resilient to corruption. Whilst outside of the direct experiences of those in Ghorahi, this has 
led to widespread optimism about the future change in routine forms of corruption. I therefore show that 
the conflict is linked to future expectations for change, as well as the contemporary nature of corruption.  
 In Chapter Nine, I draw together the three elements of conflict-induced change in corruption in 
Ghorahi into an integrated picture of this relationship. To do so, I consider the differing prominence of 
the elements of this relationship in the period in which I undertook fieldwork and over time. Here, I link 
the differing prominence of the elements of this relationship to the benefits associated with corruption 
of different forms, expectations over the beneficiaries of corruption, and the extent to which conflict-
induced change in corruption fits with historic corruption trends. Following this, I compare conflict-
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induced change in corruption to the general determinants of corruption in Ghorahi. To do so, I return to 
the contextual analysis provided in Chapter Five.  
 Based on the integrated picture of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi, I then 
discuss the contribution of this case to the literature. I do so in two parts: First, I discuss how this case 
responds to the limitations of the literature set out in Chapter Two. This includes the evidence of long 
term change in corruption in a case of relative stability, the changing prominence of elements of conflict-
induced change over time, the overlap between conflict-related causes and existing causes of corruption, 
and the dominance of local-level effects over central-level effects. Following this, I offer refinements 
for each of the four theories of change in the literature. These include the extent of contestation over 
corruption as a form of coping with conflict, the shifting legitimacy of corruption over time, and the 
possibility of social change beyond that focused on the salience of identity.  
 Finally, in Chapter Ten, I reflect on the process and outcomes of my research, provide 
recommendations for future research into conflict-induced change in corruption. These 
recommendations build on the theoretical implications I set out in Chapter Nine and the methodological 
reflections in Chapter Four, and relate to the need for further research on conflict-induced change in 
corruption in Nepal and other contexts. Reflecting the implications and limitations of this study, I 
particularly focus on the need for longitudinal and comparative work within a single national context.   
 
 
16 
Chapter Two: Literature review  
2.1 Introduction  
 In this chapter, I review the literature on conflict-induced change in corruption. I do so in three 
parts: In Section 2.2, I argue that the literature expresses four main theories of conflict-induced change 
in corruption. The first of these theories - the exploitation of fragility - serves as the default account of 
this relationship, common in both academic and policy literatures. The remaining three theories - the 
illiberal coping strategies adopted by elites, informal economic activity, and identity-based 
transformation - reflect challenges to the assumptions underlying this default account. This thesis is 
aligned with the set of works which challenge the framing of conflict-induced change in corruption as 
the exploitation of fragility, and seeks to develop and broaden these alternative explanations.  
 In Section 2.3, I set out the four limitations of the literature on conflict-induced change in 
corruption to which this thesis responds. Here, I argue that the literature is skewed towards cases of 
western-led international intervention and state collapse, gives insufficient attention to the long-term 
dynamics of this relationship, has not sufficiently considered the experiences of conflict-affected 
populations outside of cases of identity-based conflict, and has often been deficient in the way corruption 
is conceptualised. In Section 2.4, I then discuss how this thesis responds to these four limitations. This 
includes how the limitations of the literature influenced my decision to select Nepal as a context for 
analysis, my focus on corruption at the population level, and my conceptual approach.   
 As I introduced in Chapter One, my analysis engages a theoretical framework and research 
design based in grounded theory. Reflecting Glaser and Strauss’ (1967) founding work on this approach, 
the use of grounded theory invokes expectations around the role of the literature review - namely that 
the theories and assumptions of the literature around the subject of investigation are put aside to the 
maximum extent possible (McGhee et al, 2007). This distance between empirical analysis and the 
literature is intended to maximise the potential for new theory to emerge from empirical analysis, which 
is amongst the central aims of grounded theory (Glaser, 1992). This leads many ‘pure’ grounded 
theorists to engage with the literature only after presenting empirical analysis (Urquhart, 2013: 16).  
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 Whilst the grounded theory approach is central to my analysis, I do not follow the convention 
of ‘pure’ grounded theory regarding the literature review. Rather, as is common in the constructivist 
variant of grounded theory (Charmaz, 2014: 31), I use this chapter to situate my analysis in the literature 
on conflict-induced change in corruption, and to highlight the areas in which the literature is deficient. 
However, consistent with the inductive underpinnings of grounded theory (Urquhart, 2013: 8), I do not 
do so with the aim of producing testable expectations around the effects of conflict on corruption, and 
nor do I focus this thesis on one or more of the theories in the literature. Rather, in Chapters Four to 
Eight, I focus purely on the relationship which emerged through my empirical analysis, and return to 
literature in Chapters Nine and Ten.  
 
2.2 Four theories of conflict-induced change in corruption 
 The literature on conflict-induced change in corruption has grown significantly in the last 
decade. This growth is evident both in the volume of studies of this relationship (Cheng & Zaum, 2008; 
Lindberg & Orjuela, 2014) and the increasingly diverse manner in which it is theorised. However, with 
this growth, the literature has become increasingly fragmented across contexts and levels of inquiry, the 
dimensions of conflict considered significant to corruption and the way corruption is conceptualised. As 
such, in contrast to the literature on the determinants of corruption in general (De Graaf, 2007; Rothstein 
& Teorell, 2015), the literature on conflict-induced change in corruption does not immediately present 
a set of theories and debates in which to situate this thesis.   
 As a first step to defining the contribution of this thesis, in this section I argue that the literature 
on conflict-induced change in corruption is concentrated around the four theories of interaction 
summarised in Table 2.2A. Here, I discuss the approach to corruption underlying each theory, and the 
aspects of conflict with which they are linked. In doing so, I show how the literature has expanded from 
a narrow focus on the exploitation of fragility in conflict to a contextualised and less normative focus 
on the functions of corruption in conflict-affected environments. As I discuss in concluding this section, 
I situate this thesis amongst the emergent segment of the literature on conflict-induced change in 
corruption which challenges the focus on exploitation of fragility and, as I discuss in Sections 2.3 and 
2.4, respond to four specific limitations present in the literature on this relationship.  
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In this section and throughout this thesis, I use the term 'theory' to refer to the common 
underlying explanations of changes in corruption resulting from conflict which are evident in the 
fragmented literature on this topic. While useful in grouping these explanations of change, it should not 
be inferred from the use of the term 'theory' that these are fully abstracted theories of change. Indeed, as 
I discuss throughout this review, the empirical basis of the four ‘theories’ in the literature remains at an 
early stage of development, and evidence of the viability of these explanations across a diverse range of 
contexts is often lacking. The use of the term ‘theory’ in this review and in references to the literature 
throughout this thesis should be understood in the context of these limitations, and is more akin to mid-
level theory based on a small group of cases than a fully abstracted 'grand' theory. 
 
Table 2.2A – Four theories of conflict-induced change in corruption 
[2.2.1] Conflict-Induced Fragility 
Summary Conflict leads to state breakdown, which is exploited for corrupt gain 
Effects of 
Conflict The increasing fragility of state institutions 
Logic of 
Corruption Rational exploitation, which is self-regarding and for financial gain 
Forms of 
Corruption Abuse of budgets and natural resources, cronyism, regulatory avoidance 
Typical Level  Central state elites; armed groups 
[2.2.2] Illiberal Responses to Conflict 
Summary Corruption is used as an informal means of resource distribution with the aim of integrating potential rivals  
Effects of 
Conflict Conflict challenges the hegemony of an established order or set of elite interests 
Logic of 
Corruption Networked & socially contingent exchange; an alternative to violence 
Forms of 
Corruption Patronage and clientelism 
Typical Level  Central state elites; armed groups 
[2.2.3] Conflict Economies 
Summary The breakdown of conventional economic relations in conflict leads to the rise of informal activity, including and supported by corruption 
Effects of 
Conflict 
The decline of the formal economy and the capacity of the state to regulate the 
economy 
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Logic of 
Corruption Networked & socially contingent exchange; a means of coping with conflict 
Forms of 
Corruption 
Bribery, regulatory avoidance, informal taxation and other forms required to 
support informal activity 
Typical Level  Central, regional, local 
[2.2.4] Social Change & Identity 
Summary Conflict changes how corruption is understood and performed by those affected, particularly along identity group lines 
Effects of 
Conflict Increased salience of identity group boundaries 
Logic of 
Corruption Value judgements in social context 
Forms of 
Corruption Routine forms, particularly bribery, and general levels of corruption in society 
Typical Level  Identity groups 
 
2.2.1 Corruption & conflict-induced fragility 
 The first theory of conflict-induced change in corruption common in the literature is the 
exploitation of the fragility of conflict-affected environments. This theory posits that conflict 
undermines the formal institutional capacity of governments, including but not limited to those 
institutions charged with preventing corruption, and that this fragility leads to corrupt exploitation. 
Whilst often implicit, underlying this is an understanding of corruption in principally rationalist terms, 
focusing on the probability of detection and the payoffs available (Khan, 2006). These assumptions are 
rooted in the economic segment of the broader corruption studies literature, particularly the institutional 
economics of corruption in the public sector (De Graaf et al, 2010).  
 The argument that the fragility of states affected by conflict leads to corrupt exploitation frames 
conflict-induced change in corruption as an extreme case of the rational corruption dynamics widely 
associated with developing country contexts (Brinkerhoff, 2007). Some of the specific expressions of 
corruption may be new, with actors exploiting the declining levels of oversight in lucrative sectors such 
as natural resources (Le Billon, 2005; 2014; Rose-Ackerman, 2008), however conflict is seen as 
producing conditions in which the payoffs for corruption can be achieved with lower risk across the 
public sector. As such, in addition to the concentration of conflict-affected states in the lowest ranks of 
metrics such as the Corruption Perceptions Index, this form of conflict-induced change in corruption is 
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commonly evidenced by references to the financial scale of corruption scandals perpetrated across the 
public sector (Andvig, 2008; Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016). 
 In addition to a rational approach of the determinants of corruption, the framing of conflict-
induced change in corruption as the exploitation of fragility reflects a focus on the formal institutional 
capacity of states affected by conflict. Specifically, states affected by conflict are characterised 
principally with reference to the lack of well-functioning formal democratic and economic institutions, 
and contrasted against the ideal of ‘good governance’ (Kaplan, 2008; Zoellick, 2008). This 
understanding of the effects of conflict is rooted in liberal principles, and focuses on the deficits of 
conflict-affected states from the institutional capacity deemed necessary for stability (Boege et al, 2009; 
Smith, 2014). As I discuss in Section 2.2.2, alternatives to this focus on fragility in how conflict-affected 
states are imagined have been central to the broadening of the literature on conflict-induced change in 
corruption, and with this the development of alternative theories of this relationship.  
 The specific dimensions of fragility that scholars link with corruption is diverse across the many 
works which theorise conflict-induced change in corruption in this way. A focus on corruption amongst 
government officials in conflict-affected fragile states is common, but corrupt exploitation is also a 
widespread component of studies of armed group behaviour. As was particularly prominent during the 
wave of scholarship on the ‘new’ wars (Kaldor, 2013), corruption is a common component of what is 
framed as greed-driven or ‘loot-seeking’ activity by non-state armed groups (Collier, 2000). This spans 
the levying of informal taxation to the international smuggling of natural resources (Le Billon, 2001; 
Mac Ginty, 2004; Williams, 2009). In contrast to how this has been framed by works on neo-patrimonial 
governance and conflict economies (De Waal, 2009; Goodhand, 2004; 2008), it is the weakness of the 
state in the chaos of conflict which is argued to be the principal driver of this behaviour.  
 Empirically, the framing of conflict-induced change in corruption as the exploitation of fragility 
has principally been driven by studies of state collapse during periods of violence. The many instances 
of post-Cold War civil conflict in ‘fragile’ African state contexts have been central to this as examples 
in which the state was deemed to be particularly chaotic and vulnerable to exploitation. Studies of such 
contexts commonly emphasise the corrupt exploitation of resource wealth and opportunities for illicit 
cross-border trade as the capacity of the state declines (O’Donnell, 2008; Rose-Ackerman, 2008; 2008a; 
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Smillie, 2010). This focus has often been the default approach in assessing conflict-era corruption 
dynamics, and has been particularly influential in policy-orientated works (The Sentry, 2015; 
Transparency International, 2014; UNDP, 2010).  
 In addition to studies of ongoing conflict, the corrupt exploitation of fragility is also widely 
referenced in the peacebuilding literature. As with corruption during conflict, corruption in 
peacebuilding settings is commonly explained through reference to a ‘state of exception’, in which the 
formal capacity of the state is argued to be particularly low (Galtung, 2004; Cheng & Zaum, 2011). This 
fragility is widely invoked to explain the rise of corruption in response to the influx of aid and rapid 
institutional reforms common to transitional contexts (Divjak & Pugh, 2008; Johnsøn, 2016; Von 
Billerbeck, 2011). This is prominent in explanations of the scope of corruption emerging through 
international peacebuilding interventions in Iraq, Afghanistan and Bosnia (Barma, 2012; Donais, 2003; 
Marquette & Cooley, 2015; Zürcher, 2012), the experiences of which explain much of the ongoing 
prominence of this theory of conflict-induced change in corruption.   
 As I discuss below, much of the recent scholarship on conflict-induced change in corruption has 
developed out of criticisms of the focus on exploitation and fragility. This has both supported and has 
been driven by debates over the concept of fragility (Boege et al, 2009; De Waal, 2009a) and the 
increasing diversity of theoretical perspectives in the corruption studies literature (Philp, 2015). 
However, in policy-orientated publications and the peacebuilding literature in particular, it remains 
common to see conflict-induced change in corruption framed in these terms. This reflects the ongoing 
influence of economic rationalism and the focus on the public sector in the corruption studies literature 
(Walton, 2015), and the concept of fragility in the study of conflict and peacebuilding (Grimm et al, 
2014), despite well-established critiques of both.  
 
2.2.2 Corruption & illiberal responses to conflict 
 The focus on fragility as the main determinant of corruption in conflict reflects a rationalist 
construction of corruption, and a focus on the institutional deficits of conflict-affected states. The 
frequency with which conflict-induced corruption is described in these terms reflects the past dominance 
of liberal assumptions in the study of conflict and peacebuilding, under which long-term stability is 
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achieved through democratisation and economic liberalisation (Soares De Oliveira, 2011). The theory 
of conflict-induced change in corruption which I discuss here, and the two which follow, reflect 
challenges to these assumptions. The first of these frames corruption as an ‘illiberal’2 response to conflict 
by elites attempting to create or sustain order.  
 At its core, the second theory of conflict-induced change in the literature frames corruption as 
a means of informal resource distribution. Most commonly associated with networked forms of 
corruption such as patronage and clientelism (Johnston, 1986), an illicit flow of resources is argued to 
rent the support of those who are or may otherwise challenge a given order. In addition to the integration 
of peripheral rivals by a central state (Day & Reno, 2014; De Waal, 2009), this is a commonly discussed 
aspect of warlord governance in conflict-affected sub-state areas (Jackson, 2003; Mac Ginty, 2010; 
Mukhopadhyay, 2014). The focus in describing change in corruption is therefore not on the exploitation 
of fragility, but rather on the means by which elites purposefully engage informal mechanisms of 
resource distribution as a response to conflict (Zaum, 2013: 17). 
 Rather than an isolated act in response to conflict, analysis of networked forms of corruption as 
an illiberal response to conflict is rooted in works on the routine function of states with limited formal 
institutional capacity. Central to this are notions ‘neo-patrimonial’ or ‘rentier’ forms of governance, in 
which “political life can be described as an auction of loyalties” (De Waal, 2009: 103) between the 
centre and rivals at the periphery (Basedau & Lay, 2009; Erdmann & Engel, 2007). Rather than purely 
financial, these dynamics are seen as the product of a wider social and economic order, which may grant 
elites differing capacities to integrate rivals across group lines (Day & Reno, 2014; Khan, 2005). 
Corruption is therefore theorised as a contextually-contingent, deliberate, and ongoing component of a 
prevailing order, which is influenced by but not necessarily the sole product of conflict.  
 The focus on the capacity of corruption to act as an alternative means of resource distribution, 
and therefore as a stabilising mechanism in response to conflict, is rooted in some of the earliest works 
of the modern study of corruption.  Amongst the behavioural approach prominent in the 1950s and 60s 
(Navot, 2014), works by Huntington (1968), Nye (1967), and Scott (1969) in particular discussed 
 
2 Here, ‘illiberal’ signifies a departure from liberal norms, rather than authoritarian practices. See Smith, 2014  
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networked forms of corruption as potentially integrative elements of political systems. These works 
framed corruption as an alternative to unstable elite competition - including violence - with Huntington 
(1968) in particular arguing that corruption and violence are functionally similar. Recent scholarship on 
corruption as an illiberal response to conflict therefore represents a return to the emphasis on the 
integrative potential of corruption in the early corruption studies literature.  
 Whilst much of the study of neo-patrimonial governance and similar concepts focuses on the 
routine political economy of states with low formal institutional capacity (Charap & Harm, 1999; De 
Sardan, 1999; Staniland, 2012), a growing body of work explicitly explores these corruption dynamics 
as a response to conflict. In addition to demonstrating the recourse to patronage as a means of managing 
threats to an existing order, this literature links conflict to the degeneration and decentralisation of 
patronage networks where conflict displaces an established order (De Waal, 2009; Le Billon, 2005; 
Reno, 1995; 2008; Day & Reno, 2014). This links conflict to changes in the composition of elites 
benefitting from patronage, the level of competition between elites, and the nature and extent of benefits 
which are traded. As works by Reno (2008), Garrett et al (2009) and Raeymaekers (2013) exemplify, 
conflict is therefore argued to have the potential to result in patterns of patronage fundamentally distinct 
from the pre-conflict order, and which persist beyond the conflict itself.    
 In addition to the effects of ongoing conflict, the study of illiberal responses to conflict explicitly 
links the way in which conflict ends to changes in corruption. Most prominently, scholars link attempts 
at post-conflict power sharing to the ongoing structure of patronage networks. This is widely highlighted 
in cases of internationally-led peacebuilding (Belloni & Strazzari, 2014), as well as an extensive body 
of cases of state-led illiberal peacebuilding (Lindberg & Orjuela, 2011; Reno, 2008; Soares de Oliveria, 
2011). Studies of post-2001 Afghanistan have (Bojicic-Dzelilovic et al, 2015; Giustozzi, 2009; Mac 
Ginty, 2010), for example, demonstrated the willingness of western peacebuilding actors to engage in 
efforts to integrate regional warlords which closely resemble patronage-based strategies of state actors 
in other cases (Cheng & Zaum, 2011; Jarstad & Belloni, 2012; Zaum, 2013). In both types of case, 
efforts to integrate armed groups during and in the immediate aftermath of conflict are linked with long 
term consequences for the composition of patronage by shaping who has access to the state.  
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 The theory of conflict-induced change in corruption through illiberal responses to conflict is 
thus fundamentally apart from the focus on the exploitation of conflict-induced fragility. By focusing 
on how state elites and others respond to the threat posed by conflict rather than on the condition of 
fragility alone, this theory links conflict with the transformation of networked forms of corruption. This 
includes the expansion of patronage networks to include new groups in order to manage peripheral 
threats, the decentralisation of control over patronage where an existing order is displaced, and changes 
in the extent of competition within patronage networks. In contrast to much of the literature on conflict-
induced change in corruption, as I discuss in Section 2.3 below, this is linked with expectations of long 
term changes after the end of conflict.  
 
2.2.3 Corruption & conflict economies 
 The theory of conflict-induced change I discussed in Section 2.2.2 is one of a growing set of 
alternatives to the framing of corruption principally as a means of exploitation, and to the 
characterisation of conflict-affected environments principally in terms of fragility. The third theory of 
conflict-induced change in corruption also stems from challenges to these framings, but does so with a 
focus on the alternative economic systems argued to emerge as a result of conflict. Whilst overlapping 
with aspects of the focus on illiberal governance, this reflects a distinct focus on systems of economic 
relations in conflict, which are not solely tied to attempts by elites to impose order.   
 Studies of informal economic systems typically do so with reference to three inter-connected 
concepts: the combat economy, consisting of armed groups financing their activities, the shadow 
economy, comprised of trade outside of the formal regulations and control of the state but not solely 
driven by combat, and the coping economy, denoting attempts by populations to adapt to the effects of 
conflict (Goodhand, 2004; Looney, 2005). Whilst commonly segmented into these three concepts, 
central to this literature is the inter-connectedness of these domains of activity. This can include the 
integration of low-level coping activity into international illicit trade - with actors with fundamentally 
distinct motives sharing a degree of inter-dependency in the economic structures emergent in conflict 
(Bojicic-Dzelilovic & Turkmani, 2018; Larmer et al, 2013; Pugh et al, 2004).  
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 Whilst studies of conflict-induced change in corruption through conflict economies often 
include reference to exploitative activity (Jackson, 2002; Le Billon, 2001a; Looney, 2008), underpinning 
this link is a broader and less normative conceptualisation of corruption than those underlying the focus 
on exploitation. This framing of corruption is most evident in the focus on coping activity, in which 
engagement in otherwise illegal or morally unacceptable acts is argued to be legitimised by the collapse 
of the formal economy (Goodhand, 2004; Looney, 2005; 2006). Examples of this include bribery, black 
markets and trade in illicit goods, as conflict causes the decline of public services and the collapse of 
conventional livelihoods. This link draws on the characterisation of corruption as a coping mechanism 
in the broader literature (Bodruzic, 2016; Walton, 2013), with conflict forming an extreme example of 
the conditions which compel populations to engage in otherwise unacceptable acts.  
 In describing the effects of conflict, the focus on conflict-induced change in corruption through 
conflict economies draws on the fragility of formal institutions. Indeed, the decline of the formal 
economy and of the capacity of the state to regulate economic activity is argued to be central to the 
coping and informal economies (Looney, 2005; Mac Ginty, 2007). However, as with the focus on 
corruption as an illiberal response to conflict, the systems which develop in response to fragility are 
framed as a means of order-making, rather than primarily as exploitation (Bakonyi & Stuvøy, 2005; 
Strazzari, 2008). Within the coping economy in particular, corruption is instead argued to be shaped by 
the social and economic context, including changing trust, value judgements and inter-communal 
relations (Baaz & Verweijen, 2014; Looney, 2008). Fragility therefore forms the background to changes 
in corruption, but is not the main determinant of corruption emerging through conflict.  
 In addition to the period of ongoing violence, the conflict economies literature links the nature 
of economic relations emerging in conflict to the dynamics of corruption in transition and post-conflict. 
Transitional environments are seen as generating a partial stability, in which elements of conflict-era 
economic dynamics continue (Le Billon, 2003). Armed groups and other elites able to benefit from 
informal economic activity during conflict are seen as most able to engage with this emergent order, and 
with the influx of resources and institutional reforms common to transitional contexts. Consequently, 
the corruption dynamics which arise as a means of order-making in conflict are argued to influence the 
ongoing shape of corruption in the post-conflict period, particularly at the elite level. This is set out in 
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studies of both international (Andreas, 2009; Goodhand, 2008; Looney, 2008) and domestically-led 
transition (Aspinall & Van Klinken, 2011; Baaz & Verweijen, 2014; Raeymaekers, 2013).  
 Like the literature on illiberal responses to conflict, the conflict economies literature reflects a 
framing of corruption as an adaptation to conflict, rather than the exploitation of fragility, and connects 
conflict to corruption dynamics during and after the period of ongoing violence. This expands the 
discussion of illiberal responses to conflict by adding elements of the experiences of conflict-affected 
populations, and elements of the activities of armed groups. The focus on these alternative means of 
order making in conflict is now increasingly common in the study of this relationship, displacing the 
narrow focus on the exploitation of fragility. However, as I discuss in Section 2.3, with this has come 
increasing difficulties over the boundaries between informal and corrupt economic activity.  
 
2.2.4 Corruption, social change & identity 
 The majority of works on conflict-induced change in corruption focus on one of the three 
theories set out above. As I discuss in Section 2.3, the focus on these three theories of conflict-induced 
change in corruption in part reflects the types of conflict-affected context and the level at which this 
relationship is typically analysed, and the residual prevalence of narrow assumptions around the 
determinants of corruption and the impacts of conflict. However, as I now discuss, exceptions to this 
broader trend are evident from a small group of studies which focus on conflict-induced changes in the 
social determinants of corruption.  
 The small group of works which link conflict to the perceptive and social determinants of 
corruption focus on the impacts of conflict on identity group boundaries. These works argue that the 
increasing salience of identity group boundaries in ethnic conflict results in the increasing stratification 
of corruption perceptions along these lines (Orjuela et al, 2016). Rather than the perceptive domain 
alone, the rising salience of identity group boundaries is argued to influence the acceptability of corrupt 
behaviours, with the perceived actions of a corrupt other having the potential to legitimise engagement 
in corrupt activity within one’s own group (Smith, 2014a). Conflict is thus argued to heighten awareness 
of corruption, but in a manner which is partial, and which can lead to further engagement in otherwise 
unacceptable corrupt behaviours.  
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  Consistent with the focus on social and value factors in context, studies which describe conflict-
induced change in corruption through the salience of identity typically do so with a focus on routine 
forms of corruption, particularly bribery in bureaucratic settings (Nystrand, 2014; Orjuela et al, 2016; 
Smith, 2014a). However, there is diversity amongst this small body of works over the extent of these 
effects; Nystrand (2014) argues that routine forms of corruption remained largely unaffected amongst 
conflict-affected populations in northern Uganda, Lindberg & Orjuela (2011) and Orjuela et al (2016) 
describes initially significant but diminishing effects of identity in post-conflict Sri Lanka, and Smith 
(2014a) finds that conflict-induced changes remain central to routine forms of corruption over 30 years 
after the Biafra conflict in Nigeria. The literature thus indicates a high degree of contextual contingency 
of identity-based effects on routine forms of corruption after conflict, and variability in these effects 
over time across different contexts.   
 In addition to the effects on individual perceptions of routine forms of corruption, the small 
body of works which theorise conflict-induced change in corruption through social factors also link 
conflict to perceptions of corruption regarding central governments. In contrast to effects at the micro 
level, there is a greater degree of consensus over perceptive shifts of this form. Works by Nystrand 
(2014), Lindberg & Orjuela (2011) and Smith (2014a) cited above, for example, all highlight the link 
between conflict-induced perceptions of exclusion from the state and perceptions of corruption in central 
government, even where effects at the local level vary. These shared perceptions of corruption in central 
government amongst a marginalised population are also argued to reinforce the salience of these 
boundaries, and form part of the means by which identity is asserted (Smith, 2001; 2014a).  
 The framing of conflict-induced change in corruption through identity reflects the growing 
influence of constructivist and anthropological approaches within the wider corruption studies literature 
as I discuss in Chapter Three (De Graaf et al, 2010a; Shore & Haller, 2005), and the particular focus on 
social trust as a determinant of corruption (Orjuela, 2014; Rothstein, 2013; Uslaner, 2013). As also 
discussed in relation to informal economies in Section 2.2.3, this reflects a framing of networked forms 
of corruption as a particularised form of exchange, in a context in which the salience of identity group 
boundaries through conflict has undermined generalised forms of exchange (Looney, 2008). However, 
the focus of works which assert this link is broader than those specific to informal structures of economic 
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activity (Day & Reno, 2014; Reno, 2008), linking conflict to judgements around corruption outside of 
direct experiences, as well as at the local level.  
 
2.2.5 The theoretical landscape of conflict-induced change in corruption 
 In this section, I have set out the four theories of conflict-induced change in corruption 
expressed in the fragmented literature on this topic: the exploitation of fragility, illiberal responses to 
conflict, conflict economies, and identity-based transformation. Of these four theories, the framing of 
this relationship as a rational exploitation of fragility reflects assumptions on the nature of states in 
conflict and on the determinants of corruption which have previously dominated the literature. These 
assumptions stem from a liberal understanding of the factors necessary for stability (Mac Ginty, 2010; 
De Waal, 2009), and the influence of economic approaches in the wider study of corruption (Khan, 
2006). Given the prevalence of these assumptions, this narrow theory of conflict-induced change in 
corruption is often the default approach, particularly policy settings.  
 Whilst exploitative forms of corruption in fragile institutional settings is an undeniable feature 
of many conflict-affected environments, the three other theories of conflict-induced change in 
corruption in the literature reflect challenges to the assumptions underlying this approach. This includes 
the characterisation of conflict-affected environments principally with reference to the fragility of the 
public sector, and the framing of corruption as principally motived by financial gain. These challenges 
have been driven by developments in the study of alternative orders under conflict and transition (Mac 
Ginty, 2010), and the growing emphasis on the functional dimensions of corruption (Walton, 2013). 
 As I discuss in Chapter Four, I engage a grounded theory approach to researching conflict-
induced change in corruption. This approach requires theoretical development is driven by an inductive 
logic, rather than through deductive engagement with the literature. Given this, I do not set out with the 
intention of testing one or more of the four theories of conflict-induced change in corruption evident in 
the literature, but instead adopt a research design guided by the principal of emergence (Kelle, 2007). 
However, this thesis is aligned with the broad body of works which challenge prescriptive notions on 
the determinants of corruption in conflict-affected settings, and the aspects of conflict which are 
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significant to corruption. This includes, but is not limited to, the stabilising and supportive potential of 
corruption in settings with limited formal institutional capacity.  
 
2.3 The four limitations of the literature on conflict-induced change in corruption 
 In the discussion above, I set out the four theories of conflict-induced change in corruption in 
the literature and situated my analysis among the broad body of works which challenge prescriptive 
assumptions on the determinants of corruption and the impacts of conflict. Building on this, here I set 
out the limitations of the literature to which this thesis responds. These are first, the types of conflict-
affected contexts on which the literature has tended to focus; second, limits on the time period in which 
this relationship has typically been analysed; third, comparative lack of attention to the experiences of 
conflict-affected populations and finally, limits on the level of conceptual depth applied to corruption.  
 
2.3.1 The focus on collapsed states and international intervention 
 As a whole, the literature on conflict-induced changes in corruption is based on empirical 
material from diverse range of conflict-affected contexts. However, the works which have driven 
developments in the four theories of this relationship I discussed in Section 2.2 draw on a relatively 
narrow subset of examples of conflict globally. In particular, developments in the study of this 
relationship have been driven by the study of conflicts with one or both of the following characteristics:  
 First, much of the literature on conflict-induced change in corruption analyses cases of western-
led international peacebuilding. Analysis of conflict in Bosnia in the 1990s (Andreas, 2009; Donais, 
2003; Divjak & Pugh, 2008) and in Iraq and Afghanistan in the 2000s (Goodhand, 2004; Looney, 2006; 
Mac Ginty 2010) has been particularly influential in how conflict-induced change in corruption is 
theorised. Second, theoretical development around this relationship has been driven by ‘extreme’ 
examples of conflict, in which the state has been displaced through western military intervention, or in 
which conflict caused an already fragile state to collapse. In addition to the prominence of post-
intervention Iraq and Afghanistan, studies of the Democratic Republic of Congo and Liberia are 
particularly prominent (Jackson, 2002; Raeymaekers, 2013; Reno, 2008).  
 The prominence of ‘extreme’ and internationalised conflicts in the study of conflict-induced 
change in corruption has meant that much of the emphasis in analysing these cases has been on 
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explaining the successes and failings of intervention, of which corruption is one element. The focus is 
therefore on those forms of corruption which are judged to be pertinent to stability, with analysis of 
conflict-induced change in corruption emerging as an element of this, but not the focus in itself. In 
addition to the prominence given to the exploitation of fragility, this is evident in the framing of debates 
around illiberal responses to conflict and conflict economies with reference to their impacts on stability, 
rather than on conflict-induced change in its own right (see, for example, Donais, 2003).  
 In addition to the focus on stability, the dominance of cases of internationalised and ‘extreme’ 
conflict has given particular prominence to exploitative forms of corruption. Exacerbated by the influx 
of aid and the speed of transition attempted, the Afghan, Iraqi and Bosnian interventions were 
characterised by large-scale corruption in the government institutions developed as part of intervention. 
Reflecting both the financial scale and the direct connection to elements of western-led peacebuilding 
intervention, these forms of corruption have been a particular point of emphasis in studies of conflict-
induced change. This focus on exploitation has been challenged by studies of illiberal responses to 
conflict and conflict economies, however a focus on corruption of aid and the capture of political reforms 
has been central to how this relationship is analysed (see, for example, Divjak & Pugh, 2008).  
 The dominance of extreme and internationalised conflicts also means that much of the literature 
has developed through the study of cases where corruption was already part of the ‘normal’ way in 
which the state maintained order, and in which informal economic activity was a routine part of everyday 
life. The literature which frames conflict-induced change in corruption through illiberal responses to 
conflict and conflict economies is thus built principally on examples in which these structures 
degenerated through conflict and were restructured, but not in which these corruption dynamics emerged 
through conflict (see, for example, Reno, 2008). It also means that the study of these dynamics is driven 
by cases in which they have failed to maintain order and have been transformed, rather than cases in 
which they have endured and been reasserted.  
 The examination of cases of international intervention in conflict and cases of state collapse 
through conflict has defined much of the study of conflict-induced change in corruption, including 
innovative work on illiberal responses to conflict and conflict economies. However, the dominance of 
cases of this type has also skewed the understanding of this relationship towards those forms of 
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corruption relevant to western-led peacebuilding operations and to stability in general, rather than a 
focus on the dynamics of corruption alone. Comparatively less is known about this relationship in cases 
without intervention, and in which the state remained functional throughout the conflict. As I discuss in 
Section 2.4, my focus on conflict-induced change in corruption in Nepal is in part a response to this 
limitation of the literature.  
 
2.3.2 The focus on ongoing conflict and immediate transition 
 The second limitation of the literature on conflict-induced change in corruption is the neglect 
of the long term dynamics of this relationship in favour of either the dynamics of corruption in cases of 
ongoing conflict or the immediate conflict to post-conflict transition. This concentration is evident in 
studies diverse in the assumptions around conflict and corruption discussed in Section 2.2 and in part 
reflects the concentration of the effects under examination during conflict and early transition. However, 
it is also driven by the underlying assumptions of the literature. In particular, it reflects the extent to 
which conflict-induced change in corruption has been examined as part of efforts to assess the impact 
of corruption on stability and, moreover, the focus on contexts in which interventions have taken place. 
This has led to a preponderance of studies of the periods in which interventions are concentrated.  
 The focus of studies of conflict-induced change in corruption on the period in which violence 
is ongoing means that comparatively less is known about the long term ramifications of conflict for 
corruption during periods of stability. This is significant because, with the exception of the relatively 
extreme cases of conflict I discussed in Section 2.3.1, large scale conflict is typically the exception rather 
than the rule (UCDP, 2019). Similarly, the intensity of aid influx and institutional reforms commonly 
associated with international intervention are convincingly linked to corruption in transition, but this 
form of transition is in itself exceptional (Kreutz, 2010). How the corruption emergent in an exceptional 
period in the history of a state and in the experience of a population continue to affect corruption long 
after the end to conflict is therefore a significant but under explored aspect of this relationship.  
 The concentration of studies of conflict-induced change in corruption on the period of ongoing 
conflict or immediate conflict to post-conflict transition is evident across the four theories discussed in 
Section 2.2, but is particularly evident in the case of perceptive shifts and conflict economies. As I 
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discussed in Section 2.2.4, the ethnicisation of corruption perceptions is linked to long term dynamics 
of ethnic identity (Nystrand, 2014; Orjuela et al, 2016; Smith, 2014a). However, with the exception of 
Smith’s (2014a) study, studies of this relationship have focused on the period of ongoing conflict and 
the period of transition in which issues of identity were particularly salient. Similarly, in studies of 
conflict economies, the extent to which ‘coping’ activity and engagement in the informal economy 
continues to shape behaviours after a period of crisis remains largely unexplored, in favour of a focus 
on these effects during periods of violence (Goodhand, 2004; Larmer et al, 2013; Raemaekers, 2013).  
 The question of if and how conflict transforms corruption in the long term is thus a 
comparatively under-explored aspect of this relationship. The literature specific to this link and the 
broader literature on the determinants of corruption support a diverse set of expectations about the form 
such long term changes may take. However, given the diverse set of dynamics evident in the literature, 
how this may play out in any individual case is far from clear. As I discuss in Section 2.4, this thesis 
responds to the lack of attention to the long term dimensions of this relationship. This is reflected both 
in the selection of Nepal as a case of conflict-induced change in corruption, and in the use of grounded 
theory as a means of exploring the potential long term dynamics of this relationship.   
 
2.3.3 The focus on states, groups and systems 
 The third limitation of the literature on conflict-induced change in corruption is the extent to 
which development of this relationship has been driven by studies of the state and group levels, rather 
than in the direct experience of conflict-affected populations. Much of the analysis of exploitation of 
fragility and of illiberal responses to conflict in particular have focused on how these corruption 
dynamics impact the stability of the state, and have been driven principally by a focus on stability at this 
central level (Reno, 2008). Further, whilst elements of the conflict economies literature consider 
corruption as a form of coping for populations (Baaz & Verweijen, 2014; Goodhand, 2004; Looney, 
2008), the experiences of those exposed to conflict is a relatively minor part of the broader study of 
alternative economic systems during and after conflict.  
 Studies of changes in the social determinants of corruption discussed in Section 2.2.4 are the 
exception to the broader focus in the literature on changes in corruption above the level of individual 
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experiences. However, in addition to the relatively small number of studies of this type, this segment of 
the literature is focused primarily on identity-based transformations on corruption. Indeed, the three 
prominent examples of studies of change in the perceptive and social determinants of corruption 
discussed above - Lindberg & Orjuela (2014), Orjuela et al (2016) and Smith (2014a) - focus on cases 
of ethnic conflict, and on ethnic minority populations in particular. The question of changes in these 
determinants of corruption amongst non-minority ethnic populations, and populations affected by non-
ethnic conflict, thus remains open.  
 In addition to the number of conflicts which are not principally stratified along ethnic lines, the 
focus on ethnicity in studies of conflict-induced change in the social determinants of corruption is 
significant because of the number of other social determinants of corruption evident in the wider 
corruption studies literature. This includes, for example, variations in the engagement in and attitudes 
towards corruption based on levels of education, gendered social attitudes, and religious values 
(Marquette, 2012; Stensöta et al, 2015; Truex, 2011), many of which overlap with the effects of armed 
conflict highlighted in the wider literature. These factors have increasingly come to the fore with recent 
developments in the wider corruption studies literature which I discuss in Chapter Three. However, they 
are largely absent from the study of conflict-induced change in corruption.  
 This thesis builds on the outcomes of the small group of studies which focus on the social 
determinants of corruption at the population level, and reflects the gaps still evident in this segment of 
the literature. As I discuss further in Section 2.4, these influences are evident in the level at which I 
examine conflict-induced change in corruption in Nepal and the constructivist approach I engage to 
study the nature and determinants of corruption.   
 
2.3.4 The limits of conceptual development around corruption 
 The final limitation of the literature on conflict-induced change in corruption to which this thesis 
responds is the manner in which corruption is defined. Across the literature, two sets of issues are 
common: First, there is a tendency to rely on narrow and prescriptive definitions of corruption, which 
focus on public office and private gain. This is particularly evident in the segment of the literature which 
frames conflict-induced change in corruption as the exploitation of fragility, which is overwhelmingly 
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focused on the public sector. However, it is widespread across the theories of this relationship (see, for 
example, Divjak & Pugh, 2008; Donais, 2003). Second, amongst those who have argued for alternatives 
to this theory of conflict-induced change in corruption, the boundary between corruption and concepts 
such as patronage and clientelism is often vaguely expressed. This leads to issues over the boundary 
between corruption and informal but legitimate modes of exchange.  
 Taking these issues in turn, the focus of much of the literature on conflict-induced change in 
corruption on the public sector reflects broader trends in the corruption studies literature. As I discuss 
in Chapter Three, definitions of corruption based on the ‘misuse of public office for private gain’ have 
for decades been the principal manner in which this concept has been approached (Philp, 2008). Within 
the study of conflict-induced change in corruption, the prominence of this and similar definitions also 
reflects the influence of liberal principles in how this relationship is understood. Specifically, the focus 
on the quality of formal institutions of political and economic governance as a means of achieving peace 
and stability has led to the focus on corruption in or surrounding the public sector (Zaum, 2013).  
 In addition to meaning that comparatively less is known about conflict-induced change in 
corruption outside of the public sector, the imposition of narrow definitions of corruption based on 
public office and private gain supports the ongoing focus on exploitation of fragility in the literature. 
Indeed, even where ‘abuse’ is not specified in the definition employed, this definition intuitively lends 
itself to the exploitative forms of conflict-induced corruption, over those which highlight the supportive 
or stabilising dynamics of corruption (Walton, 2013a). This, along with the focus on the fragility of 
conflict-affected states, rather than on the alternative coping strategies adopted by elites during conflict, 
lends prominence to this model of conflict-induced change in corruption over the other three models.  
 As I discussed in Section 2.2, the three alternative models of conflict-induced change in 
corruption in part reflect critiques of the narrowness of the focus on the exploitation of fragility, as well 
as the wider focus of the peacebuilding literature on illiberal orders. As such, across the studies which 
propose these alternative theories of interaction, alternatives to narrow definitions of corruption based 
on the misuse of public office for private gain are widespread (see, for example, Baaz & Verweijen, 
2014; Smith, 2014a). Reflecting the developments in the wider corruption studies literature discussed 
in Chapter Three, this has broadened the set of acts and determinants considered relevant to corruption. 
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However, whilst central to the development of the three alternative theories, this has led to complexities 
over how concepts such as patronage and clientelism relate to corruption.  
 In the literature on illiberal responses to conflict and conflict economies in particular, much of 
the emphasis is on networked forms of corruption, particularly patronage. As I discussed in Section 
2.2.2 and 2.2.3, scholars focus on these forms of corruption because they offer an informal means of 
resource distribution which are capable of integrating otherwise competing elites and supporting the 
basic needs of conflict-affected populations. However, whilst central to the growth of the study of 
conflict-induced change in corruption, within these studies the relationship between corruption and 
concepts such as patronage and clientelism is often not directly discussed. Indeed, in some instances 
references to corruption are absent, with the discussion instead focusing purely on these related concepts 
(see, for example, De Waal, 2009; Day & Reno, 2014), whilst otherwise closely comparable studies 
directly engage the concept of corruption (see, for example, Goodhand, 2004).  
 The lack of conceptual clarity in studies of corruption as an illiberal response to conflict by 
elites and in the context of conflict economies means that integrating these effects with the other theories 
of change in the literature is complex. Indeed, it may be questioned whether these effects share anything 
in common with the more exploitative forms of conflict-induced corruption through fragility, which are 
based in a more conventional conceptualisation of corruption. In addition to the relatively recent growth 
of direct inquiry into this relationship, these conceptual issues explain the ongoing fragmentation of the 
literature across the four theories set out in Section 2.3.3. It also raises questions over the extent to which 
the concepts engaged in the literature resonate with those in the conflict-affected contexts studied.   
 
2.3.5 The growth and limits of the literature on conflict-induced change in corruption 
 The literature on conflict-induced change in corruption is increasingly diverse, and in the last 
decade in particular has moved beyond the narrow focus on fragility. With this has come advances in 
the study of this relationship, including increased attention to changes in corruption outside of central 
governments (Looney, 2008), evidence of the stabilising capacity of corruption (Day & Reno, 2014), 
and evidence of complex social dynamics (Orjuela et al, 2016). However, as I have argued here, four 
limitations are present in the increasingly fragmented body of inquiry into this relationship. These 
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limitations are not without exception but rather reflect the cases, levels and dynamics of this relationship 
which have been at the centre of inquiry as the literature has expanded, and which are reflected in the 
theories of conflict-induced change in corruption dominant in the literature. In the section to follow, I 
discuss how this thesis reflects and responds to these four limitations of the literature, and the wider 
need for theoretical development and consolidation in the study of this relationship.  
   
2.4 The contribution of this thesis 
 The focus of this thesis on conflict-induced change in corruption in Nepal, and elements of my 
approach to investigating this relationship, are a response to the limitations of the literature I set out 
above. Here, I compare the patterns of conflict and peacebuilding in Nepal to the cases which have 
shaped the literature on this relationship, highlighting areas in which this case is divergent. Following 
this, I discuss how the limitations of literature are reflected in the level of my analysis and conceptual 
approach. Throughout, I focus on the link from the literature to the broad approach taken in this thesis,  
the details of which are set out in Chapters Three and Four.  
 
2.4.1 Nepal as a divergent case of conflict-induced change in corruption 
 Across the four limitations of the literature on conflict-induced change in corruption, the types 
of cases which scholars have focused upon has a central role. As I set out in Section 2.3, cases of state 
collapse, western-led peacebuilding, and cases in which violence is ongoing have been central to the 
development of theory around this relationship. The consequences of this include the focus on 
exploitative forms of ‘crisis’ corruption, occurring through large scale intervention in extreme fragile 
state environments, still affected by armed group violence. My focus on Nepal reflects an intention to 
analyse this relationship in conditions divergent from those which dominate the literature.  
 The 1996-2006 Maoist insurgency in Nepal, and the period of peacebuilding and transition 
which has followed is distinct from the types of cases which dominate the study of conflict-induced 
change in corruption in three respects: First, whilst enduring two periods of direct rule by the then King 
Gyanendra (Ganguly & Shoup, 2005), the central state in Nepal largely continued to function throughout 
the decade of conflict. This resilience of the state reflects the fact that, whilst effective in disrupting 
local government across the majority of rural areas, the Maoists were not able to consolidate control 
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over urban centres, in which the presence of the state was concentrated (Gobyn, 2009). This is true both 
of the central government in Kathmandu and across the urban headquarters of the 75 Districts, none of 
which were subject to sustained Maoist control (Thapa, 2012). Nepal is thus apart from the examples of 
state collapse in Afghanistan, Iraq, the DRC and others which have driven the development of the 
literature on conflict-induced change in corruption.  
 Second, in further contrast to cases which have dominated the literature on conflict-induced 
change in corruption, Nepal was not the subject of a large scale external intervention. Rather, Nepal’s 
conflict ended by a negotiated settlement between the Maoist leadership and an alliance of political 
parties, in the context of military stalemate and the political pressure created by King Gyanendra’s 2005 
coup (Martin, 2012; Whitfield, 2012). This negotiated settlement resulted in an interim constitutional 
agreement, under which two elected Constituent Assemblies oversaw political transition from a 
constitutional monarchy to a federal democratic republic (Edrisinha, 2018), and the integration of 
elements of the PLA into a reformed Nepal Army (Wagle & Jackson, 2015; Subedi, 2018). The 
international community played a limited supporting role in this Nepali-led process through the United 
Nations Mission in Nepal and bilateral engagement from India (Jha, 2012),  
 Third, rather than being a case of ongoing armed group violence, Nepal has transitioned to a 
relatively stable democracy in which contestation over the control and nature of the state increasingly 
expressed through democratic means. Central to this has been the transition of the Maoists from an 
armed insurgency into mainstream party politics. Since 2008, the Maoist party has participated in largely 
transparent elections at the central and local levels and entered into coalitions with political parties which 
were previously amongst the primary targets of PLA violence (Ishiyama & Batta, 2011; Osterman, 
2018). The Nepali state has also proven resilient to a number of localised outbreaks of violence since 
2006, including violent objections to the proposed federal boundaries by some Terai communities and 
limited attempts by dissident Maoist groups to disrupt  national level elections (Strasheim, 2018). 
 My focus on conflict-induced change in corruption in Nepal thus contributes a further study of 
this relationship outside of conditions of western peacebuilding interventions, as is increasingly 
common in the literature. However, unlike the majority of studies of this relationship, Nepal is also a 
case in which the conflict did not cause the state to collapse, and in which conflict has been followed by 
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a domestically-led and largely successful process of democratisation and reform. Analysis of this case 
therefore offers the opportunity to examine and refine the theoretical propositions in the literature under 
a contrasting set of conditions, and with this the potential for theoretical development.  
 
2.4.2 Theoretical development at the sub-national level 
 In addition to my focus on Nepal, the level and context of analysis in this thesis also reflects 
lesser explored areas of conflict-induced change in corruption. As I discussed in Section 2.3, the 
relatively small number of studies which focus on the sub-national level examine change amongst 
identity groups or informal economic systems. How conflict impacts corruption at the sub-national level 
outside of these dynamics has not been the subject of the depth of analysis seen in these circumstances. 
My focus in this thesis reflects this in two ways.  
 First, Nepal’s conflict was not principally stratified along ethnic identity lines. Rather, whilst 
the Maoists tailored their appeals to historically marginalised communities, particularly those subject to 
caste discrimination, minority ethnolinguistic groups, and indigenous communities (Eck, 2009), their 
ideology focused on poverty, and what they described as the feudal structure of political power from 
which it stemmed (Bhushan, 2016). The conflict thus saw the mobilisation of diverse marginalised 
populations across the rural areas in which the Maoist presence was consolidated (Murshed & Gates, 
2005). This contrasts to the comparatively binary identity conflicts in Sri Lanka and Nigeria which, as 
I discussed in Section 2.3, have been central to the development of elements of the literature on conflict-
induced change in corruption in the social domain.  
 In addition to the character of the conflict in Nepal, the specific sub-national context I consider 
also reflects my intention to study the sub-national dynamics of conflict-induced change in corruption, 
outside of conditions stratified by identity boundaries. Specifically, I analyse the experiences of a city 
population of diverse caste, ethnic and linguistic backgrounds (NepalMap, 2018), and one which was 
not at the centre of disputes over federal boundaries. These disputes were in some areas stratified across 
identity boundaries relating to the Madhesi identity (Paudel, 2016), but did not affect the western Terai 
area in which Ghorahi is situated. I discuss the process by which I selected Ghorahi as an example of 
this and the specific features of the population with which I engaged in Chapter Four.  
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 Second, I adopt a grounded theory approach to analysing the effects of conflict on corruption. 
Whilst compatible with analysis of identity-based effects, conflict economies and exploitation 
individually, this approach also facilitates analysis of the multiple potential dynamics of this relationship 
which may concurrently affect a given population. In addition to expanding the set of dynamics within 
each of the four theories in the literature, through this approach I am also able to consider the relative 
significance of each. By comparison, studies of this relationship have tended to only consider one of 
these four theories of conflict-induced change in corruption, and the literature as a whole has given little 
attention to the long term prominence of these effects at the sub-national level.  
 
2.5 Summary 
 In this chapter, I set out the four theories of conflict-induced change in corruption which 
characterise the literature on this topic, discussed four limitations of this literature, and set out how these 
limitations influenced the design and focus of this thesis. As I argued in Section 2.2, much of the 
literature on conflict-induced change in corruption is driven by a focus on the ‘fragile’ nature of conflict-
affected states, and a narrow framing of the nature of and incentives for corruption. The increasingly 
widespread challenges to these assumptions has led to a broadening of how this relationship is 
understood; comprising of a focus on illiberal responses to conflict, conflict economies, and social 
change in conflict. This thesis is situated amongst the set of works which challenge narrow assumptions 
around this relationship, but does not seek to test or develop any specific theory.  
 Rather than examining any single or combination of the theories of conflict-induced change in 
corruption evident in the literature, this thesis responds to the four limitations of the literature set out in 
Section 2.3. Here, I argued that the literature has been shaped by the analysis of cases of international 
intervention and state collapse, and periods of immediate conflict to post-conflict transition or in which 
violence is ongoing. As discussed in Section 2.4, this thesis offers an alternative to this through the focus 
on Nepal; a case in which the state did not collapse, where the conflict was not defined by a clash of 
identity groups, in which conflict was resolved through a domestically-led peacebuilding process, and 
in a period in which the country has achieved relative stability. I use this divergent case to examine the 
four theories in the literature, and the potential for alternative links within and in addition to these.  
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 The contribution of this thesis however goes beyond analysing and refining the current set of 
theories of conflict-induced change in corruption in isolation. Rather than the often fragmented character 
of the literature on conflict-induced change in corruption, which has led the four theories of this 
relationship to largely be considered in isolation of each other, I explain the relative prominence of these 
effects over time. This comparative element of my analysis is facilitated by the use of constructivist 
grounded theory. In Chapter Three, I set out the ontological and epistemological features of this 
approach to corruption and, in Chapter Four, discuss the implementation of this approach through 
Constructivist Grounded Theory 
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Chapter Three: Theoretical approach  
3.1 Introduction 
 In Chapter Two, I referenced the diverse treatment of corruption in studies of conflict-induced 
change and the consequences of this for how this relationship is theorised. Across the literature, this 
spans the focus on exploitative corruption in the public sector (Rose-Ackerman, 2008a; Rose-Ackerman 
& Palifka, 2016a) to the use of patronage as an integrative means of informal resource distribution (Day 
& Reno, 2014; DeWaal, 2009), both of which are grouped under this single concept. In addition to the 
diverse forms of corruption linked to conflict, this points to a seemingly intractable complexity at the 
heart of the corruption studies literature – the debate over the nature of corruption itself. It is to this 
ontological question, and to epistemology, which I now turn.  
 Building on the conceptual discussion in Chapter Two, in this chapter I set out the constructivist 
ontological approach and subjectivist epistemology underlying my analysis of conflict-induced change 
in corruption in Nepal. To do so, I first discuss the myriad challenges associated with conceptualising 
corruption and the seemingly intractable set of debates over definition which divide the literature. 
Second, I critique the trend  in the academic and policy literatures which focuses on the establishment 
of universal and objective standards of corruption. Drawing on this critique, I then introduce the 
principles of constructivist ontology and subjectivist epistemology, and justify the application of these 
principles to the analysis of conflict-induced change in corruption in Nepal.  
 As I discuss in Chapter Four, I implement the constructivist ontology and subjectivist 
epistemology set out in this chapter through a research design and methodology based in Constructivist 
Grounded Theory (CGT). A summary of these three approaches is given in Diagram 3.1A overleaf. 
Whilst influenced in part by the context upon which this thesis is focused, in this chapter I justify the 
constructivist position primarily by engaging with a long-running set of debates in the corruption studies 
literature. I address the practical implications of the theoretical positions discussed in this chapter as part 
of the discussion of constructivist grounded theory in Chapter Four.  
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Diagram 3.1A – Ontology, epistemology and research design 
 
 
3.2 Conceptual debates in the study of corruption 
 The complexity inherent in defining corruption and the array of analytical issues which result 
from this is a well-trodden theme of the corruption studies literature (Brown, 2006; Philp, 2015; 
Rothstein & Varraich, 2017). However, despite the depth and intractability of debates over definition, 
scholars have tended to engage a small number of approaches – most commonly ‘the misuse of public 
office for private gain’. Given the prevalence and influence of this definition in the broad corruption 
studies literature, I devote this section to justifying why I have not engaged this approach or the other 
purportedly universal definitions common in the literature. This discussion informs the justifications for 
the constructivist ontological position which I set out in Section 3.3.  
 
3.2.1 Public office, private gain 
 Whilst the contemporary study of corruption owes much to the behavioural literature of the 
1950s and 60s (Kurer, 2005; Navot, 2014; Warren, 2015), the decades of conceptual development which 
have followed have been primarily influenced by economic and positivist approaches. This influence 
reflects the demand from business and western governments for internationally comparative corruption 
data to inform investment and policy decisions (Brown, 2016), alongside broader trends within the social 
• Corruption is the product of human agency. 
• The nature of corruption acts back on the context in which it is produced, 
and is encountered as objective and outside of human control. 
Constructivist ontology
• Knowledge of corruption is multiple, contested and value-driven. 
• Researching corruption requires inter-subjective engagement between 
researcher and researched. 
Subjectivist epistemology
• An iterative-inductive approach to theoretical development around 
constructed social phenomena.
• Requires the use of theoretical sampling and constant comparison. 
Constructivist grounded theory
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sciences. Whilst the last decade has seen the growth of alternative approaches to the study of corruption 
(De Graaf et al, 2010a), including the constructivist approach which I adopt, the conceptual landscape 
of the corruption studies literature still reflects much of the influence of the positivist social sciences.  
 The influence of economic positivism on the corruption studies literature has driven a long-
running focus on establishing a universally applicable standard of this concept. In addition to reflecting 
the foundationalist ontology common within economics, universality is a common demand of 
internationally comparative analysis (Charron, 2016; Olken, 2009). By far the most common definition 
of corruption which emerged from this trend in the literature is the ‘misuse of public office for private 
gain’ (Bardhan, 2015: 473), a variant of the definition originally proposed by Nye (1967) and 
popularised by Transparency International.3 Whilst semantic variations around this definition are 
common, the focus on the public-private divide as the standard which is violated by a corrupt act has 
been and remains dominant in the study of corruption (Beeri & Navot, 2013; Sequeira, 2012).  
 The appeal of definitions of corruption based on the public-private divide is that they appear to 
provide a clear standard of what precisely is violated by a corrupt act. Whilst intuitively linked to 
bribery, this definition is also not explicitly tied to specific manifestations of corruption, and thus is 
advocated as a suitable means of classifying the diverse range of acts to which the term is routinely 
applied across contexts (Rothstein & Varraich, 2017: 17). The simplicity and definitiveness of this 
standard is also linked to its widespread adoption, particularly when compared to the conceptual 
approaches offered by critical, constructivist and anthropological scholars. The combination of these 
factors is central to the ongoing engagement of this definition, particularly within quantitative analysis 
(See, for example, Liu et al, 2017; Saha & Ali, 2017; Sumaila et al, 2017).  
 While remaining the modal approach in the contemporary corruption studies literature, 
definitions of corruption based in the public-private divide are subject to an increasingly influential body 
of criticism. Elements of this critique are driven by fundamental differences over the nature of 
corruption, which I discuss in introducing the constructivist ontological position I engage in Section 3.3. 
 
3 Nye (1967: 419) defined corruption as ‘Corruption is behavior which deviates from the formal duties 
of a public role because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) pecuniary or 
status gains; or violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private- regarding influence’.  
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However, critiques specific to definitions based on the public-private divide are more widely evident, 
and form a useful precursor to the ontological discussions in Section 3.3.  
 The first critique commonly applied to definitions of corruption based in the public-private 
divide is that, whilst advocated as a universal standard, the distinction between the public and private 
spheres is contextually contingent. Scholars of a range of disciplinary backgrounds have highlighted the 
root of the distinction between the private and the public spheres in Weberian bureaucratic norms 
(Harrison, 2007; Torsello, 2011; Walton, 2015) and western liberal philosophy (Rothstein & Varraich, 
2017: 35). These Weberian norms are far from universally replicated among publics in non-western 
settings (Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Gupta, 1995; Ruud, 2000), and are also variable across the western 
contexts in which they are rooted (Rothstein & Varraich, 2017). These theoretical and empirical works 
represents a fundamental challenge to the claim that this standard is universal.  
 The second common critique of definitions of corruption based in the public-private divide is 
that, even within those western contexts in which Weberian bureaucratic norms are rooted, these 
principles are subject to contestation and revision over time. In addition to evidence of the historical 
contingency of these norms (Harrison, 2007; Shore, 2005), this is evident in the emergence of 
management strategies which emphasise the blurring of the public and the private spheres, resulting in 
a ‘revolving door’ between the political, bureaucratic, media and corporate worlds (Heywood, 2015). 
Far from corrupt, this blurring of the public and the private is advocated as a means of enhancing public 
sector efficiency and reducing corruption (Andersson & Erlingsson, 2012). Developments in the 
literature thus show that the public-private divide exhibits temporal as well as geographical relativity.  
 The body of evidence against the universality of the public-private divide in those western 
contexts in which Weberian bureaucratic norms were formed is increasingly consolidated. However, the 
partiality of this standard is most clearly expressed in studies of developing country contexts, where 
Weberian norms have little historical foundation. Anthropological works on the function of local 
government in cases of low institutional development have, for example, demonstrated the legitimacy 
of forms of exchange commonly likened to patronage and clientelism, under which elites transcend the 
public-private divide (Anjaria, 2011; Bosco, 1992; Gupta, 1995). Evidence of these distinct normative 
landscapes are increasingly engaged to explain the failures of western-led anti-corruption interventions 
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in the developing world, precisely because they have often proceeded on the basis that the public-private 
divide is universal (Brown & Cloke, 2004; Bukovansky, 2002; De Maria, 2008; 2010).  
 Evidence from a range of disciplinary perspectives thus demonstrates the partiality of the public-
private divide as a standard for corruption. Whilst the ‘misuse of public office for private gain’ remains 
the modal approach, the partiality is increasingly acknowledged across the corruption studies literature 
(Friedrich, 2002; Rothstein & Varraich, 2017: 31) and in policy applications (Szarek-Mason, 2010). 
Reflecting this, a number of alternative approaches have been proposed, which are not explicitly 
dependent on the public-private divide. Whilst improving on the classic definition of corruption 
discussed here, as I argue next these alternatives do not establish the universal standard widely sought 
in the corruption studies literature.  
 
3.2.2 Alternative universal definitions 
 Whilst criticisms of definitions of corruption based on the public-private divide increasingly 
influence mainstream scholarship, the demand for universal definitions continues to shape the 
conceptual landscape of the literature. As such, the critique of approaches based on public-private divide 
has led to the proliferation of alternative standards which, like the public-private divide, are advocated 
on the basis that they provide a universal standard which is violated by a corrupt act. Here, I discuss the 
two most prominent of these. Following this, in Section 3.3 I make a general case against  universal 
definitions of corruption, and set out the constructivist ontology which I adopt in this thesis.  
 The specific critiques raised against defining corruption as the misuse of public office for private 
gain has led to the rise of similar but distinct alternatives. Notably, it is now common in academic and 
policy works to see corruption defined as the abuse of ‘entrusted authority’ for private gain, rather than 
the abuse of ‘public office’ specifically (see, for example, Benito et al, 2015; DFID, 2013; Graycar & 
Sidebottom, 2012). In addition to removing the most problematic reference of the classic definition, this 
alternative is inclusive of corruption in the private sector, something which has long been side-lined 
(Navot, 2014). The prominence of this substitution in policy settings in particular has been driven by its 
adoption by Transparency International (2018).  
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 Whilst the shift away from explicit references to public office in universal definitions of 
corruption has expanded scholarly attention towards corruption in the private sector, it is even more 
conceptually problematic than the definition it seeks to replace. The limits of this common alternative 
first reflects the continued reference to ‘private gain’ within this definition (Transparency International, 
2018). This means that the definition retains the character of a distinct private sphere which, as discussed 
above, is far from universal. Second, the substitution of ‘entrusted authority’ in this definition introduces 
even more ambiguity than is present in the original formulation, particularly with regard to authority in 
informal settings. In seeking to clarify this, scholars have either returned to references to public office, 
or have invoked legal standards (Gardiner, 2002), both of which are variable across time and context.  
 The inclusion of legal standards in the definition of corruption has significant precedent in the 
literature, and was amongst the first to be implemented in the study of corruption (Navot, 2015: 1). 
However, the addition of legal standards into the definition of corruption as means of clarifying the 
vague concept of ‘entrusted authority’ is problematic in seeking to establish a universal definition. As 
well as the self-evident variability in corruption-related laws over time and country boundaries (Bratu 
et al, 2017; Schultz & Harutyunan, 2015), inclusion of legal standards opens this approach to distortion 
in contexts where the law acts as a means of protection of elite abuses (Kaufmann & Vicente, 2011; 
Pardo, 2011). This, along with the continuing reliance on the concept of private gain, makes this 
alternative approach equally partial as those explicitly based in the public-private divide.  
 Alongside largely semantic variations of the public-private divide, there have been more 
concerted attempts to establish an alternative universal standard of corruption. Of these, the most 
prominent has come from Rothstein’s (2011; 2014; & Teorell, 2008; & Torsello, 2013; & Varraich, 
2017) work, which defined corruption as the violation of “the norm of impartiality in the exercise of 
public policies and laws” (2014: 735). Critically, this definition does not require impartial treatment of 
all before the state, but rather that, once standards are established through the political process, the 
exercise of these standards is impartial. Like the public-private divide, the logic underlying this approach 
rests on the demands of positivist social science, and concerns over the growing cultural relativism of 
the corruption studies literature (Rothstein, 2014). 
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 The focus on impartiality as the norm which is violated by corruption appears to avoid the 
pitfalls of purportedly universal definitions based on the public-private divide or entrusted authority. 
Notably, whilst compatible with the principles of rational bureaucracy, impartiality is not directly reliant 
on Weberian bureaucratic norms and points more precisely to what is violated by corruption than the 
vague notion of ‘abuse’ in the classic definition. This approach therefore represents a significant step 
forward over definitions based on the public-private divide, which is increasingly adopted only as the 
least-worst universal definition of corruption available to those undertaking ontologically positivist 
analysis (Rose-Ackerman & Palifka, 2016: 7; Sparling, 2018). 
 Despite the step forward represented by defining corruption through impartiality, central to the 
validity of this definition in its own terms is the argument that the norm of impartiality is universally 
accepted. Rothstein also goes further than this, arguing that corruption is understood with a high degree 
of consistency across societies, and that this largely aligns with that of leading anti-corruption 
organisations (Rothstein, 2014: 746; Rothstein & Torsello, 2013). The evidence underlying this claim 
consists of a number of predominantly survey-based cross-national studies, which test the tolerance of 
surveyed populations to corruption in various forms. However, these empirical claims are questionable.    
 Citing an array of survey evidence drawn from India and Sub-Saharan Africa, Rothstein & 
Torsello (2013: 3) claim that those in the developing world “take a very clear stand against corruption 
and [understand] the problem in the same manner as it is understood by for example organizations such 
as the World Bank and Transparency International”. Drawing on this same evidence, they also claim 
that the simultaneous condemnation and practice of bribery and other ‘routine’ forms of corruption 
reflects a collective action problem, rather than one of differing values or understandings of corruption 
itself. These empirical claims are central to the otherwise largely theoretical argument that the norm of 
impartiality provides a universally accepted standard for corruption.  
 In addition to the questions over the narrowness of cross-national surveys and the potential 
influence of social desirability bias on the responses (Friesenbichler et al, 2018), evidence of attitudinal 
variation arising through similar methodologies to those cited by Rothstein places the universality of the 
norm of impartiality in doubt. Studies by Truex (2011) and Walton (2013a), for example, highlight the 
perceived legitimacy of ‘partial’ behaviours by those implementing policy in local government settings, 
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even where similar behaviours by those in central government are considered corrupt. As with the 
public-private divide, this hints at the contextual contingency of the norm of impartiality, and questions 
the ‘clear stand’ against routine forms of corruption suggested by its advocates.  
  Compounding the implications of competing sets of survey evidence, further doubt over the 
universality of a definition of corruption based on impartiality is evident from anthropological analysis. 
In addition to the potential for acts which may be externally labelled corrupt to nonetheless be widely 
legitimate (Anjaria, 2011; Gupta, 1995; Larmour, 2012: 1), anthropological studies have consistently 
demonstrated the positive value judgements which may be associated with the violation of impartiality 
(Ruud, 2000; Smith, 2007). Smith’s (2007) work on the expectations surrounding public officials in 
Nigeria provides a particularly clear demonstration of this, highlighting the negative social implications 
which result from the failure of bureaucrats to favour kin. This is not to say that the impartiality norm 
is not present amongst a majority of those within the diverse set of contexts studied by anthropologists, 
but does provide clear evidence of the legitimacy of partiality in a number of settings.  
 Whilst improving on the classic definition of corruption in theoretical terms, the substitution of 
the public-private divide for ‘impartiality in the exercise of public power’ does not provide a universal 
standard for corruption. Indeed, there is compelling evidence of the contextual contingency of the norm 
of impartiality when applied to all but the most exploitative manifestations of corruption. As I discuss 
when introducing the constructivist position below, this is not to say that impartiality cannot form one 
potential standard by which corruption may be judged, and nor that this or any other definition is false. 
Rather, the critique set out here questions the imposition of this definition for the study of corruption in 
any specific context, based on the expectation that it is universally applicable.  
 
3.2.3 Summary 
 The prospect of a universal conceptual grounding for corruption is one which has innate appeal, 
beyond the demands of the positivistic elements of social science. Indeed, as I discuss in Section 3.4, 
concerns over relativism are one of the key complexities entailed when adopting any approach divergent 
from this, including the constructivist approach which I engage. However, as I have demonstrated in 
this section, the definitions of corruption commonly treated as universal in the literature do not fit this 
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criteria. Given that there has been no rigorous assessment of the extent to which the public-private 
divide, the abuse of entrusted authority or the norm of impartiality is universally accepted by the 
population I study in this thesis, imposing any of these standards would inevitably shape the forms of 
corruption studied. As is often the case in the corruption studies literature, the fact that I am from a 
distinct cultural and social background to those I study magnifies the scope for error likely to result from 
the imposition of any of the approaches discussed here. 
 
3.3 The constructivist approach to corruption 
 In Section 3.2, I discussed why I have not adopted the number of purportedly universal 
definitions of corruption common in the literature. I did so not by rejecting the applicability of these 
definitions in all circumstances, but by critiquing the claim that such definitions are universally 
accepted. Building from this, here I discuss the constructivist approach which I adopt in my analysis of 
conflict-induced change in corruption in Nepal. In contrast to the approaches I discussed above, this 
ontology views corruption as produced by human agency. I discuss this position in three parts: 
 First, I introduce the principles of constructivism and discuss the forms of this broad ontological 
approach. Second, drawing on developments in the corruption studies literature, I set out the case for 
theorising corruption as a social construct. Here, I move from the case against the specific universal 
definition which I discussed above to the case against universal definitions of corruption in general. 
Finally, I discuss the subjectivist epistemology which I engage alongside constructivist ontology. As I 
discuss, this epistemology is not a necessary result of adopting constructivist ontology. Rather, it is 
rooted in the theoretical debates which stratify the corruption studies literature, and the specific demands 
of researching the sub-national dynamics of corruption in Nepal.  
 
3.3.1 The principles and forms of constructivism 
  Constructivist ontology relates the existence of social phenomena to human action, behaviour 
and ideas (Kukla, 2000: 24; Wendt, 1999; 68). Unlike natural phenomena, social phenomena exhibit this 
contingency because they are specific to context, time and “the interlocking beliefs, concepts or theories 
held by actors” (Wendt, 1999: 70). This is expressed through the relations and interactions of humans, 
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to which the existence of the phenomena is tied. Any given form of a social phenomenon is therefore 
not seen as inevitable, but is instead dependent on context, ideas, and interactions (Hacking, 1999: 6).  
 The dependency of social phenomena on human agency is the central ontological claim of 
constructivism. This claim does not, however, imply that individuals or groups have dominion over 
social phenomena, nor that these categorisations are neutral representations of the context. Rather, from 
the perspective of individual agents or groups, social phenomena have the appearance of inevitability 
and objectivity – shaping attitudes, behaviours and the social order. As Berger & Luckmann (1966: 78) 
summarised in amongst the first works on the constructivist position, whilst social phenomena are the 
product of human action, “[t]he product acts back on the producer”. Constructivism thus entails an 
intersubjective view of structure and agency, under which social phenomena emerge from and change 
through human factors, but also come to shape these factors (Burr, 2003) 
 The ontological dependence of social phenomena on human agency, and the reciprocal effects 
of social phenomena back on human agents, are both necessarily assumed in adopting the constructivist 
position. As I discuss below, these conditions are clearly evident in the nature of corruption – a factor 
which is increasingly acknowledged in the corruption studies literature. However, within the 
constructivist position in general, there exists a diverse range of perspectives, from the post-modern or 
‘radical’ constructivism to the ‘moderate’ social variant (Phillips, 1995). The approaches which exist 
along the constructivist continuum are differentiated by two factors:  
 First, constructivist approaches are differentiated by the extent to which constructivism is 
adopted as an epistemological as well as an ontological position. This continuum spans those who, like 
Wendt (1999), engage a purely ontological constructivism alongside epistemic realism and positivism, 
to the epistemological constructivism advocated by Von Glaserfeld (1995; 1998), amongst others. For 
those in the latter category, often termed ‘constructionists’, knowledge “is exclusively an ordering and 
organization of a world constituted by our experience” (Von Glaserfeld, 1984: 24), central to which is 
the study of discourse. However, whilst often tied to interpretivism, the constructivist position does not 
dictate these epistemological decisions (Wendt, 1999: 77).  
 Second, the constructivist position is differentiated by the extent to which material factors are 
seen to determine social phenomena. Whilst consistent with the fundamental nature of social phenomena 
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set out above, social constructivist ontology grants a significant role for material forces. These material 
forces “are not constituted solely by social meanings”, and are seen to define the limits of feasible limits 
and costs of activity (Wendt, 1999: 112). The radical constructivist position rejects this underlying 
determinacy of material forces on social phenomena, and indeed the existence of such forces outside of 
discourse. As I discuss below, I engage the moderate form of constructivism with regard to the role of 
material factors in determining corruption.  
 The distinction between constructivism as an epistemological as well as an ontological position 
and the nature and role ascribed to material forces is fundamental to the nature of constructivist research 
into social phenomena. However, rather than stemming purely from theoretical debates unrelated to the 
phenomena at hand, the variant of constructivism which I adopt in this thesis is rooted in observations 
specific to corruption. To develop this, in Section 3.3.2 I discuss how empirical and theoretical 
discussions within the corruption studies literature indicate the constructed nature of this phenomenon. 
Following this, in Section 3.3.3, I discuss the subjectivist epistemology which I engage alongside this.  
 
3.3.2 Ontology: corruption as a social construct 
 Here I demonstrate that corruption fits the two ontological conditions of constructivism – first, 
that the existence of corruption is dependent on human agency, rather than having an external reality. 
Second, that this construct acts back on the context in which it is produced, and thus has the appearance 
of objective and external reality for individuals. To do so, I draw on the theoretical and empirical findings 
of the diverse range of approaches within the corruption studies literature, including the recent growth 
of explicitly constructivist scholarship (De Graaf et al, 2010).  
 The critique of the common universal definitions of corruption I set out in Sections 3.2.2 and 
3.2.3 goes some way to satisfying the first ontological condition of constructivism. However, these 
critiques do not in themselves demonstrate that corruption lacks objective reality beyond human agency, 
but rather that attempts to establish a universal standard of corruption have failed to do so. Moving from 
this specific critique to the general case is an inherently more complex task, which I cannot place beyond 
all doubt. Here, I address this by highlighting the diverse acts and judgements with which corruption is 
associated across contexts, which indicate the contingency of this concept on human agency.  
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 The popularity of definitions of corruption based on public office and private gain has led 
studies of public sector bureaucracy to dominate the corruption studies literature. However, despite this 
often narrow focus, the literature shows the great diversity of acts to which this term is routinely applied. 
A typology of acts to which the label of corruption is routinely applied in the literature would at a 
minimum include bribery, patronage, clientelism, nepotism, and embezzlement, alongside some 
manifestations of fraud, theft, favouritism, and abuses of power. As shown in Table 3.4A, even under 
the relatively technical definitions of these corruption-related concepts offered by Transparency 
International (2018a), there is little which intuitively unites these phenomena.  
 
Table 3.4A – Common forms of corruption 
Concept Example Definition (Transparency International, 2018a) 
Bribery 
“The offering, promising, giving, accepting or soliciting of an advantage as 
an inducement for an action which is illegal, unethical or a breach of trust. 
Inducements can take the form of gifts, loans, fees, rewards or other 
advantages (taxes, services, donations, favours etc.).” 
Patronage 
“Form of favouritism in which a person is selected, regardless of 
qualifications or entitlement, for a job or government benefit because of 
affiliations or connections.” 
Clientelism 
“An unequal system of exchanging resources and favours based on an 
exploitative relationship between a wealthier and/or more powerful 
‘patron’ and a less wealthy and weaker ‘client’.” 
Nepotism 
“Form of favouritism based on acquaintances and familiar relationships 
whereby someone in an official position exploits his or her power and 
authority to provide a job or favour to a family member or friend, even 
though he or she may not be qualified or deserving.” 
Embezzlement 
“When a person holding office in an institution, organisation or company 
dishonestly and illegally appropriates, uses or traffics the funds and goods 
they have been entrusted with for personal enrichment or other activities.”  
 
 In addition to the diversity between the acts commonly grouped as corruption, the literature 
demonstrates the diversity present within these sub-categories. The anthropological segment of the 
corruption studies literature in particular shows how acts routinely described as patronage incorporate 
diverse modes, patterns and languages of exchange. Far from idle, these variations are central to 
legitimacy of these acts in context (Bjorkman, 2014; De Sardan, 1999; Hasty, 2005). Whilst often seen 
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as the most quintessential manifestation of corruption, this diversity is also present in bribery; spanning 
what is exchanged, between whom, the context, and the legality (Ruud, 2000; Walton, 2013a; Werner, 
2000). Despite decades of scholarly effort, this diversity has proven an insurmountable barrier to the 
establishment of a universal character of corruption.  
 In itself, the failure of decades of scholarly effort to establish a universal standard of corruption, 
and the roots of this in the range of acts commonly grouped under this term challenges claims of a single 
underlying reality to this phenomenon. The fact that this has emerged despite the dominance of narrow 
definitions of corruption across much of the literature strengthens this case, as this has necessarily 
limited the range of phenomena which scholars have sought to incorporate when establishing this 
underlying nature (Walton, 2014). This failure has resulted in the growth of constructivist, critical and 
anthropological analysis (De Graaf et al, 2010), the outcomes of which have led to further diversification 
in the range of phenomena linked to this term, and which have challenged the inevitability of this term 
being applied to what are otherwise regarded as quintessentially corrupt acts. 
 The growing body of non-positivist scholarship within the corruption studies literature also 
challenges the inevitably of specific attributes commonly ascribed to corruption. This includes the nature 
of corruption as a transaction or exchange (Walton, 2015), the nature of corruption as necessarily 
motived by individual or material gain (Larmour, 2012; Goodhand, 2008) and the extent to which 
corruption is necessarily exceptional or clandestine (Anjaria, 2011; Bjorkman, 2014; Charap & Harm, 
1999). These challenges have emerged through a rebalancing of the focus in the corruption studies 
literature away from external expert assessments and towards affected populations, particularly in 
developing country contexts. Evidence of variation around the commonly held attributes of corruption 
place claims of a universal underlying essence of this concept in further doubt.  
 In addition to challenging the inevitability with which specific acts are deemed corrupt and the 
diverse attributes of corruption across contexts, what has emerged from these alternative approaches is 
evidence of the role of social norms in determining the nature of corruption. This is evident firstly in the 
roots of the term in English and other linguistic contexts, the study of which demonstrates the link 
between this concept and ideas of moral and religious degeneration, which are deeply normative 
(Walton, 2015; Genaux, 2004). As is evident in the frequency with which the language of corruption is 
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engaged as a means of condemnation, even without reference to specific ‘corrupt’ acts (Lambropoulou, 
2016), corruption retains this moral rather than solely technical character.  
 The contingency of the nature of corruption on social norms and judgements in context is further 
demonstrated by evidence of changes in the nature of corruption over time. This variability has received 
particular attention in the context of post-Soviet transition, in which changes to the political and social 
context have been shown to drive changes in the usage of corruption-related terminology (Kajsiu, 2013; 
Smilov & Dorosiev, 2012). Such changes may be rapid – triggered by elite scandals – or be the result of 
incremental changes in the political and social context, such as changing attitudes towards public and 
private ownership (Andersson & Erlingsson, 2012). Rather than variation around a fixed reality, these 
changes are linked to fundamental change in the nature of corruption in these contexts.  
 In light of the failure of a protracted effort amongst scholars of corruption to establish a 
universal standard of corruption, evidence of the dependency of this phenomenon on changing social 
norms and judgements in context justify framing it in constructivist terms. This framing does not require 
that knowledge around corruption is located amongst those who possess and enact such norms, an 
epistemological question which I address in Section 3.3.3, but that the nature of corruption is dependent 
“on the interlocking beliefs, concepts or theories held by actors” (Wendt, 1999: 70). As I now discuss, 
works across a range of disciplinary approaches also establish the reciprocal effects of corruption back 
on those actors – the second necessary feature of constructivist ontology.  
  As I described in Section 3.4.1, the second component of constructivist ontology requires that 
social phenomena are encountered as objective, and outside of the domain of individual control, despite 
their roots in human agency. Because of this apparent objectivity, socially-constructed phenomena act 
back on those in the context in which they are produced. This reciprocal effect is bound in the power 
structures of the conflict (Hacking, 1999). The contemporary corruption studies literature demonstrates 
the applicability of this element of constructivist ontology to corruption in two respects; first in the value 
judgements applied to behaviours which fall under this concept across relatively empowered and 
disempowered populations, and second in solutions prescribed for corruption, particularly by 
international actors external to the context in question.  
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 As with the contingency of corruption on norms and value judgements, the capacity of a given 
construction of corruption to act back on the society which produces it is most evident from studies of 
routine instances of corruption at the micro level. Studies of routine forms of corruption in local 
government from anthropologists, for example, demonstrate the contingency of the performance of 
bribery on the prevailing notion of corruption within a given context. This includes the extent to which 
offering a bribe is an acceptable or an insulting behaviour, given the past encounters between those 
involved, and the manner in which a bribe is exchanged (Granovetter, 2004; Gupta, 1995; Ruud, 2000). 
Whilst determined by social forces, from the perspective of individuals this is encountered as a fixed 
and external set of constraints on behaviour, outside of the realm of individual influence.   
 The effect of a constructed corruption concept back on the society in which it is produced is 
particularly evident in routine forms of corruption because of the role of power in social phenomena. 
Rather than a neutral aggregation of the values within a society, the construction of corruption can serve 
to legitimise the actions of the relatively empowered. The relative acceptability of bribes to those in 
public office versus the acceptability of using a relationship with a bureaucrat to achieve the same end 
is a common manifestation of this - with the network of contacts available to an elite commonly 
constructed as more legitimate than a payment (De Sousa, 2016; Ruud, 2000). This both further 
demonstrates the general effect of corruption back on the society in which it is produced, and the 
contingency of such effects of power on social forces.  
 The effect of corruption back on those who produce it, and the extent to which this reflects the 
relative power of those involved, is also evident from studies of the solutions prescribed for corruption. 
As has particularly been the focus of critical scholars, this is evident in the extent to which the prevailing 
understandings of corruption amongst international actors have influenced policy at the national level 
(Batory, 2010; De Maria, 2008; Gephart, 2012). This has  been shown to occur regardless of the extent 
to which such understandings resonate with the national context in question, with corruption being 
principally constructed in the international system. As with the effects of the performance and 
acceptability of bribery at the micro level, corruption in this case is also encountered outside of the realm 
of individual agency, despite its constructed nature.   
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 Despite the focus of much of the corruption studies literature on the development and 
implementation of universal standards of corruption, works across the array of disciplinary approaches 
in this literature align this concept with the two main ontological claims of constructivism – that this 
concept lies within the domain of human agency, and that despite this it has reciprocal effects back on 
the contexts in which it is produced. Because of this, I engage this constructivist notion of corruption 
across my analysis of conflict-induced change in corruption in Nepal. In the section to follow, I move 
from ontological to epistemological questions, and through this the variant of the constructivism which 
I adopt throughout the analysis.  
  
3.3.3 Epistemology: subjectivism and corruption 
 As I discussed in Section 3.4.1, the constructivist ontological position is not epistemologically 
prescriptive, and has been coupled with positions ranging from scientific realism to post-structuralism 
(Gergen, 1999; Hacking, 1999; Wendt, 1999). Building from this, in this section I discuss the subjectivist 
epistemological position which I adopt in my analysis. Here, I focus on the justifications for adopting 
this position in general, and discuss the practical implementation of these principles through 
constructivist grounded theory in Chapter Four. As with the ontological discussion above, I do so with 
reference to the theoretical and empirical developments in the corruption studies literature, but here also 
consider the requirements of research into conflict-induced change in corruption in Nepal.   
 The subjectivist epistemological position locates knowledge in the interaction between the 
researcher and researched; influenced not only by the beliefs, actions, conditions and contexts facing 
the researched, but also those of the researcher (Schwandt, 2003). The product of research under this 
epistemology is interpretive theory, which “assumes emergent, multiple realities; indeterminacy; facts 
and values as inextricably linked; truth as provisional; and social life as processual” (Charmaz, 2014: 
231). The validity of explanations and theory developed under this epistemology is dependent on the 
extent to which knowledge is grounded in the context and its reflexivity, as well as the transparency 
with which it is produced (Charmaz, 2016; Manning, 1997).   
 The application of subjectivist principles to the study of a socially constructed notion of 
corruption has four main implications: First, it focuses the effort to define the nature, causes and 
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dynamics of corruption to the set of contextually contingent, fluid and contested understandings of those 
subject to analysis (Tanzler et al, 2012). The aspects of context which are significant is inherently 
variable; spanning social marginalisation, poverty, gender, conflict-affectedness and political 
affiliations, which have a varying capacity to influence how corruption is understood, expressed and 
performed (De Graaf, 2007; De Graaf & Huberts, 2008; Smilov & Dorosiev, 2012). Subjectivism 
therefore requires an approach to context beyond that common under positivistic epistemology, 
including the extent to which experiences and understandings differ across and within social groups.  
 Second, the study of corruption under subjectivist epistemology requires a focus on the precise 
language in which corruption is described by those studied (Granovetter, 2004; De Graaf et al, 2010). 
In contrast to the homogenising tendency within much of the literature (Puppo, 2013: 110), this includes 
particular attention to variation in the terminologies applied to acts typically grouped as corruption by 
those involved. Such variations are significant in revealing the judgements associated with specific acts 
in context, and through this indicate a central element of how corruption is constructed. As I discuss in 
Chapter Four, the need to focus on the language with which corruption is described is amongst the core 
justifications for my engagement of constructivist grounded theory. 
 Third, researching corruption through subjectivist epistemology requires attention to the 
judgements associated with corrupt acts in context. As I argued in Section 3.3.2, ostensibly corrupt acts 
are far from necessarily associated with negative social judgements, and such judgements are central to 
the nature of corruption. Given that elements of the academic literature and much of the research 
emanating from NGOs has approached corruption inherently as a deficiency or departure from the ideal 
function of a system or society (Walton, 2013a), here subjectivist corruption research is particularly 
apart from the mainstream. As I discuss in Section 3.5, deviation from the mainstream is linked to largely 
misplaced critique of this position on the grounds of moral relativism.   
 Finally, the emphasis on reflexivity and attention to positionality under a subjectivist 
epistemology is particularly significant in the case of corruption. Even where it is widely practiced, 
corruption is often a topic of significant contestation between elements of a population, and one which 
is widely condemned in public. Rather than as a barrier to establishing an objective picture of corruption, 
this means that the outcomes of research must be seen in part as a product of the level of trust and the 
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nature of the relationship between researcher and participants. As I further discuss in Chapter Four, my 
status as a westerner and an outsider to the context studied in this thesis is a particularly significant 
aspect of this – both in the general level of trust required to discuss corruption, and in its influence on 
the judgements articulated by respondents.  
 As I discussed in Chapter Two, my analysis of the impacts of conflict on corruption in Nepal 
responds to several underexplored aspects of this relationship. This includes the lack of attention to 
corruption at the sub-national level, the dynamics of this relationship beyond the immediate conflict to 
post-conflict transition, and the potential for multiple concurrent dynamics of conflict-induced change. 
As a response to this, my focus is on experiences of corruption and conflict amongst the population of 
one conflict-affected city in Nepal, over a decade after the end to violence. A subjectivist epistemology 
complements this focus and level of analysis in a number of respects.  
  Most significantly, subjectivist epistemology limits the potentially substantial source of error 
which can result from the disconnect between the understanding of corruption by a researcher and its 
understanding by those involved in the research. As well as the lack of externally imposed 
conceptualisations of corruption, this reflects the emphasis subjectivism places on the language and 
judgements of the participants, and the production of knowledge through the interaction of researcher 
and participants. As I further discuss in Chapter Four, these considerations are particularly significant 
for this thesis because my background is far removed from the cultural and social context of my analysis.  
 The focus on contestation over the nature and effects of corruption under subjectivism is also 
specifically beneficial to analysis of the interaction between corruption and armed conflict. Rather than 
limiting analysis to the extent to which conflict may affect the prevalence of a specific manifestation of 
corruption, such as public sector bribery, research under this epistemological position facilitates a focus 
on changes in the nature of corruption itself. Given the limits to the theoretical landscape on this conflict-
induced change in corruption which I set out in Chapter Two, this aspect of the subjectivist position is 
particularly advantageous to the objectives of this thesis. I discuss the specifics of my approach to 
theoretical development around this relationship through grounded theory in Chapter Four.  
 Whilst it is not the purpose of this thesis to produce specific recommendations for anti-
corruption actors, examining corruption in its social and contextual complexity also responds to some 
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of the critiques raised against NGO and governmental anti-corruption policy in developing countries. In 
seeking to explain why western-led action against corruption has largely failed in its stated aims, critics 
have highlighted the pivotal role of failures to understand the functions that corruption can serve, and 
the diversity of this concept across and within country contexts (Ivanov, 2007; Persson et al, 2010). The 
focus under subjectivism on the contested understandings and judgements surrounding corruption 
avoids many of the pitfalls commonly associated with policy-based analysis and prescriptions for the 
‘problem’ of corruption in contexts such as Nepal.  
 Engaging a constructivist ontology and a subjectivist epistemology to examine conflict-induced 
change in corruption is therefore a significant departure from much of the mainstream treatment of this 
concept. However, it is one which is borne out of reflections on the broad nature of this concept, and the 
specific demands of research into conflict-induced change in corruption at the sub-national level in 
Nepal. In Chapter Four, I discuss the practical implementation of this theoretical position through the 
use of constructivist grounded theory. Prior to this, however, I close this chapter by responding to the 
critiques often associated with these theoretical positions.  
  
3.4 Relativism, and Other Critiques 
 The focus of constructivist ontology and subjectivist epistemology on the complex and 
competing understandings of an affected population is central to the justifications for this approach 
which I set out above. However, relating the existence and knowledge of corruption purely to the 
population studied exposes this approach to claims of relativism. This critique is commonly expressed 
through concerns that abandoning appeals to objectivity over corruption diminishes the ability to 
challenge its harms in the ‘real world’ and to establish solutions (Kurer, 2005; Rothstein & Torsello, 
2013: 3). Here, I argue that this theoretical position neither requires that the harms of corruption are 
discarded and nor that it requires the rationales of those involved to be uncritically accepted.  
 Considering these two points in turn, whilst the rejection of any objective character of corruption 
is necessary under constructivism, it does not follow from this that the conclusions of the mass of 
analysis which claim universal definition be rejected. Rather, it is necessary only that such definitions 
are viewed as one of many potential manifestations of corruption (Tanzler et al, 2012). It follows from 
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this that the conclusions reached are viewed through the lens of the approach to corruption imposed, not 
that they be discarded. Constructivist scholars have, for example, linked the imposition of definitions of 
corruption based on the public-private divide to the focus of anti-corruption policy on the public sector, 
but far from frame public sector corruption as benign (Di Puppo, 2014; Makowski, 2016), 
 The lack of appeals to objectivity also does not require uncritical dependence on the 
justifications for corruption provided by those studied. As with critiques of anthropological analysis of 
corruption, it is argued that constructivism leads scholars to romanticise corruption as a traditional and 
‘cultural’ form of exchange, whilst ignoring the harms caused (Larmour, 2012: 119; Ivanov, 2007: 41). 
This critique is particularly applicable to the analysis patronage, rooted in culture and traditional 
practice, but which are argued in much of the corruption studies literature to undermine the political 
independence of already disempowered populations. These harms, it is argued, are lost in the focus of 
the internal legitimacy of these networks (De Graaf et al, 2010; Dion, 2010).  
 Concern over moral relativism in analysis of corruption in context is less easily dismissed than 
those based on the approach to the harms of corruption in the literature above. Indeed, there are clear 
risks in a naïve acceptance of the rationale for engagement in what might conventionally be regarded as 
corrupt acts under the definitions common in the literature. The lack of an ‘objective’ standard to counter 
this with places the theoretical approach set out in this chapter at comparatively more risk of this than 
more prescriptive approaches. Alongside simple convention, this critique in part explains the ongoing 
dominance of objective standards in informing anti-corruption policy (Gephart, 2012).  
 The mitigation of the risk of relativism when examining the justifications provided by those 
involved in corruption is a focus on the power dynamics and flow of benefits which surround it. Rather 
than an inherent flaw of this approach, research under constructivist epistemology and subjectivist 
ontology is well suited to unpacking how dominant notions of corruption may favour the acts perpetrated 
by an elite, whilst delegitimising those practiced by marginalised populations. Indeed, as I discussed in 
Section 3.3.1, central to constructivist ontology is the extent to which social concepts are seen to act 
back on the context in which they are produced. Implemented properly, the constructivist approach thus 
far from entails naïve acceptance of rationalisations of corruption.  
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 Whilst dependent on implementation through a rigorous research design, the critique that 
researching corruption under a constructivist ontology and subjectivist epistemology is flawed due to 
relativism is not well founded. Indeed, rather than undermining efforts to combat the harms of 
corruption, this approach is well suited to the identification of harmful and problematic forms of 
corruption, based on the experiences of those in contexts such as Nepal. Whilst this thesis does not seek 
to establish specific policy recommendations for anti-corruption in this context, this is nonetheless 
significant for the rigor of findings produced under this approach.  
 
3.5 Summary 
 In this chapter, I have set out the theoretical approach to the nature of corruption and the nature 
of knowledge around corruption implemented throughout this thesis. This approach is based first on a 
constructivist ontology, under which corruption is produced by and acts back upon human actors, and 
second on subjectivist epistemology, in which knowledge is contested, multiple, and based on the 
interaction of researcher and participant. As I discuss in Chapter Four, I implement these theoretical 
principles through a research design and methodology based in constructivist grounded theory.  
 The theoretical approach presented in this chapter is a substantial departure from how corruption 
has conventionally been approached by academics. However, as I have argued, it is one which is rooted 
in the theoretical and empirical debates around this concept, and in particular the seemingly intractable 
challenges faced by those who propose universal standards of corruption. The constructivist-subjectivist 
alternative does not require that these common standards are discarded, but rather that they are treated 
as one of a potential array of understandings which may exist in a given context. This position, along 
with critical and anthropological approaches, is increasingly influential in the literature.  
 In addition to a grounding in the theoretical debates on corruption in general, the justifications 
which I have presented for this approach have also drawn on the specific demands of researching 
corruption at the sub-national level. This included the management of the scope for difference between 
the understanding of the researcher and that of participants, embracing the possibility of contestation, 
and through this the possibility of developing analytical links between corruption and conflict. Crucially, 
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this facilitates the examination of how conflict has influenced the nature of corruption amongst, as well 
as the prevalence of specific manifestations of corruption, as is more common in the literature.  
 In closing this chapter, I discussed the critique of relativism often levied at research which 
departs from objective standards of social phenomena. Whilst unlikely to satisfy critiques emanating 
from economic positivism, I did so by returning to the second ontological condition of constructivism, 
the effects of social concepts back on the society in which they are produced. Rather than the naïve 
acceptance of the rationalisations of corruption for those involved, the focus is on the impacts of 
dominant notions of this concept, including the capacity to legitimise abuses by elites. Indeed, a number 
of works by constructivist scholars have demonstrated the link between dominant notions of corruption 
and the forms of corruption targeted in international and national anti-corruption policy. This approach 
is thus sensitive to questions of power and harm emanating from corruption.  
 In Chapter Four, I discuss the implementation of constructivist ontology and subjectivist 
epistemology through constructivist grounded theory. In addition to the compatibility of this approach 
with the theoretical position I have set out in this chapter, in doing so I focus on the practicalities of 
researching conflict-induced change in corruption in Nepal. In addition to the effects of these theoretical 
positions on the research design and analysis to follow, I also return to the debates raised in this chapter 
in the discussion in Chapter Nine. This focuses on the merits of the constructivist approach in assessing 
the sub-national dynamics of corruption, and its interaction with conflict.  
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Chapter Four: Methodology 
4.1 Introduction 
 In Chapter Three, I set out the constructivist approach to corruption. This approach invokes a 
relativist ontology, in which corruption is a contested, multiple, and socially determined phenomena, 
variable across time and context. I combine this with a subjectivist epistemology, under which 
knowledge of corruption is expressed in the inter-subjective engagement of a researcher and the 
experiences and perceptions of those studied. Drawing on these theoretical positions, in this chapter I 
set out the research design and analytical approach underlying the analysis of conflict-induced change 
in corruption in Nepal. I do so in the following four parts.  
 In Section 4.2, I link the discussions from Chapter Three with the principles of constructivist 
grounded theory, which provides the overarching empirical approach in this thesis. In Section 4.3, I then 
describe how I implemented this approach through the research design, including the factors which 
influenced case selection, the logic underlying the two-stage fieldwork process, and the methods I 
employed. In Section 4.4, I then discuss the coding processes by which I analysed the responses 
gathered, and how I developed a picture of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi from this. 
Finally, in Section 4.5 I link these elements to structure of the empirical chapters which follow.  
 
4.2 The Constructivist Grounded Theory approach  
 The subjectivist epistemological position which I discussed in Chapter Three entails an 
inductive logic of research. More than the absence of hypotheses, inductive research is defined by the 
privileging of findings from the field, and moving from these findings to conceptual and theoretical 
development (Creswell, 2013: 25; Ormston et al, 2014: 6). Whilst far from the sole realisation of these 
principles, they are embodied by, and often synonymous with, grounded theory (Bryman, 2016: 572).  
 First proposed by Glaser and Strauss (1967: 10), grounded theory developed as a reaction to 
what these sociologists saw as the confinement of their field to the verification of grand theory. This did 
not entail a rejection of these theories, but rather a rejection of their finality, replaced with an emphasis 
on theory building through empirical analysis (Bryant, 2017: 66; Glaser & Strauss, 1967: 28). This 
movement also reflected a desire to introduce systematic procedures for theory generation into 
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qualitative research (Urquhart, 2013: 6), in an attempt “to forestall the opportunistic use of theories that 
have dubious fit and working capacity” (Glaser & Strauss, 1967: 4). Subsequent methodological works 
(Charmaz, 2006; Glaser, 1978; 1992; Strauss, 1987; Strauss & Corbin, 1990) have seen these 
imperatives evolve into the following four defining principles: 
 First, the object of grounded theory is theory building, in which relationships between 
phenomena are abstracted from the context in which they are developed. Second, grounded theory is 
inductive, in that it seeks to minimise the influence of theoretical constructs external to the data, 
engaging these only when the emergent theory has developed. Third, grounded theory entails the 
simultaneous collection and analysis of data, with the analytical process guiding the extent and nature 
of further data collection, known as theoretical sampling. Finally, the analytical process is one of 
constant comparison, in which “every slice of data is compared with all existing concepts and 
constructs” (Urquhart, 2013: 16), and continually refined through this process. The structure of research 
defined by these principles is summarised in Diagram 4.2A. 
 
Diagram 4.2A – Grounded theory research process 
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 While sharing these principles in common, contemporary grounded theory spans a diverse range 
of approaches. In accounting for this diversity, methodological works commonly devote much attention 
to the division between Glaser and Strauss which emerged following Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) work. 
Here, Glaser (1992) saw Strauss as channelling analysis into rigid coding paradigms which, in his 
perspective, violated the principle of emergence (Duchscher & Morgan, 2004; Kelle, 2007). However, 
over time this division has blurred, with the analytical paradigms at the heart of their divergence reduced 
to one of many options in Corbin and Strauss’ (2008) later work.4 This division thus far from defines 
contemporary grounded theory to the extent that the initial gulf between its founders implies.  
 Where debate remains, however, is over the extent to which grounded theory contains an 
inherent philosophy. Corbin and Strauss’ (1990; 1998) works in particular have fuelled this debate by 
invoking elements of both positivism and constructivism as standards of the quality of emergent theory 
(Mills et al, 2006). This, along with the contrasting backgrounds of Glaser and Strauss prior to their 
1967 work (Annells, 1996), has led to the proliferation of philosophically diverse strands of grounded 
theory, and competing claims over the philosophical origins of the approach (Apramian et al, 2017; 
Bryant, 2002; Charmaz, 2014a; 2017; Ralph et al, 2015). Reflecting the approach to corruption I set out 
in Chapter Three, of these I engage the constructivist branch of grounded theory. 
 Constructivist Grounded Theory (CGT) is distinct from the mainstream associated with Glaser5 
and Strauss in three key respects. First, CGT treats meaning within interview data as co-constructed 
between participant and respondents and methods in general as non-neutral (Charmaz, 2017: 6; Charmaz 
& Belgrave, 2012). Second, CGT considers the coding and theory development process as a further 
process of meaning construction, rather than in the neutral terms of emergence (Charmaz, 2014: 239). 
Finally, drawing on symbolic interactionism (Charmaz, 2014: 262), CGT treats language itself as a route 
to understanding values and subjectivities (Charmaz, 2006: 46; 2014a: 1078). CGT is thus the product 
of the four general principles of grounded theory I outlined above, but adds to these the imperatives to 
be reflexive, aware of positionality, and sensitive to linguistics (Charmaz, 2000; 2017).  
 
4 See Urquhart, 2013: 177 on the changing emphasis in works by Corbin & Strauss, and Bruscaglioni 
(2016) on the common logical underpinnings between these approaches. 
5 Glaser (2002) published a rejection of Charmaz’s (2000) first work on CGT. 
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 In addition to its foundation in the constructivist principles I discussed in Chapter Three, I use 
CGT as the basis of my research design for three reasons: First, the emphasis on theory building in 
grounded theory in general is well suited to the contribution I intend in this thesis, given the limits of 
the literature on conflict-induced change in corruption I set out in Chapter Two. Methodological works 
on grounded theory have devoted significant attention to theoretical development, and offer well-defined 
procedures for doing so (Linden, 2017; Strauss & Corbin, 2015: 187). CGT is particularly well suited 
to theory building in a manner which is sensitive to the linguistic dimensions of corruption analysis at 
the sub-national level, including developing a contextualised definition of corruption itself.  
 Second, the nature of sampling under CGT is well suited to my focus on corruption and conflict, 
both of which are potentially contested and controversial, even within a single city context. CGT allows 
sampling to be continually adapted based on emerging aspects of the phenomenon in question, by the 
availability of data in the field, and by the developing relationship between researcher and population 
(Callery & Whittemore, 2001; Charmaz, 2014: 70). Given the challenges inherent in researching 
corruption and conflict and broader considerations of research in Nepal which I discuss in Section 4.3, 
the ability to adapt around limits to access are particularly advantageous.  
 Finally, the analytical transparency of grounded theory enhances the rigour of the research 
process and strengthens the resultant theoretical contributions. This transparency reflects the well-
developed theoretical sampling and coding processes within CGT, which have been refined across 
methodological works (Charmaz, 2006: 42; 2014: 109; Thornberg & Charmaz, 2014). As I discuss in 
Section 4.4, the use of memos in theoretical development and the nature of theoretical sampling generate 
a written record of decisions throughout the research process, allowing outcomes to be justified with 
reference to specific elements of these processes. This analytical transparency mitigates a common 
criticism of inductive and of constructivist research in general that findings reflect a partial 
representation of the information collected (Tucker, 2016; Wasserman et al, 2009).  
 CGT is thus compatible with the nature of corruption which I discussed in Chapter Three, with 
the need for theoretical development on conflict-induced change in corruption which I set out in Chapter 
Two, and is appropriate for the sensitivity of these subject matters. In the section to follow, I discuss the 
practical implementation of this approach and the nature of my research design. 
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4.3 Research design 
 Here I set out my research question, and then discuss case selection, research design, ethics and 
the methodological decisions which guided my fieldwork. In closing this section, I discuss the 
modifications I made to this design because of the challenges which emerged whilst I was in the field, 
and reflect on the implications of these modifications. I return to these limits and provide 
recommendations as to how they can be addressed through further research in Chapter Ten.  
 
4.3.1 Research question 
 The research design I set out in this section addresses the questions below. Consistent with the 
treatment of prior knowledge in CGT (Charmaz, 2014: 31; Hernandez, 2010: 155), this question is 
intentionally broad, with the many potential aspects of conflict-induced change in corruption and the 
theories in the literature treated as subjects for research, rather than specified in the research question.  
 
 
Research question  
“How has armed conflict in Nepal affected corruption at the sub-national level and in the long term?” 
 
 
As I set out in Chapter Three, I approach corruption through a constructivist ontology and a 
subjectivist epistemology. This approach means that this research question does not relate to the impacts 
of conflict on specific empirically observable manifestations of corruption such as bribery or budgetary 
abuses. Rather, it explores how corruption is perceived by an affected population. The impacts of 
conflict on corruption to which this question relates are therefore those which are evident in the 
perceptions, experiences and discourse of those studied. Consistent with the discussions of ‘objective’ 
definitions of corruption in Section 3.2, I do not attempt to define an objective reality of corruption to 
which these perceptions may be compared, and instead define corruption purely as a social construction. 
The implications and critiques of this approach and my responses to these are discussed in Section 3.4.  
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4.3.2 Case selection 
 As I discussed in Chapter Two, the literature on conflict-induced change in corruption has 
principally developed through studies of contexts of ongoing instability, of international intervention, 
and of identity-based conflict. My focus on Nepal reflects a desire to study this relationship in conditions 
different from those dominant in the literature. However, given that the contribution I intend for this 
thesis is also rooted in my focus on the local level, this is only one guiding element of case selection. To 
guide case selection within Nepal, I engaged a revelatory logic - a common feature of grounded theory 
studies (Urquhart, 2013: 61). This logic maximises the prospect for theory building by focusing on a 
case in which the phenomena in question are concentrated. Based on this logic, I selected Ghorahi, a 
city in Dang District which, as I set out below, I determined was heavily exposed to the impacts of the 
conflict and corruption. A map and population summary statistics for Ghorahi are given overleaf.  
 
Map 4.3A – Map of Dang District highlighting Ghorahi (Adapted from UNOCHA, 2008) 
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Table 4.3A – Population and development statistics for Ghorahi (Adapted from Nepal Map, 2017)6 
 Ghorahi Dang District Nepal 
Total population 62,928 552,583 26,494,504 
Average household size 4.06 4.75 4.89 
Literacy rate7 81% 70% 66% 
Proportion with education at 
SLC8 level or above 36% 20% 30% 
Proportion living in cement 
constructed housing 49% 19% 29% 
Proportion with a piped drinking 
water source 61% 41% 48% 
 
 Prior to entering the field, I identified Ghorahi as a revelatory case for a study of conflict-
induced change in corruption based on the following four factors: First, my analysis of the Transitional 
Justice Reference Archive (TJRA) of civilian and combatant deaths during the 1996-2006 conflict 
highlighted Dang District in general and Ghorahi specifically as amongst the most heavily conflict-
affected areas of Nepal (OHCHR, 2015).9 As shown in Graphs 4.3A below, Dang District suffered the 
fourth highest level of killings during the conflict recorded by the TJRA, with Ghorahi the single most 
affected area within this District. Along with a number of areas in Rolpa, Rukum and Kailali, I 
highlighted Ghorahi as an area in which the impacts of the conflict were acute.  
 
 
6 Based on census and development data gathered in 2011 
7 Proportion of those aged 5 and above who can read and write  
8 School Leaving Certificate – completed at the end of secondary education 
9 The TJRA also includes reported disappearances. However, the significant gaps in these data 
preclude the possibility of reliable comparisons.  
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Graph 4.3A – Distribution of conflict-era killings recorded in the TJRA by District (left) and VDC 
within Dang District (right) (Adapted from OHCHR, 2015) 
 
 
  
 Second, amongst the number of heavily conflict-affected areas highlighted through analysis of 
the TJRA, I selected Ghorahi because it was the site of the November 2001 PLA offensive. This was the 
first major offensive by the PLA against fortified Royal Nepal Army (RNA) positions (Pasang, 2008: 
113), the relative success of which led to the transformation of attitudes in Kathmandu towards the 
Maoist threat10 (Mehta & Lawoti, 2010). Far from isolated to urban Ghorahi, secondary data shown in 
Map 4.3B also indicated that the PLA destroyed the majority of local government infrastructure in the 
rural areas surrounding the city during the conflict. Together, this shows that Ghorahi was exposed to a 
sustained presence of the RNA, a major PLA attack, and close proximity to areas under Maoist control.  
 
 
10 Further detail of this attack and its impact on the conflict as a whole is given in Chapter Five. 
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Map 4.3B - Impact of the 1996-2006 conflict on local government services in Dang District  
(Adapted from UNOCHA, 2007) 
 
 
 
 Third, I selected Ghorahi because it has seen an influx of former PLA combatants in the post-
conflict period (Robins & Bhandari, 2016). This is relevant not only because of the significance of PLA 
demobilisation within Nepal’s transition from conflict (Adhikari, 2012; Wagle & Jackson, 2015; Subedi, 
2014a), but also because of the connection that the Nepali media have drawn between PLA 
demobilisation and corruption.11 Specifically, during the period of 2016 in which I was making this case 
selection decision, the Nepali media widely alleged that funds which had been intended to support PLA 
combatants in cantonment had been abused by the Maoist leadership. This combination indicated that 
Ghorahi was directly exposed to a key element of the post-2006 transition, and through this to a 
corruption scandal of national significance.  
 Finally, I selected Ghorahi because of the urban nature of its population, and the proximity to 
institutions of local government that this implied. Based on a review of the limited literature on 
corruption in Nepal from academic (Kondos, 1987; Sharma, 2012; Sharma & Bhattarai, 2013; Subedi, 
2006; 2014 Truex, 2011), NGO (ADB, 2013; Dix, 2011; Bhattarai, 2010; Koirala et al, 2015; 
Transparency International Nepal, 2013; 2013a; Wills, 2014) and government sources (CIAA, 2014; 
DFID, 2014; ICAI, 2014), the results of which are summarised in Appendix 4.1, I determined that an 
 
11 See, for example, Himalayan Times (2016), Manandhar (2012); Pradhan (2016); Sharma (2016). 
For further background to this issue see Subedi (2014) and Timalsina (2016). 
Officials displaced, 
buildings destroyed 
Officials displaced, 
buildings damaged 
Buildings destroyed only 
Buildings damaged only 
Officials displaced only 
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urban population would be more exposed to local government, locally-led development projects, 
political parties, and other sites linked to manifestations of corruption. Whilst the level of local insight 
which can be taken from this under a social constructivist approach is limited, this acted as a further 
proxy for the general level corruption to which the population might be exposed.  
 Through the combination of these secondary data sources and published works, I identified 
Ghorahi as an area in which the effects of both conflict and corruption were likely to be acute, to the 
limited extent that this could be assessed externally. As I now discuss, the research design which 
followed from this was influenced by the need to verify the factors which had driven these decisions, 
something which could only be achieved through primary research.  
 
4.3.3 Two phase research design 
 I conducted my fieldwork through a two-stage research design: First, over five weeks in 
February and March 2017, I sought to verify and expand upon the four factors above which influenced 
my selection of Ghorahi. The interviews I conducted in this phase focused on the extent to which the 
impacts of the conflict and the level of exposure to corruption indicated by the literature and TJRA 
resonated with the local experience. I also used Stage One to assess the practicalities researching 
corruption and conflict in Ghorahi, including through extensive discussions with my translator and 
facilitator LD.12 Following this, in Stage Two I used interviews to explore the depth and interaction of 
experiences of corruption and conflict. In this section, I detail my research design under the headings of 
positionality, access and entry, theoretical sampling, methods, and ethics and risk management. 
Following this, I also set out the adaptions which I made to my research design whilst in the field.  
 
Positionality 
 Attention to positionality within CGT links aspects of identity including “social class, gender, 
race, age, health, and professional statuses” (Charmaz, 2017: 6) to the process and outcomes of 
fieldwork. This is not with the intention of removing biases, but rather to acknowledge the role of these 
 
12 I have decided to keep my translators anonymous throughout this thesis. I discuss this further under 
‘Ethics and Risk Management’ below.  
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factors in the construction of responses and development of theory (Cousin, 2010; Srivastava, 2006). 
Here I introduce aspects of positionality for myself and LD13 which were pertinent to my fieldwork, and 
discuss the influence of time on the responses. I use the elements of this in discussing each subsequent 
element of my research design.  
 First and foremost, my positionality in Ghorahi was influenced by being a white westerner, and 
therefore a visible ‘outsider’.14 Across my experiences in Nepal during and prior to that described here, 
this came with two associations: first that of a tourist, often with an assumption of naivety, and second 
that of an international NGO worker. Given that Ghorahi receives almost no western tourists,15 this 
second assumption was more significant to my positionality than the first, and was typically expressed 
through questions about the ‘project’ or organisation I was assumed to be representing. The negative 
connotations associated with this assumption somewhat balanced my experience of the privilege given 
to ‘guests’.16 As I discuss below, this was an aspect of positionality I sought to manage in introducing 
myself to respondents.  
 In addition to my ethnic and national identity, being male and unmarried was also a significant 
aspect of my positionality for my fieldwork. Despite improvements in access to education and 
employment amongst women since the 1990s (ADB, 2010), Nepal remains a deeply patriarchal society 
in which traditional family structures are seen as fundamental to social order. As I discuss under Access 
& Entry below, my positionality in such a context influenced the extent and depth of engagement with 
women possible, but was also significant to my everyday encounters during fieldwork in Ghorahi. My 
marital status was frequently questioned in discussions with respondents, the contrast of which to the 
norms for men of my age in Nepal reinforced my status as an outsider.   
 In contrast to myself, LD is a long-term resident of Ghorahi and comes from a family with roots 
in Dang District over several generations. The combination of this background and LD’s work in the 
 
13 The identity of those supporting fieldwork is a significant by often unacknowledged dimension of 
positionality - see Caretta, 2015 
14 The insider / outsider dichotomy has rightly been critiqued, and is used here in acknowledgement of 
the multiple aspects of positionality amongst different groups. See Merriam et al (2001) and 
Wiederhold (2015). 
15 This reflects my conversations with LD and my observations 
16 Deference to guests in general relates to principles in Hinduism, but given the extent to which 
Nepal’s economy is dependent on tourism, is particularly applied to those from western countries. 
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media means he is a highly recognisable figure amongst much of the media, political, and local 
government elite in the city, many of whom I sought to interview. Whilst not wealthy in comparison to 
many of those within this elite, the combination of LD’s senior position within the media, personal 
connections with elites and his ‘high’ caste identity grants him an elite social status in Ghorahi. This is 
only qualified by LD’s visible youth, in a context broadly deferential to elders.  
 In addition to its contribution to an elite positionality, LD’s work as a journalist is significant to 
his political positionality. In Ghorahi, as elsewhere in Nepal, political affiliation is widespread for both 
organisations and individuals, however LD is a relatively neutral figure. This was expressed through 
LD’s close and open social connections with representatives from a number of political parties, and in 
the frequency with which respondents and the wider population described LD as politically unaffiliated. 
LD’s relatively elite positionality is thus not qualified by the political insider status which commonly 
follows in Ghorahi. How this and other dimensions of our positionalities influenced the conduct and 
outcomes of the fieldwork is considered throughout the elements of the design discussed below.  
Finally, the role of time must also be considered as an aspect of positionality. Most directly, the 
interviews I conducted in Ghorahi took place over two periods in 2017, and must be seen in the context 
in which they were produced. However, the interviews relate not only to the respondents' perceptions 
of corruption in 2017, but also to their perceptions over time. Indeed, central to the purpose of this thesis 
is linking experiences of the conflict - over a decade previous to the interviews - with the contemporary 
construction of corruption. I acknowledged in doing so that, as with perceptions of contemporary events, 
the respondents' memories of the past are incomplete, influenced by identity, and subject to biases in 
recall. They are also the product of the level of trust between researcher and respondent, linked to the 
factors set out in this section. The contents of the interviews I conducted, and the explanations I draw 
from them, should therefore be seen as reflecting socially constructed perceptions of past and present 
conditions.  
 
Access and entry 
 I approached access and entry in Ghorahi in relational and dynamic terms. Considering these 
issues in this manner acknowledges the agency of the populations subject to research and the role of 
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positionality in the level and depth of engagement that emerges (Srivastava, 2006). Here I discuss these 
considerations with reference to overlapping processes of negotiating primary and secondary access. 
Primary access relates to Ghorahi in general, and secondary to the building of relations to facilitate 
interviews within this city context (Cuncliffe & Alcadipani, 2016).  
 With regard to primary access, being a visible outsider with a focus on conflict and corruption 
necessitated that I consider a number of gatekeeper groups. My assessments before entering the field 
and discussions with LD once in Ghorahi during Stage One led us to identify the groups listed in Table 
4.2. As is commonly the case (Reeves, 2010), these gatekeepers consisted of those with formal authority 
to limit the fieldwork, and those with the informal capacity to aid or hinder its progress.  
 
Table 4.3A – Gatekeepers in Ghorahi 
Gatekeeper Group Nature of potential influence on my research 
District police leaders 
Legal authority across the city, control over access to police 
personnel at all levels and a high degree of informal influence over 
former police personnel active during the conflict.  
District political party leaders 
Control over access to political party cadres, and a significant 
informal influence on the media, NGOs, civil society organisations 
and much of the business community.  
District government officials 
Legal and political authority across the city, control over access to 
serving local government bureaucrats and informal influence on 
political party representatives.  
NGOs & civil society leaders 
Knowledge of marginalised populations such as landless people, 
conflict victims and indigenous communities, and commonly 
linked to current political party representatives.  
Nepal Army officers Legal authority and control over access to current and former security force personnel.  
Ex-PLA network leaders 
Knowledge of former PLA combatants now resident in Ghorahi, 
internal knowledge on the PLA during the conflict, and links to the 
Maoist party.  
 
 My approach to these gatekeeper groups centred on informing and, if possible, involving those 
I identified in my fieldwork. To do so, in Stage One LD contacted those in the roles listed in Table 4.2 
to request interviews. This initial contact was used as way of acknowledging the status of these elites 
and to counter any negative assumptions or rumour which may have been present. Channelling these 
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requests through LD was also used as means of legitimising my presence. This was largely successful, 
with none of the groups identified proving obstructive, and several aiding the process by providing 
contacts to others in their networks, and by agreeing to be involved in interviews in Stage Two.    
 In addition to managing gatekeepers, I also negotiated primary access by familiarising myself 
with the city and its population. Being resident in the central bazaar area of the city throughout the 
fieldwork, and regular informal conversations in Nepali with those encountered aided in the 
normalisation of my presence. Indeed, many of those I interviewed across both stages of fieldwork were 
aware of my presence in the city prior to being asked to participate. This regular and public presence, 
along with my association with LD, diminished the ‘extractive’ or self-regarding character often applied 
to those working for international NGO amongst many of those in Ghorahi.  
 For secondary access, LD’s positionality was central. As a journalist, LD had a professional 
relationship with many of those I interviewed, including some of the gatekeepers discussed previously. 
These relations helped to mitigate the significant trust threshold for interviews around corruption and 
conflict which would otherwise have proven obstructive. LD’s role as a journalist also served to 
normalise the request for interviews and diminished the sense of political motive which may have 
otherwise been associated with such a request. As I discuss throughout the empirical analysis in Chapters 
Five to Eight these aspects of LD’s positionality did have some unforeseen impacts on the respondents, 
however from the perspective of access this was a vital and positive influence.  
 In addition to LD’s role in secondary access, my positionality was also significant. Given the 
association of visible outsiders to international NGOs, my introduction to respondents focused first on 
the academic nature of my research, second on the provision for anonymity, and third on my status as a 
research student. Emphasising these aspects of my identity, along with my presence in the city discussed 
above, mitigated concerns over the motivation for the research and the negative connotations often 
associated with international organisations. My decision to emphasise ‘student’ and ‘researcher’ 
identities reflects the particular status attached to university education amongst the respondents and 
wider population, which alongside LD’s positionality was central to secondary access.  
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Theoretical sampling 
 Across both stages of fieldwork, I selected participants via theoretical sampling – the process 
of directing sampling decisions with reference to emergent themes (Urquhart, 2013: 63). This required 
the simultaneous collection and analysis of responses throughout my fieldwork, and was also informed 
by a review of sampling decisions after Stage One. As well as being central to the emergence of theory 
(Glaser & Strauss, 1967:45), I engaged theoretical sampling to respond to the practical challenge linked 
to the social constructivist approach I set out in Chapter Three; namely that, under this approach, 
knowledge of corruption is diffuse and variable across social groups and is therefore abundant compared 
with the limited resources available to engage with it. Theoretical sampling aids with this by allowing 
sampling decisions to develop as themes are constructed from this abundance, rather than requiring a 
prior researcher-driven decision (Butler et al, 2018).  
 In addition to its practicality, theoretical sampling is also advantageous because of the 
transparency it introduces to an iterative-inductive research. In particular, the requirement that sampling 
decisions be directed by the emergent themes of ongoing analysis creates an imperative to record these 
themes throughout fieldwork. Following the conventions of CGT, I recorded these decisions using 
theoretical memos (Charmaz, 2006: 112), an example of which is given in Appendix 4.2. Together, these 
memos provide a record of the sampling decisions I took throughout my fieldwork. The outcomes of 
theoretical sampling decisions in Stage One are summarised in Table 4.3B, in which I detail the areas 
of knowledge of conflict and corruption which motivated my engagement with each of the groups listed.  
 
Table 4.3B – Theoretical sampling in Stage One 
Group # Logic (Experience of Conflict) Logic (Experience of Corruption) 
Journalists 10 
Able to provide an analytical overview 
of the conflict and recovery across 
Dang District and nationally.  
Able to provide an analytical view of 
current corruption issues, and the 
patterns of corruption over time.  
Former PLA 5 
Experience of PLA activities in Dang 
District, of the resettlement process 
and of Maoist political transformation.  
Knowledge of attitudes in the Maoist 
party towards corruption during the 
conflict and subsequently.  
Civil Society 
& NGOs 3 
Involved in peace advocacy, with a 
direct connection to victims, including 
marginalised groups.  
Often cast in a preventative role, holding 
local government and political parties to 
account for corruption.  
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Landlord 1 
Commonly targeted by the PLA; and 
experienced the post-conflict land 
return and reallocation processes.  
Close contact with complex local 
government processes in land 
registration and return.  
Peace 
Committee 2 
Officially responsible for the victim 
registration and compensation process 
after the conflict in Dang.  
Part of local government, and 
responsible for the verification of 
beneficiaries of government funds.  
Political 
Parties 2 
Commonly targeted by the PLA, and 
directly involved in the local political 
transition after the conflict.  
Widely identified as a major source of 
corruption, self-identified as holding 
local government accountable. 
District 
Police 1 
Internal knowledge of the police and 
security force approaches during the 
conflict and recovery.  
Part of the state apparatus of corruption 
prevention.  
Rural 
community 
leaders  
11 
Knowledge of the PLA and security 
forces in rural areas during the conflict, 
to compare to urban experiences.  
Knowledge of exposure to corruption 
amongst historically marginalised ethnic 
and linguistic groups.  
Business 
Leaders 1 
Knowledge of the effects of conflict on 
the local economy, and the local 
economic recovery in the transition.  
Often seen as the victims of corruption 
in local government, but also as the 
perpetrators of black markets. 
  
 The focus of Stage One on the background to conflict and corruption  led me to engage with 
respondents with a direct connection to these issues through their occupation and activism. Reflecting 
this and the ease of access to this group via LD, I began with journalists, and branched out to other 
professional groups based on the outcomes of these interviews. For example, the indication from 
interviews 1(07)-1(09) that Ghorahi had an active former-PLA network and that civil society groups had 
engaged with local government on corruption led me to engage with representatives from these 
networks. The respondent group from Stage One is thus principally comprised of elite perspectives. 
 As shown in Table 4.3C, the respondent group which emerged through theoretical sampling in 
Stage Two shares many of the characteristics and logics of those from Stage One, but with the addition 
of experiences from shopkeepers and small business operators in Ghorahi bazaar. I engaged with this 
group to gain insight into the everyday experiences of these issues amongst an unconnected ‘ordinary’ 
population. This nuanced the information gained from those with direct occupational connections to 
conflict and corruption issues. The relatively large number of interviews I conducted amongst this 
respondent group reflects both their absence from Stage One, and the depth and complexity of additional 
issues raised during initial interviews with this group. 
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Table 4.3C – Theoretical sampling in Stage Two 
Group # Logic (Experience of Conflict) Logic (Experience of Corruption) 
Journalists 8 
Targeted by the security forces and the 
PLA, and closely connected to the 
changing political system.  
Knowledge of the language used 
around corruption, and engaged in 
reporting on this issue.  
Political 
Parties 8 
Commonly targeted by the PLA, and 
directly involved in the local political 
transition after the conflict. 
Widely identified as a major source of 
corruption, self-identified as holding 
local government accountable. 
Civil Society 
& NGOs 8 
Representing communities particularly 
impacted by the conflict, such as the 
disabled and conflict victims.  
Self-identification as part of local 
efforts to control corruption by 
advocating on behalf of victims.  
Legal 
Professionals 3 
Internal perspective on land return 
processes, and on the changing 
structures of local government.  
Internal perspective on legal processes 
to control corruption, and on corruption 
in the police and legal system.  
District 
Coordination 
Committee 
1 
Part of the new structure of local 
government which emerged through 
reforms in the centre.  
Part of local government with a formal 
monitoring role over development 
projects across Dang.  
Ethnic 
Communities 5 
Representing communities particularly 
impacted by the conflict, such as the 
Tharu and Magar communities.  
Self-identification as part of local 
efforts to control corruption by 
empowering minority communities.  
Shopkeepers 
& Small 
Business 
22 
Everyday experience of the conflict 
period and transition, particularly 
Maoist demands for donations.  
Everyday experience of corruption, 
without a direct 'anti-corruption' role.  
Business 
leaders 4 
Able to provide a top-level perspective 
on the impacts of conflict on business 
and the local economy.  
Self-identification as part of local 
efforts to control corruption through 
advocacy on behalf of business.  
Big business 
& industry 5 
Indications of differing levels of 
exposure to PLA targeting than small 
business respondents.  
Exposed to higher levels of government 
than small business respondents.  
Rural 
communities 6 
Knowledge of the PLA and security 
forces in rural areas during the conflict, 
to compare to urban experiences. 
Lesser access to government services 
and lesser exposure to failed 
development projects 
  
 The respondent group which resulted from the application of theoretical sampling across the 
two stages of my fieldwork thus comprises of those who, by virtue of their occupation and organisational 
roles, have a connection to anti-corruption or to conflict and those without this direct link. Respectively, 
the first of these groups provided a principally analytical perspective on these issues, and the second 
were principally focused on their personal experiences. My analysis of conflict-induced change in 
corruption combines both of these perspectives, whilst being sensitive to the overlap and divergence 
between and within these groups. A full list of my respondents is given in Appendix 4.3. 
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 In addition to the logic underlying respondent selection, three features of the respondent group 
require further discussion: First, I have excluded the eleven interviews in Stage One and six in Stage 
Two which were conducted in rural areas surrounding Ghorahi. My decision to pursue interviews in 
these areas was based on an emergent theme around rural-urban separation in experiences of corruption 
from Stage One, which I sought to expand on in Stage Two. However, I faced significant barriers to 
access in this setting. As well as heightening my outsider status, LD was also treated with some suspicion 
in these rural areas. This resulted in a greater proportion of interview requests being declined, and limited 
the depth of discussion with those who agreed. Given the resource and time constraints of my fieldwork, 
I decided that I was unlikely to achieve the level and depth of participant engagement necessary to 
provide a contextualised comparison to urban Ghorahi. As such, I have excluded the small number of 
responses gathered from these respondents, and focus my analysis on urban perspectives.  
 Second, the majority of my respondents are male. Rather than a deliberate aspect of theoretical 
sampling, this reflects the difficulties in accessing female respondents which LD and I faced as two male 
researchers. In particular, we encountered a reluctance amongst potential female respondents to be 
interviewed in the private setting required to discuss corruption and conflict effectively and safely. I 
considered employing a female translator to aid with this, however no suitable candidate could be found. 
These issues exacerbated the wider absence of women from the media, political parties and from 
business within Ghorahi, which formed the main respondent groups I identified via theoretical sampling, 
meaning that my efforts to increase the presence of women respondents produced limited results.   
 Finally, I could not recruit any members of the armed forces in Ghorahi in either stage of my 
fieldwork. Despite LD’s repeated attempts to contact current and former members of the Nepal Army 
resident in the city, we could not establish access to this group. Whilst inherently difficult to assess, LD 
noted his lack of familiarity with those in the current military establishment as a contributor to this, 
along with a culture of separation of the military from the civilian population. This is despite the physical 
proximity of a major Nepal Army barracks to Ghorahi city centre. Military voices are thus absent from 
the respondent group, despite their connection to the conflict period and recovery. I discuss the impacts 
of this and the other features of my respondent group throughout my empirical analysis.  
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Methods 
 Across both stages of my fieldwork, I used extended interviews as the primary means of 
gathering information. Reflecting the design described above, I conducted interviews with distinct but 
complementary purposes within each phase: the first focused on the themes necessary to verify case 
selection and assess the sensitivity of key topics and the second on the intensive development and 
expansion of themes around corruption and conflict. Reflecting the contrasting aims of my two stages 
of fieldwork, I used written notes to record responses in Stage One, and in Stage Two I engaged full 
audio recording and transcription. Across both stages, I included the respondent’s background, the 
setting of the interview, and the rapport between the respondent, LD and myself in order to retain key 
elements of the context. Despite my expectations, the majority of respondents appeared unfazed by the 
use of audio recording, and this was possible across all interviews in Stage Two.  
 The nature of the interviews I conducted, supported by LD, were guided by two principles from 
CGT: First, the content of interviews in both stages was driven by theoretical sampling. Like the process 
for participant selection, this entailed the iterative development of themes of questioning through a 
continual process of reflection and review (Charmaz & Belgrave, 2012). Doing so required a 
combination of continual analysis of responses, theoretical memos, and informal discussions with LD, 
but also developed as I established the extent of sensitivity over controversial topics through the 
experience of the interviews. For example, I found aspects of corruption less sensitive than I initially 
assumed, whilst personal experiences of the conflict were less openly discussed than I assumed. 
 Second, my interview style drew on the constructivist intensive interviewing approach. Distinct 
from the often pre-determined thematic progression within semi-structured interviewing, this approach 
is characterised by following the emphasis of participants as they engage with key concepts (Charmaz, 
2006: 25; 2014: 84). My interviews thus typically started with questions about the general impact of 
corruption and life in the conflict, rather than the themes which I had developed through theoretical 
sampling at that stage. My follow-up questions then followed the emphasis placed by the respondents 
within the broad themes of corruption and conflict, and introduced the themes arising through theoretical 
sampling as points of comparison. An example of this progression is given below: 
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“Did you face pressure for donations from the Maoists during the conflict time? 
The Maoists took donations from all businessmen – they requested this two times from 
me. But my home is the rural area – in the Dhelkuri valley – so my family used to provide 
some of the cadres with grains. So I told them that we couldn’t provide from both sides 
– I said I couldn’t pay in cash, because we were already providing grain from our home. 
I didn’t pay, but other businessmen had to pay.  
 
How did they respond to that suggestion? Did they just accept it, or was there any 
negotiation or difficulties after that? 
They didn’t respond very well – they didn’t think I was a good person, and they behaved 
badly towards me. They used to treat me as a rival to the Maoist party, as an opposition 
to the party. 
 
What did that mean? 
They used to think I wasn’t helping them, and wasn’t taking positively to the conflict, 
but they didn’t regularly create problems about that. They just didn’t have a good 
perception of me. They couldn’t come here regularly. 
 
What do you think they were doing with the donations that they took from businessmen 
in general? Were they all for the conflict, or were they used for corruption or personal 
benefit? 
I think perhaps that they misused the donations. They got it personally, and used it for 
themselves.” 2(53) Electrical business owner 
  
 Practically, because of the limits to my Nepali language ability, my interviews were conducted 
using LD as a translator. Given the significance of language in constructivism and CGT, I provided 
training to LD which stressed the need for literal translation. Alongside this, I conducted reviews of 
audio recordings and translations with LD throughout Stage Two to ensure a consistently high quality 
of translation, and to enable me to develop a clear picture of the language and terminology used around 
corruption and conflict. This enabled me to respond to terms specific to corruption and conflict in Nepali, 
and encourage respondents to elaborate on terminology where necessary.  
 In addition to interviews, I also used observational memos throughout both stages of my 
fieldwork. Typically consisting of a photograph and written explanation, I most frequently used this 
method when I travelled to areas of the city that my respondents had linked to the conflict or to 
corruption. This included a number of failed or partially completed building projects which many 
respondents characterised as examples of corruption, as well as the areas of the city they described as 
most affected by the conflict. I then used my observations alongside themes developed from prior 
interviews when questioning respondents, which led to more detail in questions specific to the 
experience of corruption and the impacts of the conflict. An example memo is given in Appendix 4.4.  
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Ethics and risk management 
 Before entering the field, my research design was subject to an ethical review and risk 
assessment by the University of Birmingham. A summary of the major considerations I put forward in 
these reviews is given in Appendix 4.5. The majority of these provisions would necessarily occur in 
interview-based research by an external party in a developing country, such as the need for information 
security and data protection, procedures to respond to instability or natural disasters, and care around 
sensitive interview topics (Crawford et al, 2017). However, three of the decisions I made within these 
processes warrant further discussion, as they diverge somewhat from common procedures.  
 First, I elected not to use a written information sheet and signed consent procedure. I did so 
because of the sensitivity of the topics of my research, which I deemed likely to provide an 
insurmountable barrier to obtaining written consent. I instead engaged a verbal process of consent at the 
start of each interview, and verbally confirmed this with the participant at the end of each interview.  
This confirmation step is particularly important in allowing the respondent to reflect on how they want 
their information to be used in light of their responses. The training I provided to LD during Stage One 
and our discussions after each interview ensured that this was delivered consistently and fully.  
 Second, the consent procedure was influenced by my positionality and that of LD. Through the 
early stages of the fieldwork, it became clear that my identity as a western ‘guest’ and LD’s relatively 
elite status had the potential to limit the capacity of some potential respondents to refuse requests for 
interviews. Whilst the extent to which this influenced the respondents is inherently difficult to assess, 
my discussions with LD highlighted the need to ensure consent was explained in such a way to minimise 
social pressure. Interviews were terminated in two instances where I judged that participants had felt 
undue pressure to engage, and our approach to consent evolved based on this experience.  
 Finally, my decision to keep the identities of the respondents anonymous required greater 
reflection than I had expected based on the formal ethical review process. Specifically, a significant 
minority of respondents expressed a preference to have their names used where they were quoted in this 
thesis. From their perspective, this was a way of expressing confidence in their responses, and having 
’nothing to hide’. Beyond procedural reasons, my decision to override this preference reflects my use 
of quotations in combination. Whilst wanting to respect respondent preferences, I determined that it 
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could not be guaranteed that those who expressed a desire to have their name included would retain this 
preference if seen in combination within other responses. As such, throughout this thesis I refer to my 
respondents by interview number and occupation, e.g. ‘2(38) Agricultural business owner’.  
 
4.3.4 Adaptations to the research design 
 Thus far, I have reflected on the processes underlying the 89 interviews which inform the 
empirical chapters to follow. In doing so, I discussed the exclusion of interviews conducted in rural areas 
distinct from urban Ghorahi and two instances where I terminated interviews due to concerns over 
consent. However, this was not the only adaptation I made to my research design whilst conducting 
fieldwork. To close this section, I now discuss how Ghorahi emerged as the sole location of my 
fieldwork, rather than the comparative analysis I had originally intended. In Chapter Ten, I reflect on 
how this adaptation shaped my research, and how this might be addressed in future research.  
 The first iteration of my research design included a comparative element. Specifically, I sought 
to compare Ghorahi to an urban area in Rolpa District. Rolpa includes the areas in which the Maoist 
movement had its origins, and in which there was a history of Maoist political mobilisation before the 
conflict (De Sales, 2013). I intended to engage with the experiences of those living in a major market 
town in this District and, through this, to compare conflict-induced change in corruption across 
differently conflict-affected areas. During Stage One, I conducted interviews with 35 respondents in 
Rolpa. To facilitate this, I employed KG – a journalist and political activist from Rolpa.  
 Whilst only indirectly involved in party politics during Stage One, the local government 
elections which took place in Rolpa between the first and second stages of my fieldwork led to KG being 
employed in local government. In addition to limiting his availability, this led my fieldwork in Rolpa to 
be directly related to KG’s new areas of work, and to have the potential to conflict with those connected 
to him. I attempted to adapt to this by shifting my focus to Liwang, the headquarters of Rolpa District, 
but lacked the logistical support necessary to conduct sufficient interviews in this comparatively more 
challenging area of Nepal. Because of these challenges, I have excluded the 35 interviews from Stage 
One and 8 from Stage Two from my analysis, and focus solely on Ghorahi.  
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 The changes to my research design which came out of the changing political conditions between 
Stages One and Two mean that I could not realise the comparative element of my original design. This 
does not undermine the core contribution of this thesis to the literature on conflict-induced change in 
corruption, but does leave the question of variations in this relationship based on different experiences 
of conflict open. Whilst limiting my analysis in this area, responding to this challenge in the field also 
meant that I could conduct fifteen further interviews in Ghorahi in Stage Two. The account of conflict-
induced change in corruption in Ghorahi which I develop over the chapters to follow is deeper than 
would have been the case had the comparative element of my design been realised  
 
4.4 Analytical approach 
 My fieldwork yielded 25 responses recorded in written notes from Stage One, 64 audio 
recordings from Stage Two, and a set of theoretical memos and observational notes collected across both 
stages. In this section, I set out the process by which I analysed this information; focusing first on 
transcription and data management, and second on the coding process. Following this, I reflect on the 
conduct and outcomes of these processes, including the influence of my positionality and assumptions.  
 
4.4.1 Transcription 
 The use of theoretical sampling in my fieldwork required an overlapping process of data 
collection and analysis. Reflecting this, I attempted to write up written notes and transcribe interview 
recording on the day they were conducted, and in some instances delayed further interviews to allow 
this to occur. Aided by the additional background notes I took for each interview, I did so to ensure that, 
to the maximum extent possible, the context of the interview remains present as transcripts and notes 
are constructed (Birks & Mills, 2015: 75). This included, for example, notes on the openness of the 
respondent to potentially controversial topics, and the influence of the setting.17  
 The emphasis on language within CGT (Charmaz, 2014: 94) was also central to my approach 
to transcription. Rather than focusing only on the English translation provided by LD, I maintained 
Nepali terminology around corruption alongside the English translation across the transcriptions of 
 
17 For example, interviews conducted in cafes and public areas of hotels 
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interviews in Stage Two. In addition to consulting the Nepali language resources that I had developed 
across five months of language tuition, I used daily review meetings with LD to ensure accuracy as my 
picture of these concepts and the contestation around them emerged. The key terms developed from this 
and the manner in which they are used form a central part of the context for conflict-induced change in 
corruption, and are introduced in Chapter Five.  
 The emphasis on contextualisation present in both these elements did, however, need to be 
balanced against ethical considerations relating to respondent protection and consent. As I discussed in 
Section 4.3, I have elected not to use the names of respondents, but this alone is insufficient to protect 
their identities. Reflecting this, during transcription and in the empirical chapters to follow, details I 
deemed sufficient to identify the respondent have been altered, as have the names of others mentioned 
within interviews. The exception to this is major public figures, such as political leaders and others in 
the public eye. The specific details I have changed reflect my assessment of the number of those in 
Ghorahi with the characteristics described, and the vulnerability of the respondent.  
  
4.4.2 Coding and theoretical development 
 Across the two stages of fieldwork, my analytical approach was as follows: First, during and 
subsequent to Stage One, I used the coding processes described below to produce an initial analysis of 
major themes relevant to corruption and conflict amongst the respondents. In Stage Two, I added 
transcripts to the set responses from Stage One as I conducted and transcribed additional interviews, 
from which I developed and refined the themes and concepts present in the set of responses as a whole. 
The coding process I describe here thus relates to the whole set of responses.  
 Whilst all grounded theory studies entail coding, the stages of coding are the subject contestation 
across methodological works within this approach. As I introduced in Section 4.2, this contestation 
stems from debate between Glaser and Strauss over the role of coding paradigms in theoretical 
development, and in particular the role of axial coding (Strauss & Corbin, 1990). This leads many 
grounded theorists to identify their coding approach as either Glaserian or Straussian (Apramian et al, 
2017; Hernandez, 2009). Whilst narrowing through methodological developments since the 1990s, 
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including the development of CGT, this still diverts methodological attention in grounded theory to 
debates over ‘pure’ or ‘authentic’ elements of the approach (Charmaz, 2014a: 1081). 
 As is common in CGT (Charmaz, 2006; 2014: 113), I opted for a three-stage coding process 
summarised in Diagram 4.4A. This process is comprised of initial, selective and theoretical coding. 
Consistent with the emphasis on participant-led conceptualisation within constructivism, this coding 
approach prioritises openness and spontaneity as routes to theoretical development, rather than rigid 
coding paradigms. These coding paradigms are not entirely absent from contemporary methodological 
works on CGT, but are seen as an optional and potentially distortionary addition, to be used with caution. 
This contrasts the central role of coding paradigms in Strauss and Corbin’s (1990) work, and fits more 
closely with the Glaserian branch of grounded theory (Duchscher & Morgan, 2004; Kelle, 2007). 
  
Table 4.4A – Three stage coding process 
 
 In the first instance, I coded my transcripts line by line, producing a set of ‘initial’ or ‘open’ 
codes (Charmaz, 2014: 116; Urquhart, 2013: 45). These initial codes are intended to reflect the meaning 
intended by respondents as closely as possible, in a manner which is “provisional, comparative, and 
grounded in the data” (Charmaz, 2014: 117). I implemented this through assigning nodes in NVivo to 
the vast majority of sentences in my interview notes and transcripts, and in doing so attempted to follow 
the emphasis in the responses rather than a preconceived logic. I did so through an iterative process of 
Initial 
Coding
• The application of largely descriptive labels on a sentence-by-sentence basis.
• Conducted with an emphasis on coverage and remaining open to any 
potential theoretical direction from the responses. 
Selective 
Coding
• Refining initial codes into analytical categories, which are specific to conflict 
and corruption. 
• Conducted through the use of the constant comparative approach as a means 
of moving from descriptive to analytical labels.
Theoretical 
Coding
• Exploring and defining the relationship between conflict and corruption in 
order to build theory. 
• Achieved through the ongoing refinement of selective codes, in combination 
with theoretical memos. 
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re-labelling and review to ensure codes faithfully represent the responses, whilst acknowledging my role 
in the construction of codes. An example of this process is given in Table 4.4B. 
 
Table 4.4B - Initial coding 
Transcripts (2(02) Journalist)  Initial Codes 
Q: What are the major political issues affecting Dang?  
“Dang was badly affected by the conflict, … Dang as a comparatively heavily impacted area of Nepal 
… and in the post-conflict period the political leaders have 
sought to bring about significant change, including in Dang. 
Political leaders driving change 
nationally and locally 
There was a social revolution because of the conflict, … Conflict as a driver of social change 
… and the people have become more aware. Awareness as an element of social change 
Despite this, the political leaders are still involved in 
corruption - … Political leaders as corrupt actors 
 … people see the lack of development progress, and the lack 
of spending within the area, and so they think there is 
corruption. 
Lack of development and spending 
as proxies for corruption 
The political leaders have tried to convince the people that 
they are transparent, and free from corruption, … 
Public relations efforts by political 
leaders 
… but they have not convinced the people of this.” Popular perceptions of political leaders 
 
 The second aspect of coding - ‘selective’ (Urquhart, 2013: 48) or ‘focused’ (Charmaz, 2014: 
138) coding - moves from the largely descriptive set of initial labels to a set of increasingly analytical 
codes, which are the foundations of theoretical development. Reflecting the concept of constant 
comparison I discussed in Section 4.2, this second aspect of coding is largely concurrent to initial coding, 
with the set of focused codes evolving as initial codes are added and refined. Through this process, I 
refined initial codes into categories defining dimensions of experiences of the conflict and of corruption 
amongst the respondents. An example of this process of refinement is given in Table 4.4C, showing how 
I grouped and developed the codes in Table 4.4B from initial to focused codes.  
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Table 4.4C - Focused coding 
Initial Codes Focused Codes 
Dang as a comparatively heavily impacted area Conflict intensity 
Political leaders driving change nationally and locally Political change through conflict 
Conflict as a driver of social change Awareness through conflict 
Awareness as an element of social change Awareness through conflict 
Political leaders as corrupt actors Continuity in political corruption 
Lack of development and spending as proxies for corruption Proxies for corruption 
Public relations efforts by political leaders Continuity in political corruption 
Popular perceptions of political leaders Continuity in political corruption 
  
 The final stage, theoretical coding, considers how the concepts which emerged from focused 
coding are connected. This emphasis on the connection between emergent concepts distinguishes 
theoretical from focused coding (Charmaz, 2014: 150), however there is overlap between these stages. 
To complement the continual refinement of concepts at this stage, I developed these relations through 
the use of theoretical memos.18 These memos describe the emerging relationship between aspects of the 
conflict and of corruption, and were written as often as relationships occurred to me. Typically starting 
from a single quote and comment which typifies a relationship, these memos were expanded and 
grouped as the responses were coded. An example memo is provided in Appendix 4.2.  
 The outcome of the theoretical coding process is the three elements of conflict-induced change 
in corruption in Ghorahi which I set out over Chapters Six to Eight. These are: [1] the corrupt 
transformation of the mid-level Maoist elite, [2] instability and politicisation in the local and central 
governance systems, and [3] the transformation of mindsets and awareness. These three elements 
collectively define the respondents’ experiences of conflict-induced change in corruption. In Chapters 
Six to Eight, I discuss each of these three elements in isolation. Reflecting the emphasis within CGT on 
 
18 Glaser (1965: 443) wrote that memos “provide the content behind the categories, which are the 
major themes of the theory”. The collation of memos is central to theoretical development process 
described by Glaser & Strauss (1967: 113), and contemporary use of CGT (Urquhart, 2013: 110) 
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theory building, in Chapter Nine I then integrate these relationships into a combined theory of conflict-
induced change in corruption in Ghorahi, and compare this to the four theories of this relationship 
evident in the literature – as I discussed in Chapter Two.  
 
4.4.3 Reflections 
 I selected the coding process described above based on its compatibility with the constructivist 
theoretical approach I set out in Chapter Three, but also because of the flexibility that this approach 
afforded over more prescriptive coding paradigms within other branches of grounded theory. This 
flexibility is advantageous because it reduces the extent to which coding is channelled towards pre-
determined ends, and thus is more conducive to theoretical innovation. However, with this flexibility 
comes the increased capacity for my decisions and positionality to influence coding processes. 
Acknowledging this, here I reflect on my assumptions and positionality in the coding process.  
 As I discussed in Chapter Three, constructivist epistemology defines researcher and respondents 
as co-constructors of knowledge. In contrast to the more conventional emphasis on researcher agency 
alone (Breckenridge et al, 2012), this frames participant as well as researcher agency and the 
positionality of those as influences on responses. The coding process forms an extension of this 
construction of data, but is one in which the participant is absent. Whilst supported by reflective 
discussions with LD, the codes constructed through the above process reflect my input far more than 
any other. On reflection, two aspects of my positionality particularly influenced this process.  
 First, as is implicit in the research question in Section 4.1, I assumed that, at some level, 
experiences of corruption were influenced by experiences of conflict among my respondents. This 
assumption inevitably leads to greater interest in instances where the relationship between these 
phenomena is confirmed or refuted than in those where it is simply absent. Whilst representativeness in 
the positivist sense is not the goal of CGT (Charmaz, 2014: 8), this assumption has the potential to lead 
to this relationship being overstated compared to the extent to which it is present amongst the 
respondents. This would undermine the fit of the emergent theory to the information gathered in the 
field, the core validity criteria in grounded theory (Chiovitti & Piran, 203; Hernandez, 2010: 159).  
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 I have attempted to manage the impacts of my focus on conflict-induced change in corruption 
by also analysing the nature and causes of corruption in Ghorahi in general. I use this information on 
forms of corruption which are a constant presence, or which have changed for reasons other than the 
conflict and transition, as point of comparison for the three relationships between corruption and conflict 
emergent from the coding process. I present this in Chapter Five, in which I discuss the language used 
to describe corruption in Ghorahi, and in Chapter Nine, in which I integrate the three forms of conflict-
induced change in corruption with corruption in Ghorahi in general.  
 Second, my theoretical approach to corruption is linked to an interest in the forms of corruption 
which do not conform to the public-private divide. In particular, the fact that constructivist scholars and 
others criticise the focus on public sector bribery as the primary form of corruption has led me to take a 
particular interest in forms and understandings of corruption which contradict this. The risk stemming 
from this is that the genuine dominance of experiences of bribery amongst my respondents could be 
understated in an effort to ensure that divergent - but far less prevalent - forms are represented. The 
attempt to counter a dominant international discourse on the nature of corruption thus can itself lead to 
the experiences of the respondent group being misrepresented through the coding process.  
 My efforts to manage the impact of my theoretical positionality within the coding process comes 
first through ensuring that the initial coding process covered all representations of corruption, even 
where examples of bribery in particular added little to the category. In the chapter to follow I discuss 
the nature of corruption in Ghorahi without reference to the impacts of conflict, and within this consider 
the frequency of different forms of corruption. This emphasis on frequency is far from the only driver 
of this discussion, but is a significant point of reference in ensuring that the emphasis remains driven by 
prioritisation within the respondent group. Comparisons of forms of corruption specific to the conflict 
to corruption in general are also a key element of the discussion in Chapter Nine.  
 
4.5 Summary 
 In this chapter I have set out the principles, practical realisation and analytical strategy that I 
employed during and subsequent to my fieldwork. I began by linking the social constructivist 
ontological approach I discussed in Chapter Three with constructivist grounded theory, moved to the 
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two-stage research design based in this approach, and finally detailed how I developed findings and 
theory of conflict-induced change in corruption from this case.  
 My reflections across the research design and analytical approach emphasised the influence of 
my positionality and that of LD in constructing a relationship between corruption and conflict in 
Ghorahi. These reflections describe a difficult balance between factors which eased access to the field 
and facilitated a large number of in-depth interviews to be conducted in relatively short period of time, 
but which also shaped the nature of the respondent group and raised ethical considerations around 
consent. Reflections in this chapter also detailed how my focus on Ghorahi alone emerged through 
developments in the field. I consider the implications of this, and how future research might address the 
question of intra-local variations in conflict-induced change in corruption in Chapter Ten.  
 The structure of the four chapters to follow reflects the outcomes of the coding process which I 
have described in this chapter, as well as the emphasis constructivism and CGT place on contextualised 
analysis. In Chapter Five, I build from the influences on the case selection discussed in this chapter to 
the context of conflict and corruption experienced by those I interviewed in Ghorahi. As well as 
reflecting the need for contextualisation within constructivism and constructivist grounded theory, this 
reflects the imperative to consider the general prevalence of different experiences of corruption which 
stem from the reflections in this chapter. In Chapters Six to Eight, I then set out each of the three elements 
of conflict-induced change in corruption which emerged from the coding process and in Chapter Nine, 
integrate these elements and discuss their contribution to the literature.  
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Chapter Five: Corruption and conflict in Ghorahi 
5.1 Introduction  
 In Chapter Two, I discussed the ways in which Nepal’s conflict differs from those which have 
driven theoretical development on conflict-induced change in corruption in the literature, and how my 
focus on change at the local level and in the long term reflects two under-explored areas of this 
relationship. Following this, in Chapter Four, I discussed the factors which led me to focus on Ghorahi 
as an example of conflict-induced change in corruption at this level and time period. Drawing on the 
theoretical approach set out in Chapter Three, I also discussed the need to define corruption in context, 
based on the understandings of those studied. Reflecting this, in this chapter I introduce the experiences 
of conflict and of corruption among my respondents. This provides the context for the three elements of 
conflict-induced change in corruption I discuss over Chapters Six to Eight.  
 This chapter has two main parts: In Section 5.2, I discuss my respondents’ experiences and 
reflections on the 1996-2006 conflict and the post-2006 recovery. Reflecting the themes emphasised 
across the respondent group, in this section I focus on the isolation of Ghorahi from the impacts of the 
first five years of the conflict, the transformative impacts of the 2001 PLA attack on the city, and 
everyday life during the emergency period which resulted from this attack. Moving to the post-conflict 
transition, I then discuss the reintegration of former PLA combatants into the city, the changes in the 
governance system, and the transformation of the Maoists into a mainstream political party.  
 In Section 5.3, I discuss the nature of corruption in Ghorahi, as constructed by those in the city. 
Reflecting the emphasis on language within social constructivism detailed in Chapter Three, I focus on 
how the respondents describe and discuss corruption, and the set of acts and standards which distinguish 
corrupt and legitimate behaviours in this context. To do so, I set out the key corruption-related 
terminology in the responses, the judgements expressed in accounts of corruption of a variety of forms, 
and how these linguistic and normative components act back on those in the city. Together, this provides 
the context for the discussion of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi which I set out over 
the three chapters to follow.  
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5.2 Conflict and transition in Ghorahi 
 Across the literature on Nepal’s conflict, the majority of analysis is focused on those rural areas 
in which the Maoist movement was formed and on the political dynamics of conflict and transition in 
Kathmandu. With the exception of the consequences of the 2001 PLA attack on Ghorahi – the first large 
scale assault on the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) in an urban area (Pasang, 2008) – the literature includes 
little analysis of the experiences of urban populations outside of Kathmandu. This reflects the 
concentration of Maoist control and ideology on historically marginalised communities in rural areas 
and the historic concentration of political power in the capital (Subedi, 2013).  
 In this section, I discuss how my respondents experienced and perceive the 1996-2006 Maoist 
conflict and the post-2006 transition. Within each sub-section, I situate my respondents’ experiences 
and perceptions alongside the key events of the conflict and transition in the literature. I do so to 
contextualise the discussion of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi to follow among the 
broader set of events in Nepal, and in particular to highlight areas in which the experiences of this 
population differ from the experiences of those in Maoist-dominated rural areas and in Kathmandu. I 
return to this discussion when considering the transferability and limits of this case in Chapter Nine.  
 
5.2.1 Experiences of the conflict 
 From the Maoist perspective, the conflict began with the 1996 declaration by the then United 
People’s Front Nepal. Concentrated in remote areas of Rolpa and Rukum Districts, this small force 
conducted skirmishes with isolated police outposts, and initially received little attention from the 
government or military leadership in Kathmandu (Eck, 2010; Subedi, 2013). However, as these attacks 
escalated beyond the areas in which ideological affinity with Maoism had been present since the 1950s 
(Seddon, 2010), the police conducted operations aimed at limiting the Maoists militarily. The repression 
employed in these operations drove many historically marginalised populations towards the Maoists, 
aiding their growth across rural areas from 1998 (Adhikari & Samford, 2013; Graham, 2007). 
 Whilst bordered by Rolpa to the north, the early events of the conflict in the Maoist base areas 
and the rural areas to which the Maoists expanded after 1998 were largely peripheral to the experiences 
of those I interviewed in Ghorahi. At this time, the city had little of the road and communication 
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infrastructure seen now, and the flow of information from rural communities was limited. A small group 
of journalists I interviewed reported on the violence and motivations of the Maoists,19 however the 
conflict had little direct effect on Ghorahi. As such, for the vast majority of those I interviewed, the 
conflict is synonymous with the 2001 PLA attack and the emergency period which followed.  
 My respondents’ focus on the 2001-2006 period is evident in their responses to questions I 
posed on life in the conflict period in general. These questions were almost universally responded to 
with a focus on the period after 2001, and in particular on the restrictions on everyday life faced during 
the state of emergency initiated by King Gyanendra.20 Those few who referenced events before 2001 
tended to do so only by means of contrast to the emergency period, or chance encounters with PLA 
combatants during travel in rural areas.21 A minority, like 2(03), also spoke of encounters with those 
displaced in the early phases of the conflict, however this was far from common across the respondents.  
 
“There are a lot more victims in the rural areas though, as many people were forced to give 
shelter to the Maoists, and because of this were the targets of the security forces. The people in 
the city did not face these impacts, they just read about it and heard stories from those who fled 
from the rural areas into the city.” 2(03) Journalist and academic 
 
 In part because of the limited direct impacts of the conflict on everyday life in Ghorahi before 
2001, the respondents describe the Maoists as an external and remote group during the early phase of 
the conflict. This is reflected in how the respondents describe the populations that the Maoists appealed 
to and the areas of the country that their combatants were recruited from, both of which are dominated 
by references to impoverished rural communities.22 The respondents thus characterise the conflict as 
having been external to the city population before 2001, and that for many there was a feeling of 
immunity from Maoist attack. Indeed, 1(09) and 1(12) describe that the conflict was only of interest to 
the politically minded in Ghorahi throughout the late 1990s, despite mounting violence in the rural Hill 
areas proximate to the city.  
 
 
19 1(09) Journalist and activist; 1(12) Journalist 
20 2(22) Legal professional; 2(60) Electronics business owner; 2(74) Clothing business owner 
21 2(16) Journalist; 2(49) Animal supplies business owner; 2(56) Medical business owner 
22 1(12) Journalist; 2(36) Tharu community representative; 2(41) Senior business representative 
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“There was vast discrimination between the lower and the upper castes in the villages, and so 
they tried to recruit lower caste people and get them to join the war. They wanted them to fight 
against discrimination.” 2(16) Journalist 
 
 At the national level, the 2001 PLA attack on Ghorahi was transformative of the conflict. As 
well as representing the first successful PLA assault against a fortified Royal Nepal Army (RNA) 
barracks in an urban area, the attack transformed attitudes in Kathmandu as to the capabilities of the 
PLA. This triggered a switch from police to military-led counter-insurgency and led to the declaration 
of a state of emergency (Adhikari, 2014: 65; Chalmers, 2012: 68; Jha, 2014: 87). With the state of 
emergency came the most violent months of the conflict (OCHCR, 2014), with the RNA and armed 
police force deployed into heavy-handed operations in the Maoist base areas. As I discuss below, this 
escalation of the conflict ultimately resulted in the stalemate which facilitated key talks between the 
Maoists and the political establishment in Kathmandu in 2005.  
 Whilst widely discussed as a turning point in the literature on the conflict, the impacts of the 
PLA attack on Ghorahi is only set out in detail in an account published by Pasang (2008: 113), the 
former Chief of the PLA. Pasang describes that 1,100 PLA simultaneously attacked the city from 
multiple directions, and overran the RNA and police garrison of 325. Whilst Pasang’s claims on the 
relative losses on each side are dubious, accounts I gathered from senior local government officials,23 
journalists24 and other residents of the city25 during the attack confirm the extent of destruction in the 
city in Pasang’s account. This includes the destruction of government offices, the District Police 
Headquarters and the RNA barracks, as well as the raiding of the city bank. The respondents also attest 
to the shock felt at the attack, given the rural concentration of Maoist attacks before 2001.  
 The respondents describe the 2001 attack as transformative of everyday life in Ghorahi. Most 
directly, the attack was the first and only major attack by the PLA on the city area, and as such is 
synonymous with the start and the height of experiences of conflict-era violence for those I interviewed. 
However, the intense but brief period of physical damage inflicted on the city, and on the infrastructure 
 
23 1(18) District Peace Committee member; 1(19) District Peace Committee member; 2(19) UML 
District representative 
24 1(08) Journalist and activist; 1(09) Journalist and activist; 2(03) Journalist and academic 
25 1(25) Small business owner and former senior business representative; 2(74) Clothing business owner 
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of the state in particular, is emphasised only by those directly connected to local government, party 
politics and the media at the time of the attack.26 For the respondent group as a whole, the impacts of 
this attack are instead described through the following two sets of experiences. 
 First, the respondents stress the failure of the security forces to protect the city, and the chronic 
sense of vulnerability to further attack by the PLA that this introduced. Whilst the Maoists were seen as 
a rural and therefore external force, the illusion that Ghorahi was immune from the conflict was shattered 
by the brief but highly destructive incursion of the PLA in 2001, and the inability of the security forces 
to defend even their own bases in the city. Consequently, the respondents describe the aftermath of the 
attack principally in terms of feelings of fear and the suspicion of outsiders to the city. 27 This marked 
the end to immunity from the conflict for the city, and for many the real start of the conflict period.  
 
“[T]he security forces were not providing security at that time. The District Headquarters was 
attacked by the Maoist party. The army barracks itself was not secure!” 2(41) Senior business 
representative 
 
“If any new person came here in the shop, we didn’t think it was a customer. We thought it 
might be the Maoist making enquiries or looking for help. There was terror. If we saw a new 
person in the market or on the street, we thought it was the Maoist planning an attack[.]” 2(74) 
Clothing business owner 
   
 Second, the respondents describe the days after the attack and the emergency period through 
reference to the increasingly draconian measures to control the population imposed by the security 
forces. Rather than as a necessary response to a PLA attack, the fact that these provisions were 
implemented in the context of perceived failures of the RNA to defend the city means these measures 
are not seen as having been to the benefit of ordinary people. Rather, they are seen by some as part of 
an effort of the security forces to ensure their own protection, after being exposed by the PLA.28 
However, for the majority, they are simply described in terms of the intrusions imposed on daily life.  
 The respondents’ accounts of the restrictions imposed by the security forces in the wake of the 
2001 attack widely include curfew and limits on movement to rural areas, which were near-universal 
 
26 2(19) UML District representative; 1(28) Senior police officer; 1(09) Journalist and activist 
27 1(08) Journalist and activist 2(49) Animal supplies business owner; 2(53) Electrical business owner 
28 1(17) Journalist; 2(06) Senior business representative; 2(41) Senior business representative 
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experiences. The impacts the respondents emphasise beyond this vary principally by the profession of 
the participants: Those involved in business emphasise restrictions on goods seen as useful to the 
Maoists, including fast food and clothing.29 Journalists emphasise the direct censorship of their reporting 
on RNA losses and on Maoist movement, and a wider context of fear in reporting.30 Political activists 
were limited in their capacity to gather and meet with cadres, with the emergency period seen to close 
political space.31 Together, these accounts give a picture of an increasingly closed environment within 
the city after November 2001, the intensity of which is largely described as at the whim of the security 
forces, rather than to the benefit of the population of Ghorahi.  
 
“The security forces restricted us opening at night and in the early mornings. They also restricted 
the number of guests in the hotel as well. The security forces didn’t give permission for more 
than 3 or 4 people to gather in one place during the emergency time.” 2(58) Auto business owner 
  
 Pressure from the security forces was not, however, the only manner in which the emergency 
period transformed life in Ghorahi. Rather, as the Maoists drove the security forces out of the rural areas 
of Dang,32 the respondents describe themselves as increasingly stuck between the security forces and 
the PLA. Most literally, both the Maoists and the security forces restricted movement to the rural areas, 
particularly for those connected to rival political parties,33 but also exerted pressure on the urban 
population in other ways. For those in business, the Maoists exerted pressure for donations through their 
network of cadres, often accompanied by threats of violence. These demands exacerbated the toll of the 
pressure from the security forces on everyday life, and compounded declines in the city economy.34  
 
“The Maoists used to regularly demand donations from me. I sometimes used to provide the 
donations, but I couldn’t give what they expected. I was afraid that they could do anything – 
they could attack me or anything – so I was always afraid”. 2(78) Factory Owner 
  
 
29 2(16) Journalist; 2(52) Medical business owner; 2(54) Senior business representative 
30 1(08) Journalist and social activist; 1(29) Journalist; 1(35) - Journalist 
31 1(13) Journalist and former PLA combatant; 2(18) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(19) 
UML District representative  
32 1(28) Senior police officer 
33 1(22) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(19) 
UML District Representative 
34 2(59) Auto business owner; 2(77) Petrol station worker; 2(50) Business community representative 
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 The respondents’ accounts of the peak of the conflict thus focus on the restrictions they 
experienced in their everyday lives, and the fear rampant after the 2001 PLA attack. They describe 
themselves as having been trapped between a security force unable to provide effective protection, and 
an external Maoist threat able to reach into the city militarily, and through their network of cadres. 
Neither the security forces nor the Maoists are described as having acted principally in a protector role, 
and equivalences between the pressure from both sides are a frequent feature of the responses. The 
respondents thus characterise the 2002 to 2005 period as one of constant pressure from both sides.  
 
5.2.2 Experiences of the transition  
 The de-escalation of violence and peace agreement which followed emerged through changes 
in the military and political context in 2005/06. Militarily, the two sides were increasingly locked in 
stalemate, with the PLA unable to repeat their successes against the RNA in Ghorahi, and the RNA’s 
lack of experience in counter-insurgency meaning that they made little progress against the PLA in rural 
areas (Gobyn, 2009; Mehta & Lawoti, 2010). Politically, King Gyanendra’s 2005 coup against the 
elected government produced a brief alliance of political parties in Kathmandu, and aligned them with 
the republican demands of the Maoist leadership (Bhatt, 2010; Wagle & Jackson, 2015; Mishra, 2009). 
This alignment of political and military factors led to a ceasefire, widespread protests against the 
monarchy, and the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord (CPA) in 2006 (Whitfield, 2012).   
 The peacebuilding process which followed from the CPA had two main components: First, the 
Government of Nepal and the Maoist leadership oversaw a demobilisation, disarmament and 
reintegration (DDR) process which led to the retirement of 92% of verified PLA combatants (Wagle & 
Jackson, 2015). The remaining minority were integrated into the Nepal Army, which was reformed to 
fall under democratic control (Upreti & Vanhoutte, 2009). Second, the governance system was 
fundamentally transformed, moving from a unitary constitutional monarchy to a federal democratic 
republic (Whitfield, 2012). The Maoists emerged as the largest party in the first set of elections under 
this new system, but failed to replicate this success in 2012. In 2018 the Maoists merged into the 
Communist Party of Nepal Unified Marxist Leninist (UML) to form the Nepal Communist Party.  
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 The factors which lead to the CPA and which have shaped the DDR process and political 
transition have been the subject of extensive academic analysis (see, for example, Subedi, 2014; Upreti, 
2014; Whitfield, 2012). However, despite the extent to which the conflict was driven by the exclusion 
of peripheral populations, areas outside of Kathmandu typically feature in this only to the extent that 
they influenced events in the centre. Amongst the most highlighted of these has been the violence in the 
Terai which emerged over the drawing of federal boundaries (Strasheim, 2018). These episodes of 
violence were, however, concentrated in the Eastern Terai, and did not inspire a similar degree of 
contestation in the western area. How the transition has been experienced in Ghorahi and other areas in 
which tensions over federalism have not been inflamed is therefore largely absent from the literature.  
 Despite the contrast between my respondents’ experiences of the conflict and the national level 
picture set out in the literature, the respondents emphasise many of the same elements of the transition 
present in the literature. News of the ceasefire, PLA combatants entering cantonment, the signing of the 
CPA, and the 2008 Maoist-led government are described as having incrementally boosted the confidence 
that violence would not return, including amongst respondents without political and media 
connections.35 There was widespread tentativeness in the first two years of the transition given the 
breakdown of talks in 2001,36 however this is equally present on the national level, particularly during 
the period in which the Maoists exited the transitional government (Martin, 2012; Whitfield, 2012).  
 
“It was still fearful just after it ended. I couldn’t believe the government or the Maoist, because 
they could again just start the conflict. There were many peace talks before between the 
government and the Maoist, many were broken, and the Maoist again started the conflict … 
When they made an agreement for the peace process, and the Maoist also participated in the 
government, at that time only I could believe it[.]” 2(75) Clothing business owner  
 
 Despite the instability of the early transition and the fear of a return to violence the respondents 
associated with this, the respondents now see the Maoists as a political force. Even for those who were 
directly targeted by the PLA as political opponents37 or who were subject to violent pressure for financial 
 
35 2(12) Disability rights activist; 2(49) Animal supplies business owner; 2(75) Clothing business owner 
36 1(35) Journalist; 2(19) UML District representative; 2(80) Agricultura business owner 
37 1(22) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(13) UML District representative; 2(14) Nepali 
Congress District representatives 
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donations,38 the military roots of the Maoist party are described as an aspect of their past, rather than the 
factor shaping the current or future direction of the party. As I discuss in Chapter Six, elements of this 
insurgent history are central to the experience of corruption in Ghorahi. However, from the perspective 
of the transition alone, the central level transformation of the Maoists to a political force resonates with 
the experience of those I interviewed in Ghorahi. As 2(80) summarises, the Maoists are now widely seen 
as part of the mainstream of party politics in Ghorahi and Nepal more broadly.  
 
“[W]hen they started to settle in the cantonments, and after the peace process started, and they 
made some agreements, and were willing to come into the parliament, the people were 
convinced that the Maoists would not return to conflict. So, people stopped being afraid of them. 
We thought that the Maoist were more like the other political parties - like UML and Congress. 
They became the same. They didn’t have power like in the conflict time, so it wasn’t necessary 
to fear them.” 2(80) Agricultural business owner 
 
 The transformation of the Maoists from a military to a political force is a central aspect of the 
respondents’ accounts of the transition. The relatively educated nature of many of the respondents means 
that they were well connected to news from the centre, which played directly into their confidence in 
the transition locally.39 However, the respondents also describe progress in the transition through the 
return to normality and openness in everyday life after 2006. Given the absence of conflict-era violence 
in Ghorahi apart from the 2001 PLA attack, this theme of the responses principally consists of accounts 
of change in the restrictions imposed on the population by the police and the RNA.  
 As with accounts of life in the conflict period, discussion of the emerging openness in the post-
conflict period is dominated by references to livelihoods. This includes the ability of business owners 
and traders to freely move goods into rural areas without pressure from the security forces or fear of 
attack by the PLA,40 the return of political party mobilisations in the city and later in its rural 
surroundings,41 and the ability of the media to approach government and security forces, and to publish 
without fear of censorship.42 The transformation of encounters with the security forces are therefore as 
 
38 2(41) Senior business representative; 2(42) Factory owner; 2(52) Medical business owner 
39 2(13) UML District representative; 2(24) Civil society organisation leader; 2(80) Agricultural 
business owner 
40 2(44) Bookshop owner; 2(50) Business community representative; 2(79) Factory owner 
41 2(13) UML District representative; 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(18) Nepali 
Congress District representative 
42 1(12) Journalist; 1(36) Journalist; 2(03) Journalist and academic 
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much an aspect of accounts of the transitional period as changes within the Maoists in the centre, 
contrary to the emphasis typical in the literature on the transition at the national level.  
 For the majority of those I interviewed, the lessening of the restrictions which had been imposed 
by the security forces was the most direct experience of the changing conditions of the transition. 
However, accounts from those active in local party politics during the transition also widely reference 
the interface of this opening environment with the transformation of the Maoists in the centre.43 For 
these respondents, agreements between the Maoists and other parties at the national level and the 
removal of limits on political activities by the security forces in Ghorahi are jointly described as having 
fostered increasingly cooperative links between political party representatives in the city. These 
improving relations brought progress in the centre into the local experience, particularly the 2008 
Maoist-led coalition in the first post-conflict Constituent Assembly.  
“There was a realisation amongst the local leaders that we couldn’t hold feelings for revenge 
for a long time. We saw that, at the central level, the top leaders were working together in one 
place and that we had a coalition government. So, we thought that we can’t be enemies at the 
village level. So, we slowly improved relations and became more social with each other.” 2(18) 
Nepali Congress District representative 
 
  The final major theme across the respondents’ accounts of the transition is the impact of the 
arrival of significant numbers of ex-PLA combatants into the city. Influenced by the proximity of the 5th 
Divisional cantonment and the broader trend toward urban migration amongst ex-PLA, Ghorahi and the 
neighbouring city of Tulsipur have seen amongst the largest influxes of ex-PLA of any area of the Terai 
(Robins & Bhandari, 2016). The ex-combatant activists I interviewed estimated that a minimum of 2,100 
ex-PLA settled in these cities subsequent to the cantonment period, and remained in the decade since.44 
In addition to being an important theme of the respondents’ experience of the transition, this was 
significant in verifying the reasons for my focus on Ghorahi, as I discussed in Chapter Four.  
 The social reintegration of ex-combatants is characterised by the DDR literature as amongst the 
core challenges to long term stability in Nepal and in general (Robins & Bhandari, 2016; Subedi, 2014; 
 
43 2(15) Tharu community representative; 2(18) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(44) 
Bookshop owner 
44 1(14) Social activist and former PLA combatant; 1(15) Social activist and former PLA combatant; 
1(27) Journalist and former PLA combatant 
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Subedi & Jenkins, 2018). However, whilst feelings of unease appear across the respondents’ accounts 
of the initial arrival of large numbers of ex-PLA, the ex-combatant population of Ghorahi is described 
as having become an accepted part of the population of the city.45 Informing this is a sense that the 
context in which the majority of ex-PLA resettled to the city is entirely apart from the conditions of 
conflict in which they joined. This sentiment is linked both to the political transformation of the Maoists 
in the centre and the changing conditions of everyday life discussed above.46 References to ex-
combatants within the city thus stress the extent to which their presence has become normalised and 
their place amongst the wider population of the city, as stated by 2(49).  
 
“[G]enerally, ex-combatants just came from the cantonment and started a business. There 
wasn’t a problem for them. The people thought the war had ended, and it was a normal 
situation. It wasn’t difficult for them”. 2(49) Animal supplies business owner 
 
 The experiences of those I interviewed in Ghorahi thus largely resonates with the literature on 
the transition. This is despite the contrasting nature of the respondents’ experiences from much of the 
national picture of the conflict and the focus of much of the literature primarily on the transition in the 
centre. In their reflections, many respondents stressed that conflict remains a significant event in the 
history of the city, particularly given the role of the 2001 attack in transforming the conflict and the 
drastic changes in everyday life which followed.47 However, the contemporary Maoist party, relations 
with the security forces and everyday life are seen as entirely apart from the conflict and the early stages 
of the transition. As I show across the chapters to follow, conflict-induced change in corruption in 
Ghorahi is thus far from an expression of incompleteness in the transition or ongoing instability.  
 
5.3 Corruption in Ghorahi 
 As I set out in Chapters Three and Four, this thesis engages a constructivist approach to 
corruption, assessed through constructivist grounded theory (CGT). This approach sees corruption as 
the product of human agency, and locates knowledge of corruption amongst those studied. Reflecting 
 
45 2(13) UML District representative; 2(49) Animal supplies business owner; 2(54) Senior business 
representative 
46 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(44) Bookshop owner; 2(51) Bookshop owner 
47 1(07) Journalist; 1(19) District Peace Committee member; 1(24) Human rights activist 
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this, here I set out the nature of corruption amongst those I interviewed. To do so, I first discuss the 
Nepali terms which the respondents engage in their accounts of corruption. Following this, I discuss the 
dividing lines between corrupt and legitimate behaviours which inform the use of these terms.  
 
5.3.1 Concepts 
 Literally translated, corruption in Nepali is bhrastachar.48 Indeed, among the minority of my 
respondents who speak English with a degree of fluency, and who chose to do so in responding to my 
questions, corruption and bhrastachar are used synonymously and often interchangeably.49 My questions 
on the general state of corruption were framed in terms of bhrastachar by LD and myself, with follow-
ups focusing on terminology and concepts engaged by the participants where this diverged from the 
literal translation. Through this process of moving from the general to the specific with each respondent, 
I identified the following conceptual landscape of corruption-related terminology.  
 As is often the case with ‘corruption’ in English (Génaux, 2004), the respondents most directly 
associate bhrastachar with the payment of bribes when accessing public services. Experiences of 
demands for bribes to access local government services are ubiquitous across the respondents, and 
dominate much of their initial reactions to my questions on the state of corruption in Ghorahi specifically 
and Nepal in general.50 Bhrastachar is thus closely tied with ghus,51 the literal translation of ‘bribe’, with 
which comes an association to the abuse of powers granted by the state, and the exchange of money.  
 Whilst the immediate focus on bribery is common in responses on bhrastachar, this term is also 
applied as a pejorative term to denote undesirable behaviours. Indeed, the Nepali term acharna,52 from 
which the latter element of bhrastachar is derived, denotes conduct or behaviour. Reflecting this, 
bhrastachar is also used in reference to undesirable behaviours which are not directly financial in nature, 
with characterisations of those involved in corruption often invoking their broader bad conduct,53 kharab 
 
48 भ्रष्टाचार – for the purpose of accuracy I provide Nepali terms in devanagari when they are first used. 
49 2(03) Journalist and academic; 2(21) Journalist; 2(48) Dairy products business owner 
50 2(02) Journalist; 2(04) - Rastri Jan Mocha District representative; 2(17) Landlessness Activist 
51 घुस 
52 आचरण 
53 2(21) Journalist; 2(32) Gender rights activist; 2(76) Clothing business owner 
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acharna,54 as well as financial gain. This is less common than the focus on bribery, but indicates the 
versatility of the term. Two of the journalists I interviewed described this as follows:  
 
“Corruption, in Nepali, is ‘bhrastachar’ … ‘Bhrasta’ means bribery and these things, as you 
mentioned, and ‘acharna’ is your personality, or conduct. So the two together is corruption. It 
can be bribery … [i]t can be immoral, or exploitation.” 2(21) Journalist. 
 
“In Nepal, the term corruption as bhrastachar is synonymous with financial transactions. So, in 
the rural areas there is a lower budget available, so in total there is less corruption in the classic 
sense. However, corruption can also be thought of as discrimination. If the system is 
discriminatory, we could also call this corruption.” 2(03) – Journalist and academic 
 
 Second to bhrastachar, discussions of corruption are framed in terms of dalal,55 a noun meaning 
‘broker’ or ‘mediator’. Whilst applicable to all of those in a mediator role, dalal is used in the pejorative 
to denote those who provide connections and facilitation to elites, but do so without the positive 
contribution more commonly associated with Nepal’s deeply interconnected social relations. Brokers 
are seen as able to play this role because of an informational advantage or access to power which they 
have cultivated, and which they engage for a financial benefit.56 However, it is the exploitation of their 
power rather than the nature of benefit they receive alone which links dalal to bhrastachar.  
 The many responses describing dalal concentrate on two forms of brokerage.57 First, there are 
dalal within government offices, who are seen to facilitate the procurement of bribes by bureaucrats. In 
these accounts, the local level bureaucrats are characterised as directing those attempting to access 
government services towards brokers, who then use their position to manage access to the bureaucrats 
in exchange for bribes.58 Many respondents suggest that this is particularly prominent in offices in which 
complex processes limit the ability of service seekers to complete the necessary documentation directly, 
with lawyers and former bureaucrats with inside knowledge of the process acting as brokers. Both the 
bureaucrat and the broker are characterised as benefitting from this arrangement.  
 
“Brokers are not helping the farmers, they are exploiting them. Yes, they will contact them with 
the new landowner, but they will only do it to get something. The broker will get the same 
 
54 खराब आचरण 
55 दलाल 
56 22(14) Nepali Congress District Representative; 2(21) Journalist; 2(22) Legal professional  
57 2(16) Journalist; 2(20) Journalist; 2(24) Civil society leader 
58 2(11) Legal professional; 2(17) Landlessness activist; 2(56) Medical business owner 
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relationship with the landowner as well. The landowner also wants to manage the problem of 
distributing the land to the landless people, but can’t identify them. They want to do it through 
a monetary relationship, but they want the problem to be solved. So the broker acts a mediator, 
and manages the relationship to get benefit from both sides.” 2(17) Landlessness activist 
 
 Second, businessmen are characterised as dalal where they are seen to take advantage of 
complexities between buyers and sellers in a range of conventional transactions. The selling of land is a 
particularly common context in which this is discussed, with brokers seen as exploiting the complexity 
faced by sellers in finding buyers and in dealing with the government land registration process.59 Similar 
characterisations are applied to those who mediate between factory owners and their customers, and 
between farmers and crop purchasers. As with the bureaucratic context, it is the exploitation of a lack of 
access and knowledge which is central to usage of this term, and its link to bhrastachar.  
 
“Generally, the brokers are the retired bureaucrats from the land taxation office. They know 
everything about that process … Some of the lawyers who write documents for land registration 
and this process are also involved. They are regularly trying to get this kind of benefit, because 
they know everything about this process and documents.”2(24) Civil society organisation leader 
  
 The final term central to the respondents’ accounts of corruption is kalo bazaar,60 a ‘black 
market’. Unlike dalal and bhrastachar, which are primarily engaged in accounts of those in the public 
sector, kalo bazaar is applied primarily to those in the private sector.61 As well as being outside of the 
taxed and regulated market system, the central element of kalo bazaar is the perceived exploitation of 
customers through artificially raised prices, even where this is legal. This is informed in part by the 
existence of regulation on business margins, but more broadly relates to the legal but illegitimate 
exploitation of scarcity. The pejorative and accusative nature of kalo bazaar means it is typically 
reserved for those who combine informal or clandestine trade with exploitation through price, however 
this is not always the case, particularly during periods of shortage.  
 
“When there was the blockade or strikes, there is shortage, and the customers use the black 
market. It’s normally with the food items. When there is a shortage of food a businessman can 
sell at a higher price. People will still buy. The government has a policy here that a business 
 
59 2(24) Civil society organisation leader; 2(33) Maoist Centre District Representative; 2(38) 
Agricultural business owner 
60 कालो बजार 
61 2(06) - Senior business representative; 2(20) Journalist; 2(57) Grocer 
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shouldn’t get more than a 20% margin, but on the black market they can do more. There are so 
many cases where there is a 100% or more on something.” 2(60) Electronics business owner 
 
5.3.2 Dividing lines 
 The nature of the three terms above and the actors they denote inform much about the context 
of corruption in Ghorahi: Bhrastachar and the terms related to it are understood to be concentrated but 
far from solely confined to the public sector, invoke exploitation as well as a clandestine character, and 
are informed more by expected norms of behaviour than legal provisions. Here I expand on the dividing 
lines between the acts which are and are not described in terms of bhrastachar, dalal and kalo bazaar, 
and the factors which determine the legitimacy of acts according to the respondents.  
 Running across the three concepts discussed above is the theme of unfairness and injustice. This 
is most explicit in the distinction between informal but legitimate trade and black markets, central to 
which is the exploitation through price. This is also invoked in the characterisation of the benefits 
obtained by brokers which, whilst often legal, are seen to violate the routine exchange of favours in 
Nepali society. The wider set of comments from the participants, particularly around the actions of 
political leaders, emphasises the extent to which this standard informs the distinction between legitimate 
and illegitimate behaviours. This is apparent in statements like those from 2(06) and 2(29): 
 
“[B]efore they were the President or minister, they would have to get medical treatments in 
hospitals in Nepal. But when they become President or a minister, they go abroad for treatment. 
Businessmen see this in the newspapers - that the Prime Minister or the leader of a political 
party was provided with 50 lakh rupees to go and get his treatment, and that they got these funds 
from the government. We see that the people are not getting this kind of facility, but the 
Ministers are getting these facilities for their treatment.” 2(06) Senior business representative 
 
“[W]e grow vegetables - tomatoes, cabbage, onion - then the businessman will come from 
Tulsipur bazaar with a truck. He will fix the price, not the farmers. He fixes the price here, then 
he takes the vegetables, and sells them in the market for a much higher price. So the mediator, 
or the broker, get more benefit from farming than the farmers. The brokers get the money 
without the labour.” 2(29) Maoist Centre District representative 
 
 These quotes are representative of the role of inequality in informing the construction of 
corruption in Ghorahi. Here, it is not suggested that the benefit of foreign medical treatment obtained 
by the political elite falls outside the system, or that there has been an abuse of power to obtain it. Rather, 
this falls into the language of corruption because of the distinction between what is available to an elite 
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and the perceived conditions faced by the wider population. Similar distinctions are found in discussion 
of brokers: the fact that benefit is obtained without the level of work seen to justify it informs the dalal 
concept, as does the contrast in the financial status of the broker and those they are seen to exploit.62 In 
both regards, it is inequality which is central to the characterisation of these acts as corrupt.  
 Alongside the emphasis on inequality is the significance of motive in distinguishing legitimate 
and corrupt acts. This distinction is best expressed in the different judgements applied to those receiving 
and giving bribes. The motive ascribed to the giver is typically that of an ‘ordinary’ person overcoming 
the otherwise impassable barriers to access which exist in local government bureaucracy or elsewhere. 
Their power and agency in the situation is typically described as minimal, given the nature of the 
system.63 The taker, by contrast, is seen as motivated by a mentality which emphasises wealth and status, 
and having the discretion to create artificial barriers to services in order to facilitate payment.64 This 
contrasting motive, and the contrasts in power underlying it, result in a situation where bribery can be 
simultaneously widely condemned and widely practiced without contradiction. 
 The distinction between the giver and taker, and the perception of motive underlying this, is 
visible in the language the respondents use in describing acts of bribery. Most commonly, bribes are 
expressed as being taken (ghus linu)65 rather than being given (ghus dinu),66 with the act of the giver 
described instead with reference to the outcome they sought to achieve. References to bribes in exchange 
for faster completion of work or the guarantee that work will be completed within a single day are the 
most common characterisation applied to the giver.67 This is widely seen as legitimate given the 
difficulties of travelling to the government offices in the city from the surrounding rural areas of the 
District.68 This emphasises the power of the bureaucrat over the speed of the process, and therefore their 
responsibility for the transfer of bribes, whilst minimising that of the giver.  
 
 
62 2(38) Agricultural business owner; 2(47) Furniture business owner; 2(51) Bookshop owner;  
63 2(21) Journalist; 2(37) Tharu community representative; 2(40) Agricultural business owner 
64 2(02) Journalist; 2(04) - Rastri Jan Mocha District representative; 2(53) Electrical business owner 
65 घुस िलनु – to take a bribe 
66 घुस िदनु – to give a bribe 
67 2(02) Journalist; 2(04) Rastriya Janmorcha District Representative; 2(11) Legal professional 
68 2(09) Journalist and gender rights activist; 2(54) Senior business representative; 2(83) Bank clerk 
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“They are obliged to offer the money because without it they won’t get the service on time. 
People know this, and so they come ready to offer the money. The bureaucrats are immoral, 
they want an extra income source, and so they collect the money from the people on a daily 
basis. Its only small amounts, 50/100/200, but they collect it very regularly from the people 
coming to access the government services.” 2(02) Journalist  
 
 A third and final dimension to the divide between corrupt and legitimate acts comes in the focus 
on rapid changes in wealth, which combines elements of the theme of injustice and motive. Across the 
responses, the rapid transformation of wealth is often sufficient for the language of corruption as 
bhrastachar to be invoked, without necessarily requiring discussion of specific activities which might 
fall into the more conventional account of corruption.69 This is typically informed by comparisons to 
the education and business background of those involved, and to the success or otherwise of ‘normal’ 
businesses and amongst the ‘ordinary’ population of the city.70 Together, these form a standard of 
legitimate earnings, against which changes in wealth are judged.  
 As I discuss in Chapter Six, the role of rapid changes in wealth, and the comparison of this to a 
norm which defines legitimate earnings, is particularly significant to conflict-induced change in 
corruption in Ghorahi  because of its application to the former Maoist elite who settled in the city during 
the transition. However, this understanding of corruption based on illegitimate and unexplained wealth 
is far from solely applied to this group: examples of brokers, bureaucrats and political leaders outside 
of the Maoist party are also described in the language of corruption because of what the respondents see 
as unexplained changes in their wealth and status.71 The example from 2(51) below focuses on brokers, 
and emphasises the perceived gap between the education and skills of this group and their apparent 
wealth, which is in itself sufficient to describe this activity as corruption. 
 
“Most of the brokers are not so educated, and not so talented or skilful. If anyone wants success 
in their life, it takes time, demands some skills, and demands some level of education. But a 
person who is not educated and not skilled, how can they get so much success in such a short 
time? Definitely there is suspicion about them. I think it’s impossible to get success like that in 
legal ways. No one is getting that wealth in just a few years.” 2(51) Bookshop owner 
  
 
69 2(06) Senior business representative; 2(07) Journalist; 2(51) Bookshop owner 
70 2(07) Journalist; 2(19) UML District representative; 2(21) Journalist 
71 2(02) Journalist; 2(06) Senior business representative; 2(08) Journalist 
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 The construction of corruption in Ghorahi is thus informed by socially-contingent standards of 
inequality, fairness and legitimacy. The distinction between the private and the public central to the 
accounts of corruption in much of the literature are comparatively less significant, as are the legal 
standards which form the official barriers between corrupt and legal behaviour in Nepal. These norms 
and the language invoked to describe them are fluid over different contexts and sets of actors, something 
central to the impacts of conflict on corruption described in the chapters to follow.  
 
5.4 Summary 
 In this chapter, I have set out the context for the relationship between conflict and corruption 
which I discuss over the chapters to follow. In doing so, I first drew a number of distinctions between 
the characterisation of the 1996-2006 conflict in the literature and the experiences of those in Ghorahi. 
Here, I showed how the experiences of this urban population with close proximity to the RNA contrasts 
the common depiction of the conflict as a rural phenomenon. For those I interviewed, the conflict was 
experienced through one transformative act of PLA violence, and the fear and suppression which 
followed from the reactions of the security forces. However, I also argued that the post-2006 transition 
in Ghorahi has in many respects been shaped by news of the incremental gains in the centre, which 
reinforced changes in the restrictions and fear experienced in everyday life.  
 On corruption, I have set out the language which the respondents engaged in responses to 
general questions on corruption, and the set of standards and value judgements underlying the distinction 
between corrupt and legitimate behaviours in this context. I explained this distinction in terms of relative 
power, motives, inequality and the rapid transformation of wealth, across concepts relating to bribes 
(ghus), black markets (kalo bazaar) and brokers (dalal). The nature of corruption in this context stands 
apart from an often technocratic and legalistic discussions common in the wider literature, as I discussed 
in Chapter Two. It also demonstrates this fundamental dependence of corruption in this context on 
human agency, the key ontological condition of constructivism which I set out in Chapter Three.  
 The three chapters to follow build from this context to set out the three areas in which conflict 
has shaped the nature and extent of corruption in Ghorahi. Chapters Six to Eight are respectively focused 
on the transformation of the Maoist elite, on instability and politicisation in the central and local 
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governance system, and social change among rural and urban communities. After discussing each of 
these three relationships individually and in the specific context of Ghorahi, in Chapter Nine I return to 
the contextual discussion in this chapter to consider the broader transferability of these relationships, 
and the contribution of this analysis to the four theories of conflict-induced change in corruption which 
I set out in Chapter Two.  
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Chapter Six: Corruption and the transformation of the Maoists 
“There were so many errors and problems with the governance system, and most people thought 
that the Maoists could change that. The Maoist demanded these changes in the system. Most 
people thought that they would change this system, and other problems in the society. But the 
Maoists became the problem.” 2(83) Bank Clerk 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 In this chapter I set out the first of three elements of conflict-induced change in corruption in 
Ghorahi; the corrupt transformation of the Maoist elites. I do so in three parts, summarised in Diagram 
6.1A below. First, I discuss the respondents’ experiences of forced donations to the Maoists during the 
conflict, and how this impacts the respondents’ reflections on the Maoist elites who resettled in Ghorahi 
after the conflict. Second, I discuss the legacies of land capture by the PLA during the conflict and link 
this to the perception that Maoist elites have become brokers (dalal) during the transition. Finally, I 
discuss the respondents’ reflections on the ideology of the Maoists and link this to perception that 
Maoist-led governments have failed to deliver on promises to marginalised communities since 2008. In 
concluding, I bring these three elements together, and show how the sense of inequality and injustice 
central to the construction of corruption in general is informed by the clash between these ideological 
reflections and the experience of forced donations and land control.  
 
Diagram 6.1A - Corruption and the transformation of the Maoists 
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 My focus on the Maoists in this chapter reflects the specific set of corruption dynamics which 
the respondents link to this group, and the root of these dynamics in their experiences of the conflict. 
Compared with the other major political parties represented in Ghorahi, the dynamics relating to the 
Maoists are more prominent in the responses, and are more directly related to the conflict. I discuss the 
other political parties active in Ghorahi in the broader context of changes in the governance system in 
Chapter Seven. The relationship I set out in this chapter is informed by 1,158 coded statements from 89 
respondents, developed under the approach I set out in Chapter Four.  
 
6.2 Corruption and forced donations to the Maoists 
 As I discussed in Chapter Five, clandestine demands for donations were a common element of 
the respondents’ encounters with the Maoists during the conflict. Eleven years later, these encounters 
inform a widespread perception that mid-level72 Maoist elites in Ghorahi have transformed their 
lifestyles through corrupt means. I show this in two parts: First, I discuss how the respondents frame 
forced donations in their accounts of the conflict period. Here I show that, despite threats of violence 
and the financial difficulties many faced, that the link from this aspect of conflict to corruption is not 
simply a reflection of resentment of these demands. Following this, I show that this link is instead 
informed by the radical transformation of the wealth of the Maoist elite since the conflict, the 
comparisons the respondents draw between this and the lack of change in their own lifestyles, and the 
fragmentation of the Maoists after the conflict.  
 The responses which inform the relationship between corruption and experiences of forced 
donations which I discuss in this section are summarised in Table 6.2A; grouped by the major themes 
of this discussion and the occupational category of the respondents. As shown, the responses informing 
this span all occupational categories, but are particularly concentrated amongst those working in a range 
of small businesses in Ghorahi bazaar. I discuss the factors underlying this concentration and variations 
 
72 ‘Mid-level’ refers to those relatively senior in the PLA and political movement during the conflict, 
but who did not have direct access to the top leadership. These elites now commonly hold District-level 
positions in the Maoist party, with the top-level elite predominantly residing in Kathmandu. 
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in how this relationship is constructed across the occupational categories and other aspects of the 
backgrounds of the respondents throughout this section and in Chapter Nine.  
 
Table 6.2A – Sources & respondents73 
 Sources References 
Themes 59 276 
Bargaining 21 35 
Looting & other forms of fundraising 9 16 
Targeting of demands 21 37 
Transformation of wealth 27 66 
Motives for demands 20 26 
Use of force 13 22 
Sources 59 276 
Journalists 11 25 
Business 32 188 
Business representatives & civil society 8 18 
Political party representatives 5 40 
Legal representatives 1 3 
Police & local government 2 2 
 
6.2.1 Forced donations in the conflict 
 Whilst largely absent from the literature on the financing of the Maoists (see, for example, 
Adhikari, 2014; Seddon, 2010; Upreti, 2006), demands for donations were amongst the most common 
direct experience of the Maoists across the respondents.74 This is second only to being present in the 
city during 2001 PLA attack, the details of which I discussed in Chapter Five. For those without 
connections to the Maoist party, these demands for donations are described as an inescapable part of life 
during the height of the conflict. The level of RNA and police presence meant that demands were 
delivered in a clandestine manner, typically via letters and phone calls from Maoist cadres with 
knowledge of the city.75 The inescapability of these demands is a central theme of the respondents’ 
accounts, despite the distance between the respondents and the PLA throughout the conflict.  
 
 
73 The themes summarised here include only the elements central to the relationship developed here 
and as such the totals in the first row are greater than the sum of the themes listed below. 
74 It is discussed at some level by all 59 of those listed in Table 6.2A. 
75 2(55) Electronics Business; 2(59) Auto Business 
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“No one could escape from donations. When they requested, you had to pay. The amount could 
be different, if you could bargain and convince them the business wasn’t so big they would 
reduce the amount, but no one could escape.” 2(49) Animal supplies business owner 
  
 While demands for donations are widely described as inescapable for those without connections 
to the Maoists, the specific amount demanded was far from uniform. Based on comparing the 
experiences of respondents of differing backgrounds76 and in the comparisons made by the respondents 
themselves,77 the amounts demanded by Maoist cadres varied based on the individual’s wealth and 
political connections. Despite the feeling of distance from the PLA before the 2001 attack, the 
respondents emphasise the ability of Maoist cadres to target their demands on those with greater ability 
to pay, and on those the Maoists saw as their political opponents; particularly members of the Nepali 
Congress or UML. The extent of this difference and the amounts paid in general vary significantly, with 
some such as 2(39) seeing themselves as particularly exploited because of their wealth. 
 
“It was very difficult … the small businessman had to pay 500, 1000, 5000, like this, but the 
big businessman had to pay 50,000 or 1 lakh.78 It was different for the different business”. 2(39) 
Agricultural equipment business owner 
  
 The emphasis the respondents place on wealth and political connections in their accounts of  
forced donations to the Maoists is linked to the wider theme of bargaining around these demands. Whilst 
the demands themselves were inescapable for the majority, those with personal connections to Maoist 
cadres are characterised as having been able to avoid making payment altogether.79 Other forms of 
connection are also significant; for some of those in business, opportunities for bargaining arose where 
Maoist cadres were using their services in a clandestine manner,80 whilst for others having family in 
Maoist controlled areas who had already provided donations proved an effective bargaining tool.81 
 
76 For example, 2(78), a factory owner, reported paying 200,000 on one occasion and 500,000 on 
another, whilst 2(82), the owner of a small bookshop, reports paying 500 on one occasion. 
77 2(39) Agricultural business owner; 2(45) Publisher; 2(82) Bookshop owner;  
78 100,000 
79 2(11) Legal professional; 2(19) UML District representative; 2(43) Hotel owner 
80 2(16) Journalist; 2(38) Agricultural business owner; 2(82) Bookshop Owner 
81 2(55) Electronics Business owner 
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Leaders of business groups and civil society describe a collective role in this, and emphasise their 
successes in reducing the level of donations paid by those they represented.82  
 
“Did you face demands for donations from the Maoists?” 
“Not for any big amounts, just a request to provide some amount. I only gave 500 rupees, I told 
them that I was only selling books, not a big business. They were regularly getting books from 
me, so they were convinced.” 2(82) Bookshop owner 
  
 Whilst significant, the emphasis that some respondents place on bargaining with the Maoists 
must be seen in the context of the threats of violence underlying the demand for donations. Despite the 
successes reported by some in reducing payment and the close proximity of the security forces, Maoist 
demands are widely seen to have been backed by a credible threat of targeted violence. Echoing the 
rural characterisation that the respondents apply to the PLA which I discussed in Chapter Five, the 
possibility of being kidnapped and forcibly taken to areas under Maoist control was a particularly 
common fear.83 Direct experience of such violence is not widespread amongst the respondents, however 
the threat was clearly an influence on efforts to bargain. Indeed, as I discuss below, for many the payment 
of donations is framed as a worthwhile means of avoiding violence.  
 The demands for donations by the Maoists exacerbated the financial hardship widely felt during 
the conflict, even among the relatively wealthy.84 When combined with the role of violence in the 
demands, it could be concluded that the perception of corruption now focused on Maoist elites in 
Ghorahi is an expression of feelings of injustice over these payments.  The fact that this centres on a 
financial transaction could be judged to motivate the expression of this in terms of corruption, given the 
financial connotations of bhrastachar set out in Chapter Five. However, when the moral judgements 
that the respondents apply to these donations are considered, it is clear that this is not the case.  
 Whilst adding to the burden of the conflict, the judgements the respondents apply to the Maoists’ 
demands for donations in discussions specific to the conflict time are mediated by variations in these 
demands based on wealth, and the possibility of bargaining. Rather than feelings of anger or exploitation, 
 
82 2(41) Senior business representative; 2(50) Business community representative 
83 2(06) Senior business representative; 2(49) Animal supplies business owner; 2(50) Business 
community representative 
84 2(39) Agricultural business owner; 2(41) Senior business representative; 2(42) Factory owner 
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the respondents instead focus on their success in bargaining, or in the avoidance of payment altogether. 
The account from 2(50) below is typical of this, with the respondent first emphasising the struggles of 
the conflict, and second the drastic reduction in the demands from the Maoists he claims to have 
achieved. Donations are thus remembered as having been burdensome, but the moral judgement applied 
to this is influenced by how the demands were targeted and by the bargaining process.  
 
“The Maoists demanded a 12,000 donation from me. But I discussed with them - I said I don’t 
have so much money, and I can’t pay. I had to pay for my family and take care of all of the 
things for my business. I was facing a financial shortage. After bargaining, I provided only 500 
rupees. I didn’t pay 12,000, but only 500.” 2(50) Business community representative 
  
 The judgement the respondents apply to forced donations during the conflict is also influenced 
by the protection from violence that the payments are seen to have provided. Despite the Maoists 
themselves being the source of the violence, making a donation is commonly framed as a route to relative 
security, meaning that doing so is widely seen as having been a worthwhile exchange.85 The exact cause 
of this incongruity is difficult to determine, however it in part reflects the external nature of the PLA 
cadres believed to inflict the violence, compared with the more local Maoist cadres delivering demands 
for donations. Consequently, a willingness to provide donations at some level is a common theme of the 
responses, and doing so is seen as a legitimate exchange for projection from violence.   
 Compared with that applied to the payer, the judgement applied to the Maoist cadres extracting 
the payments within the conflict time is more contested. For respondents with links to the Nepali 
Congress and UML, the demand for donations indicates an exploitative core of the Maoist movement 
which was emboldened by the military power of the PLA. For these respondents, this is inherently linked 
to corruption.86 However, for those outside of party politics, the opportunity that payment offered to 
avoid violence from the Maoists dominates the judgement applied. Indeed, respondents describe 
themselves as either not knowing or not caring about the use of the donated funds during the conflict 
time, so long as it provided a route to avoiding violence. The response from 2(79) is typical of this: 
 
 
 
85 2(47) - Furniture Business; 2(48) - Shopkeeper; 2(50) - Hotel Owner 
86 2(13) UML District representative; 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(18) Nepali 
Congress District representative 
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“Did you feel more secure, having paid them?” 
“That’s the main reason. Most people were afraid of the Maoists, if you provided donations, 
then you were safer from the Maoists.” 2(79) Factory owner 
 
 The judgements applied to forced donations during the conflict resonates with those applied to 
public sector bribery, as I set out in Chapter Five. As with these bribes (ghus), those providing donations 
to the Maoists during the conflict are not themselves judged to be ‘corrupt’, with the threat of violence 
from the Maoists seen to justify the payments, and the inescapability of demands limiting the agency 
ascribed to the payer. However, it is not simply dissatisfaction with this which drives this link to 
corruption in the contemporary context. Rather, as I discuss next, it is the effect these donations are seen 
to have had on the Maoist elites who received them which links this to the respondents’ perceptions of 
corruption in the post-conflict period.  
 
6.2.2 Corruption after the conflict  
 The link between the demand for donations during the conflict and the contemporary experience 
of corruption in Ghorahi reflects three themes, which I discuss here: First, I discuss what the respondents 
see as the radical and public transformation of the lifestyles of Maoist elites in Ghorahi since the conflict. 
Second, I discuss the contrast the respondents draw between this radical transformation and the changes 
in their own lives, and the sense of what is possible through legitimate means informed by this. Finally, 
I discuss the contrast the respondents draw between the lifestyles of the Maoist elite and the former rank 
and file of the PLA, and how this fragmentation has reinforced perceptions of elite corruption.  
 In Chapter Five, I referred to the significant internal migration of former PLA combatants after 
their exit from cantonment, and the fact that large numbers of these former combatants had chosen to 
settle in Ghorahi. I further detailed that, despite the impacts of the conflict on Ghorahi, the presence of 
former PLA in the city is now widely accepted, and that this indicates the successful transformation of 
the Maoists from an armed group into the political mainstream. However, as I now discuss, the 
respondents also see this period of transition as one in which the lifestyles of mid-level Maoist elites in 
the city have been radically - and illegitimately - transformed.  
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 The transformation of the lifestyles of the Maoist elite is typically described with reference to 
two status symbols: first, that since relocating to the city after the conflict, these elite have constructed 
large multi-storey buildings in the central market area for personal and business use.87 Despite the wealth 
of the city relative to much of Nepal, and certainly to the neighbouring areas of Dang District,88 such 
buildings are a recent addition to the city, and their construction is a matter of public notoriety. Second, 
that these elites are seen driving or being driven in large vehicles, owned either by the party or 
personally.89 This is in a context in which travel either by public bus or by motorbike are visibly 
dominant, and travel in private cars is prohibitively expensive for many.90 Other symbols of newly 
acquired wealth are associated with this group, but across the responses these two are by far the most 
common, and align with how the respondents describe wealth in the urban environment in general. 
 The fact that the Maoist elite in Ghorahi are seen to have acquired these symbols of wealth since 
the end of the conflict is noteworthy for the respondents in itself. Indeed, it is amongst the most common 
themes raised in discussions specific to this group in the post-conflict period and features widely across 
respondents of a range of backgrounds.91 However, it is not the presence of this wealth alone which 
leads the respondents to connect this to corruption. Rather, this connection is supported by the perception 
that the scope and the speed of transformation is unexplainable by any legitimate means. This draws on 
the impoverished backgrounds widely associated with the Maoists at all but the highest levels of 
leadership, and perceptions of what change in wealth is possible through legitimate business activity.  
 The scope of the transformation in the wealth of the Maoist elite in Ghorahi is seen as 
particularly radical because of the consensus among the respondents that those involved in the Maoist 
movement during the conflict came from impoverished backgrounds. Whilst lacking specific details of 
the backgrounds of the Maoist elite who have settled in the city, the respondents’ accounts of the 
backgrounds of these elites widely focus on precarious rural conditions.92 Despite the fact that the PLA 
 
87 2(19) UML District representative; 2(46) Auto business owner; 2(56) Medical business owner 
88 See Table 4.3A in Chapter Four  
89 2(07) Journalist; 2(51) Bookshop owner; 2(57) Grocer 
90 Based on my own observations and discussions with LD 
91 2(07) Journalist; 2(13) UML District representative; 2(42) Factory owner 
92 2(19) UML District Representative; 2(82) Bookshop Owner; 2(55) Electronics Business 
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was recruited from across the country during the height of the conflict (Eck, 2010), this is supported by 
the association of the Maoists with Rolpa and Rukum Districts, references to which focus on their status 
as amongst the most impoverished areas of Nepal.93 As 2(82) expresses, this widespread perception that 
the mid-level Maoist elites came from conditions of rural poverty accentuates the scope of the 
transformation in their lifestyles after the conflict:  
 
“It’s very visible and obvious that their lifestyle is high. They were in the jungles at that time, 
they didn’t have enough clothes to wear or enough food to eat at that time. But now we see that 
their lifestyles are very high, with their vehicles and buildings” 2(82) Bookshop owner 
 
 The scope of the transformation of wealth amongst the Maoist elite since the conflict is further 
reinforced by what the respondents see as the lack of change in their own lives over this same period. 
For the majority of respondents, the post-conflict period is characterised in terms of the return to 
normality in the wake of economic decline and restrictions placed on everyday life during the emergency 
period.94 This is particularly true of those operating small businesses, who see the eleven years since the 
conflict as allowing for a return to normality in lifestyles, but not for radical improvement. This return 
to normality, and the recovery of what was lost because of the conflict, informs the respondents’ 
understanding of what is possible through legitimate means, and provides the standard against which 
the transformation of the Maoist elite is compared. This is true of respondents across the wealth scale 
including those, like 2(80), who are themselves in a position of relative wealth and power:  
 
“They’re wearing shoes that cost 10,000 rupees. I’m in business all my life, but I’m only 
wearing shoes costing 1,000 or 1,500! My situation is the same, but the Maoist leaders have 
changed so drastically.” 2(80) Agricultural business owner 
 
 The scale of the transformation in lifestyles of the Maoist elites, informed by comparisons to 
the lives of ‘ordinary’ people and the background ascribed to these elites leads many to conclude that 
this change is unexplainable by legitimate means. Several respondents expressed this explicitly, using 
their experience in business as a standard of legitimate gain.95 Because of the lack of a legitimate 
 
93 2(15) Tharu community representative; 2(20) Journalist; 2(82) Bookshop owner 
94 2(11) - Legal Advocate; 2(16) Journalist; 2(42) Factory Owner; 
95 2(51) Bookshop owner; 2(54) Senior business representative; 2(60) Electronics business owner 
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explanation, this transformation is widely seen as fundamentally corrupt. However, it is also in 
accounting for this gap that the respondents invoke their experiences of forced donations during the 
conflict, and through which the transformation is typically framed.96 This provides an explicit 
mechanism which fills the gap between Maoist transformation and what is possible via legitimate means.  
 The link the respondents draw between their experiences of forced donation in the conflict and 
the transformation of the wealth of Maoist elites in the post-conflict period is on occasion discussed 
simply as Maoist elites keeping funds intended for the conflict for themselves.97 Their position in the 
Maoist party during the conflict and transition is seen to have afforded this opportunity, and many are 
characterised as seizing upon it. However, it is also often discussed as these elites using the funds 
donated to launch businesses once they had relocated to the city, mirroring the actions of the top 
leadership.98 The contribution of otherwise legitimate business activity to the wealth of these elites is 
thus also framed as corrupt, because it is seen as rooted in the exploitation of donated funds.  
 
“The Maoist leaders who became rich used the donation which they had collected in the conflict 
time, and used it in business. They expanded their business because of those funds, it was the 
main source to them.” 2(43) Hotel owner 
  
 The perceived use of donations for personal rather than party benefit is seen to be fundamentally 
corrupt by the respondents, and aligns closely with conventional definitions of corruption focused on 
misuse of power which I discussed in Chapter Three. However, rather than legalistic or technocratic 
standards to define ‘misuse’, underlying this is a standard of fairness rooted in comparisons to ordinary 
life. Like the broker (dalal) concept which I introduced in Chapter Five, this is informed by the 
comparison between the inputs and outputs of work by ordinary people and elites.99 The respondents’ 
references to the ordinary people since the conflict thus serves not only to define the boundaries of what 
is possible through legitimate means, but what is fair to earn. The transformation of the Maoist elites, 
backed by comparisons of their backgrounds to their new lifestyles, is seen to violate this principle.  
 
96 2(16) Journalist; 2(53) Electrical business owner; 2(80) Agricultural business owner 
97 2(53) Electronics business owner; 2(55) Electronics business owner; 2(56) Medical business owner 
98 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(48) Dairy business owner; 2(78) Factory Owner 
99 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(43) Hotel owner; 2(55) Electronics business owner 
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 In addition to comparisons to their own lifestyles, the violation of the principle of fairness is 
informed by the contrast the respondents draw between Maoist elites and the rank and file of the PLA 
after the conflict. As I discussed in Chapter Five, the respondents emphasise the normalisation of the 
former PLA rank and file in the city after the conflict, despite the impacts of the 2001 attack and 
emergency period on their lives. Informing this normalisation is the sense that this population have faced 
increasingly comparable livelihood challenges to the broader population of the city since their exit from 
cantonment, and are now living lives comparable to the general population.100 Indeed, many expressed 
that former PLA rank and file are increasingly indistinguishable from the wider city population.  
 The ‘ordinary’ lives of the former PLA rank and file in Ghorahi reinforces two aspects of the 
respondents’ perception of conflict-induced change in corruption: First, it enables a line to be drawn 
between those who remained connected to the Maoist party after the conflict, and thus who were able 
to benefit from donated funds, and those who separated from it. As is generally the case across the 
respondents’ accounts of corruption, the party is seen as a mechanism by which corrupted funds are 
accessed or, at the least, the means of protecting corrupt gain.101 The capacity of political leader to 
provide protection to those involved in corruption is a charge levied across the three major parties, 
however it is particularly acute in the case of the Maoists because of the transformation of elite wealth.  
 Second, the comparison between the different levels of the Maoist party in the post-conflict 
contributes further to the violation of the principle of fairness central to the construction of corruption 
amongst the respondents. Specifically, the elite are seen to have benefitted at the expense of the rank 
and file of the party who are widely seen as drawn from marginalised communities and impoverished 
rural areas.102 The extent to which the respondents sympathise with the plight of former PLA since the 
conflict varies considerably, however the sense of abandonment by the elite as the party entered the 
political mainstream is common. The former PLA rank and file thus provide a standard of what is 
possible without political connections, and access to donated funds, as well as a symbol of the 
illegitimacy of the newly acquired wealth of the party elite.  
 
100 2(03) Journalist and academic; 2(09) Journalist and ender Rights Activist; 2(60) Electronics business 
owner 
101 2(06) Senior business representative; 2(16) Journalist; 2(24) Civil society organisation leader 
102 2(03) Journalist and academic; 2(08) Journalist; 2(49) Animal supplies business owner 
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6.2.3 Summary 
 Demands for donations were amongst the most common experiences of the conflict, and were 
central to the respondents’ direct interactions with the Maoists. The pressures of the conflict period lead 
the respondents to frame these demands in terms of minimising their exposure to violence. Because of 
this, how the donated money was spent during this time was unknown to the respondents and was also 
largely irrelevant to their motivations for providing the money. However, after the conflict, the radical 
transformation of the wealth of the Maoist elite who settled in the city has led these demands to be 
central to the perception of corruption. This perception combines the experience of donation with a 
radical and rapid transformation in wealth, unexplainable by legitimate means, with the continuity in 
everyday conditions of the respondents, and with the lives of the former PLA rank and file.  
 
“So many leaders have changed their lives dramatically. They said that they were poor in the 
conflict time, for example one leader was a dry cleaner, who used to just wash clothes, but now 
he’s the wealthiest person in the bazaar. He has his vehicles, lots of land. Everyone knows he’s 
misused the money”. 2(60) Electronics business owner 
 
6.3 Corruption and land control 
 The experience of forced donations and the corruption dynamics linked to this is the single most 
significant aspect of conflict-induced change in corruption specific to the Maoists across the respondent 
group. However, this element of conflict-induced change in corruption is also informed by the legacies 
of Maoist land control during the conflict, and issues arising in the land return process. As I discuss here, 
the theme of land control constitutes a further mechanism by which the Maoist elite in Ghorahi are seen 
to have illegitimately transformed their lifestyles through the conflict and transition. This adds to this 
the sense that elements of the mid-level Maoist elite have become corrupt brokers (dalal).  
 The respondent group which informs the theme of land control is summarised in Table 6.2B. As 
shown, this primarily consists of those from political and media backgrounds. This reflects the largely 
external nature of land control issues to the life of urban populations during the conflict and 
subsequently. However, this group includes two respondents103 who reported to have been the victims 
of displacement from their lands in rural areas of Dang by the Maoists, and who came to live in Ghorahi 
 
103 1(10) Landlord; 2(18) Nepali Congress District representative;  
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as a result of this displacement. It also contains three with direct involvement in the land return 
process,104 and one with direct experience of the capture of government lands through his work in the 
District Police.105 This, along with the experience of a number of journalists,106 provides a diverse and 
detailed insight into this legacy of the conflict for corruption.   
 
Table 6.3A – Sources & respondents 
 Sources References 
Themes 30 338 
Nature of Land Control in the Conflict 23 80 
Impacts on Affected Populations 17 78 
Maoists as Brokers 16 48 
Resolution Process 11 48 
   
Sources 30 338 
Journalists 8 81 
Business 7 36 
Business Representatives & Civil Society 7 83 
Political Party Representatives 5 113 
Legal Representatives 1 8 
Police & Local Government 2 17 
 
6.3.1 Land control in the conflict 
 The redistribution of lands was a central aspect of Maoist ideology at the outset of the conflict 
(Bhattarai, 1996; Joshi & Mason, 2010). This focus on land was driven by the concentration of 
subsistence agriculture amongst historically marginalised communities and the historic links between 
landholding and political power. Whilst variable across Nepal, the literature describes the often violent 
displacement of landlords as the Maoists expanded their control over rural areas during the conflict 
(Joshi & Mason, 2007; Khalil, 2012), and some efforts to initiate land redistribution via Village People’s 
Governments in the Maoist base areas (De Sales, 2013). Drawing on the Chinese experience, the Maoist 
leadership sought an end to feudal land relations and a move to collective farming (Wickeri, 2011).  
 
104 1(19) District Peace Committee Member; 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 
105 1(28) Senior Police Officer 
106 1(08) Journalist and social activist; 2(07) Journalist; 2(08) Journalist 
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 Despite the transformation the Maoists achieved in their base areas, Maoist land control in the 
rural areas surrounding Ghorahi is described by the respondents as going little beyond the displacement 
of landlords, and the symbolic declaration of lands being under Maoist control.107 Indeed, the presence 
of PLA and Maoist party cadres on these lands is seen as having been rare even at the height of the 
conflict. The Maoists are instead characterised in a reactionary fashion; being present only if there was 
an attempt to reassert control by former landlords, or in response to pressure by the security forces on 
the farmers using these lands.108 As with demands for donations, landlords associated with rival political 
parties are seen to have been more vulnerable than those without political affiliations, and the often 
absent owners of large plots of land more vulnerable than local landlords.109  
 Owing to the presence of the security forces in Ghorahi, Maoist land control during the conflict 
most affected the southern areas of Dang, particularly the relatively isolated Deukhuri valley. This is 
described by the respondents as reflecting the larger landholdings, and with this wealthier landlords, 
concentrated in this comparatively flat and fertile area of the District.110 The closest instance of Maoist 
landholding to Ghorahi indicated by the respondents was a Tharu-majority village of Bargaddi, 
approximately 10 kilometres from the central bazaar. This village is notorious because of the mass 
killing of up to 17 farmers by the RNA which followed the Maoist incursion.111 However, both the 
confinement of the security forces to the urban centre and the inability of the District police to protect 
even their own lands from capture112 implies a widespread pattern of Maoist land control across Dang.  
 Whilst there is relative consensus over the scope of displacement of landlords, the impacts of 
Maoist land control on affected populations in Dang is contested. Representatives from the historically 
landless Tharu community (McDonaugh, 1997) and of landless peoples in general, attest to the 
significance of promises of land reform in driving support for the Maoists among their communities. 
 
107 1(17) Journalist; 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(17) Landlessness activist 
108 1(17) Journalist; 2(46) Auto business owner 
109 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(18) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(19) 
UML District Representative 
110 2(13) UML District Representative; 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(17) 
Landlessness activist 
111 1(17) Journalist; 2(18) Nepali Congress District representative 
112 1(28) Senior police officer 
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Exploitative landholding practices, often involving forced labour and servitude, are described by these 
respondents as driving the impoverished condition and discrimination of their communities. The 
displacement of landlords is described by these leaders as having brought some improvement in 
condition during the conflict by ending these exploitative practices. This is presented as a radical period 
of transformation in livelihoods and rights, in the context of incremental improvement.113  
 
“They could plough and use the land to their benefit. If anyone tried to dominate or exploit 
them, they could get the support of the Maoist party, and they would target them.” 2(17) 
Landlessness Activist  
 
 The two direct victims of Maoist displacement,114 the journalists who reported on these issues115 
and those involved in the land return process after the conflict116 acknowledge elements of these benefits 
to landless populations from Maoist land capture in general. However, they also emphasise the gap 
between the realities of Maoist land distribution in Dang and the party’s rhetoric. In particular, they point 
to the continuation of sharecropping arrangements, in which the Maoists demanded crops after landlords 
were displaced, and the lack of legal title granted to famers using lands under Maoist control. Their 
conclusion from this is that there was little material change for farmers during the conflict, with the 
Maoist cadres argued to have taken a comparable role to the landlords that they had displaced, and thus 
failing to deliver on a central aspect of their ideology. 
 
“When the Maoists captured the land during the conflict, they changed the system so the half of 
the amount would go to the Maoist party, rather than the landowner. So they still lost half of 
what they produced, and the Maoist party benefitted from this.” 2(14) Nepali Congress District 
representative 
  
 My focus on the experiences of those in urban Ghorahi means that the voices of farmers in 
communities affected by Maoist land control are necessarily absent from this discussion. Because of 
this, I cannot reconcile the competing accounts of the impacts of Maoist land control on farmers in the 
 
113 2(23) Magar community representative; 2(35) Tharu community representative; 2(36) Tharu 
community representative 
114 1(10) Landlord; 2(18) Nepali Congress District representative 
115 2(03) Journalist and academic; 2(07) Journalist; 2(08) Journalist 
116 1(19) District Peace Committee member; 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(18) 
Nepali Congress District representative 
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areas surrounding Ghorahi, and do not seek to do so. However, despite this lack of direct experience for 
many in this sub-set of the respondent group, for those in the media, local government and party politics 
in particular, land control remains one of the central themes by which the activities of the Maoists during 
the conflict are understood. As I discuss next, issues in the land return process and in particular in the 
sense that Maoist cadres have transformed themselves into brokers since the conflict is significant to 
conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi.   
 
6.3.2 Corruption after the conflict 
 The small group of respondents117 who were directly connected to the management of captured 
lands in the post-conflict period characterise this process as an informal and protracted series of 
negotiations between Maoist cadres, landlords, farmers, and various interlocutors. These processes were 
initiated in lieu of clarity from the central and local government over the conditions in which land should 
be returned, itself a reflection of the contestation over land return in the centre (Adhikari, 2011). Rather 
than disputes over ownership, the often drastic increase in the value of the land and an ideologically-
driven reluctance of the Maoist cadres to allow landlords to return are perceived by these respondents 
as the primary causes of tension and delay. This emphasis on the obstructionist tendencies of Maoist 
cadres in part reflects the political makeup of those directly involved in the land return process,118 but is 
broadly consistent with the view of journalists from a range of political backgrounds.119  
 Echoing that discussed in relation to forced donations, responses specific to the complexities in 
the land return process after the conflict focus on the group of mid-level elites who resettled in Ghorahi. 
Across those with and without direct connection to the land return process, the return of displaced 
landlords and the re-establishment of their claims to land highlights their capacity to determine the 
outcomes of negotiations over land with few consequences. This power is described as stemming from 
the influence of Maoist elites on the small communities from which landlords were displaced, and the 
 
117 1(10) Landlord; 1(18) District Peace Committee member; 1(19) District Peace Committee member; 
1(28) Senior police officer; 2(13) UML District representative; 2(14) Nepali Congress District 
representative; 2(17) Landlessness activist; 2(18) Nepali Congress District representative 
118 2(13) UML District representative; 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(18) Nepali 
Congress District representative 
119 1(08) Journalist and social activist; 2(07) Journalist; 2(08) Journalist 
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use (or abuse) of the voice of these communities in the negotiation with landlords. Fear of violence is 
also seen as contributing to this, but declined as the PLA demobilised and as the Maoists entered the 
political mainstream through the 2008 elections.120  
 
“The Maoists had created pressure against the landowner, which meant that he could not return 
to there. The Maoists were also not ready to return the land without a payment. The Maoists 
told him that he could either sell the land, and that there would be no problem after that, or he 
could not, but either way that he could not return.” 2(08) Journalist  
 
 The theme of fragmentation is also key to how the respondents characterise those Maoist elites 
involved in the capture of lands. Across respondents involved121 and uninvolved122 in the land return 
process, the central and District level Maoist party is described as having often reached a compromise 
with landowners, which typically allowed them to return. However, the elites directly occupying the 
lands are seen to have resisted these higher level settlements and to have continued to negotiate for 
payments and control. To these respondents, this vertical fragmentation of the Maoist party explains 
why, despite the agreements reached by those affected there remains a number of areas of land under 
the control of mid-level Maoist elites in Dang District. These lands are for the most part those belonging 
to the police, colleges and temples, rather than those of individual landlords.  
 The emphasis on the power of the mid-level Maoist elites over the return of captured lands 
further informs the sense that these elites have illegitimately benefited from the conflict. The legacies 
of conflict-era land control are described as contributing to the radical transformation of the wealth of 
mid-level Maoist elites, adding to that relating to forced donations. The manner in which this 
characterised is in some aspects straightforward; those connected to issues of land control and elements 
of the wider respondent group see Maoist elites as having benefitted from the sale of captured lands, 
and from payments taken from returning land owners as a condition of sale.123 This is perceived to 
further explain the wealth and success of these elites in business since the end of the conflict, and is 
characterised as fundamentally illegitimate and, through this illegitimacy, as corrupt.  
 
120 1(28) Senior police officer; 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative 
121 1(19) District Peace Committee member; 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(18) 
Nepali Congress District representative 
122 1(24) Human rights activist; 2(07) Journalist; 2(08) Journalist 
123 2(07) Journalist; 2(11) Legal professional; 2(39) Agricultural business owner 
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 The link from conflict era land control to the respondents’ perceptions of corruption is not, 
however, solely built on the financial contribution of funds gained through this process to the 
transformation of the wealth of the Maoist elite. Rather, it is also informed by the perception that these 
elites have transitioned into a broker (dalal) role which, as I set out in Chapter Five, is one of the core 
concepts by which the respondents understand corruption. This is expressed in explicit references to 
Maoist elites as land brokers by two respondents.124 However, in general this exists through the subtler 
parallels which several respondents draw between these elites and brokers in other contexts.  
 
“The Maoist leaders who captured the lands became the brokers who sold the land. They got 
the lands through the conflict for a cheap price, and then sold it to others. They would threaten 
the landowners, and say that they can sell the land for a low price to them, or they would capture 
the land, and stop the landowner from using it.” 2(11) Legal professional  
 
 The likening of the mid-level Maoist elite to brokers rests on two themes specific to accounts 
of their involvement in land control during and after the conflict, and one general to the nature of those 
involved in the trade of land. On this more general point, the respondents characterise the land selling 
process as bureaucratic and complex, and one in which barriers to direct engagement between buyer and 
seller are exploited.125 The act of engaging in this business as a mediator is therefore widely seen as 
questionable in itself, with the gains ascertained widely described as far exceeding their contribution to 
the process.126 This mis-match between the input and output of work is central to the broader 
construction of corruption through inequality and injustice, as I discussed in Chapter Five. 
 Second, the Maoist elites involved in the sale or control of captured lands are judged to have 
exploited the fear present immediately after the conflict to obtain further profits. 127  The exploitation of 
fears exacerbates the wider sense of exploitation associated with the barriers to the trade in land, and 
through this contributes to the sense of illegitimacy. The focus of the respondents on the power of these 
elites is central within this; both in their capacity to prevent the return of landlords many years after the 
end to violence, and in their capacity to resist directives for land return within their own party. They are 
 
124 2(08) Journalist; 2(11) Legal professional 
125 2(02) Journalist; 2(04) Rastriya Janmorcha District representative; 2(07) Journalist 
126 2(21) Journalist; 2(38) Agricultural business owner; 2(40) Agricultural business owner 
127 1(10) Landlord; 2(07) Journalist; 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative 
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thus seen to benefit from the protection offered by connection to the Maoist party, as I set out in Section 
6.2, but also from the degree of autonomy resulting from the fragmentation of the Maoist movement as 
it transformed into a mainstream political party after the conflict.   
 Finally, despite consensus amongst the respondents that the vast majority of personal lands 
captured by Maoists during the conflict have been returned to the original landowner or has been sold, 
the elites who profited from this are characterised as continuing in the broker (dalal) role in the long 
term.128 As with the role of conflict-era donations in the establishment of businesses after the conflict, 
the root of their capacity to engage in this business in assets seized in the conflict further delegitimises 
this ongoing business activity. This impact of the conflict for corruption is therefore not confined to the 
resolution of the small group of cases in which captured lands are still held by Maoist cadres, but rather 
is seen to have facilitated these elites in joining what to many is a fundamentally corrupt profession.  
 
6.3.3 Summary 
 While the urban nature of the respondent group means few were directly exposed to Maoist land 
capture during the conflict, the legacies of conflict-era land capture contribute to the respondents’ 
perceptions of corruption among the mid-level Maoist elites. Compared with forced donations, those 
who emphasised this link were overwhelmingly drawn from those with political, media and activist 
backgrounds, however the degree of consensus across these groups indicates that it is far from motivated 
by political opposition to the Maoists alone. Rather, as well as providing further explanation for the 
radical transformation of the wealth of the mid-level Maoist elite, this is informed by the perceived 
transformation of these elites into land brokers, and the belief that these brokers have been the principal 
beneficiaries of land capture in the decade since the end of the conflict.  
 
6.4 Corruption and the motivations of the Maoists 
 The transformation of the Maoist elite after the conflict, and the roots of this in forced donations 
and land capture, is central to the contemporary perception of corruption amongst the respondents. To 
complete this link, I now turn to how the respondents reflect on the motives and principles of the Maoists 
 
128 2(08) Journalist; 2(11) Legal professional; 2(39) Agricultural business owner 
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in initiating the conflict, and in particular to the theme that the Maoists have deviated or ‘forgotten’ these 
principles in the post-conflict period. This further explains how corruption focused on the mid-level elite 
in Ghorahi not only reflects their financial gain since the conflict, but also the values that this is seen to 
violate. The responses which inform the link between are summarised in Table 6.2C.  
 
Table 6.4A – Sources & respondents 
 Sources References 
Themes 65 325 
Abandoning Principles 33 140 
Fragmentation 12 37 
Maoist Party Perspectives 4 31 
Principles & Motives 41 100 
Recruitment 18 32 
   
Sources 65 325 
Journalists 15 84 
Business 20 65 
Business Representatives & Civil Society 10 36 
Political Party Representatives 9 132 
Legal Representatives 1 7 
Police & Local Government 1 1 
 
6.4.1 Motivations in the Conflict 
 The respondents’ accounts of the motives of the Maoists focuses on an overlapping set of 
priorities to the demands set out by the movements’ leadership before the conflict (Bhattarai, 1996; 
Bhushan, 2016). Most commonly, the respondents highlight caste and ethnic discrimination as central 
to the ideology and motivation of the Maoist leadership in starting their armed campaign, and their 
broader focus on historically marginalised communities and those in poverty in rural areas. Because of 
demographics of Dang District (NepalMap, 2018), the respondents commonly highlight the particular 
focus of the Maoists on the Tharu community, which is seen by Tharu129 and non-Tharu130 respondents 
alike as having been excluded from political power, education and access to land across Nepali history.  
 
129 2(15) Tharu community representative; 2(35); Tharu community representative; 2(36) Tharu 
community representative; 2(37) Tharu community representative 
130 1(08) Journalist and activist; 2(23) Magar community representative; 2(17) Landlessness activist 
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 Within conversations specific to the ideological motivations of the Maoists, explicit references 
to communism appear only among the handful of respondents connected to Maoist party politics.131 This 
is, however, consistent with how the Maoist leadership sought to convey their ideology, which focused 
on the translation of communist principles to the conditions of Nepal, rather than imposing a model of 
communism from elsewhere (Bhushan, 2016; Upreti, 2006). An absence of explicit references to 
communism thus does not imply that the respondents characterise the Maoists as divergent from these 
principles, however they understand them. Rather, as has historically been the case in Nepal (Gellner, 
1997: 175; Lawoti, 2010), this reflects an alignment of ‘communism’ with anti-feudalism, 
republicanism, democratisation, and rights for oppressed communities.  
 The connection the respondents draw between the Maoists and marginalised groups is 
particularly apparent in their accounts of PLA recruitment during the conflict. While for some the Maoist 
leadership are seen to have exploited the vulnerability of marginalised communities to drive recruitment 
rather than sincerely ‘believing’ in these principles,132 cynical motives are not ascribed to those from 
these communities. Rather, the legitimacy and necessity of change for historically marginalised 
communities is seen as the key driving force for those recruited into the rank and file of the PLA. This 
is particularly evident in responses from Magar and Tharu community leaders,133 but is more widely 
present across respondents of all backgrounds.134  
 
“[T]hey had the slogan to release the Tharu people from slavery. At that time there was the 
bonded labour system, and 98% of those involved in that system were from the Tharu 
community. They were oppressed by the so-called upper castes. So the Tharu people thought 
that, if we participate in the Maoist movement then we will be released from this system”. 2(15) 
Tharu community representative 
 
  
 The respondents’ characterisations of the motives of the Maoists are broadly consistent with 
accounts of these motives in the literature (Eck, 2010; Subedi, 2013). Where they differ is in the lack of 
 
131 2(04) Rastriya Janmorcha District Representative; 2(10) Nepal Communist Party District 
representative; 2(33) Maoist Centre District representative 
132 1(08) Journalist and activist; 2(18) Nepali Congress District representative 
133 2(15) Tharu community representative; 2(23) Magar community representative; 2(36) Tharu 
community representative; 2(37) Tharu community representative 
134 2(16) Journalist; 2(17) Landlessness activist; 2(31) Senior member of District government  
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references to violence as driving elements of marginalised communities towards the Maoists. This 
reflects the urban nature of the respondent group which, as I discussed in Chapter Five, isolated them 
from the routine violence from the security forces common to areas in which many PLA combatants 
were recruited (Pettigrew, 2004). The respondents’ focus on discrimination, and the set of promises for 
radical change they see the Maoists as having made to historically marginalised communities, thus may 
overstate the significance of this to those recruited to the PLA. However, across the respondent group, 
these promises are nonetheless central to the understanding of Maoist recruitment.  
 The respondents’ understandings of Maoist ideology and recruitment is thus centred on the 
theme of discrimination, with the Maoists’ leadership seen as promising radical change for marginalised 
communities. When discussing this, I asked many of the respondents about the extent to which they 
view corruption as relevant to the ideology of the Maoists during the conflict. I did so with the intention 
of examining specific experiences of Maoists targeting those involved in corruption, but also to 
understand how the respondents connect the Maoists and corruption during the conflict period, given 
the characterisation applied to the mid-level Maoist elite in the post-conflict.  
 Across the respondents, none - including current Maoist party officials135 - suggest that 
corruption was a primary motivation for the Maoist leadership. For the small group of current and former 
Maoist party members interviewed, change in corruption is described as having been included in the 
fundamental change in the governance system they sought through the conflict, rather than something 
which required explicit attention. For these respondents, corruption is inherent to what they see as the 
feudal structure of power in Nepal throughout its history. However, for the wider respondent group the 
issues of marginalisation discussed above dominate how the Maoists are characterised, and several were 
directly dismissive of the suggestion that corruption was significant to the Maoists in the conflict.136  
 
“We wanted to change the corruption system by changing the whole governance system”  
2(33) Maoist Centre District representative 
  
 
135 1(14) Social activist and former PLA combatant; 1(15) Social activist and former PLA combatant; 
2(29) Maoist Centre District representative; 2(33) Maoist Centre District representative 
136 2(09) Journalist and gender rights activist; 2(15) Tharu community representative; 2(55) 
Electronics business owner 
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 The exception to the trend across the respondents on the link between Maoists ideology and 
corruption comes from the small group of journalists and businessmen who briefly experienced rural 
areas under Maoist control.137 In these responses, the Maoists are described as having targeted 
businessmen and traders they judged to be engaged in exploitative black market selling (kalo bazaar). 
As I discussed in Chapter Five, rather than an inherent reflection of their informality, black markets fall 
into the language of corruption where they are seen to entail exploitation, and it is exploitation through 
price that the Maoists are described as responding to. This is, however, framed as part of the wider focus 
of the Maoists on marginalised communities and the targeting of those seen as exploiters in rural 
settings. These acts are thus seen as a means to an ideological end, rather than a priority.  
 
“[W]hen anyone tried to start a black market to access the goods, the Maoists in the villages 
would control these, and so no one tried to do this kind of activity openly. Some businesses may 
have tried to get involved in that kind of market, but when they would try to sell goods for a 
high price on the black market then the Maoists were there with their People’s Governments, 
and they would punish the people who were involved in the black market. 2(06) Senior business 
representative  
  
 The combination of these factors leads corruption to be largely absent from the respondents’ 
understandings of motivations of the Maoists. Rather, issues of discrimination and empowerment 
epitomise Maoist ideology to the respondents, and are seen to have formed the primary appeal of the 
movement to those recruited by the PLA. Despite their experiences of the post-conflict period, the 
respondents remain largely uncynical about these motivations, particularly at the level of the PLA rank 
and file. However, as I discuss next, the perception that the Maoists reneged on these promises after the 
conflict reinforces the perception of corruption specific to forced donations and land control.  
 
6.4.2 Corruption after the conflict 
 In Chapter Five, I discussed how the transformation of the Maoists from an armed to a political 
force at the central level resonates with those I interviewed in Ghorahi. This is despite the respondent 
group containing many who were either political opponents of the Maoists during the conflict and 
subsequently, who were subject to violence or intimidation by the PLA during the conflict, or who were 
 
137 2(02) Journalist; 2(06) Senior business representative; 2(07) Journalist 
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direct witnesses to the 2001 PLA attack. The discussion above built on this, arguing that the majority of 
respondents do not view the Maoists as initiating the conflict for cynical ends. Rather, the respondents 
largely describe an overlapping set of ideological claims to the Maoists themselves.  
 The respondents’ accounts of the ideology of the Maoists informs their perceptions of corruption 
through the view that, since the conflict, the Maoists have abandoned their radical programme of change. 
This discussion focuses on the failed expectations for change by the Maoists as a political force in 
Kathmandu, which reinforces the perception of corruption linked to Maoist elites in Ghorahi. Following 
the emphasis of the respondents, I discuss this in three elements; first, the expectations of the Maoists 
whilst in government since 2008, second the specific set of expectations around land reform, and finally 
the comparison to the Maoist splinter groups which have emerged since 2006.  
 The respondents with backgrounds in the media138 and in rival political parties139 speak 
specifically about the actions of the first Maoist government, and the expectations of the party at this 
time. They suggest that, given the sweeping gains made by the Maoist party in the 2008 elections and 
the wider mood of the country after the conflict, that the Maoists were given a clear opportunity to 
govern, and to implement a radical programme of change. Whilst not expressed in the same analytical 
terms, respondents outside of politics and the media140 speak of similar expectations of the Maoists 
during this time. Both highlight the changes occurring in the structure of the political system, but also 
expectations for change in their everyday lives, and those of the marginalised communities.  
 In common with the literature which I discussed in Chapter Five, the Maoist party 
representatives I interviewed emphasise the radical changes in the system of governance since 2006, 
particularly its republican and federal character.141 These are characterised both as direct achievements 
of the Maoist party through the conflict, and as a sign of the party delivering on elements of its promised 
programme of change. The Maoists I interviewed, however, are not naive to the lack of transformation 
in everyday lives felt amongst many of the people, particularly those from marginalised communities. 
 
138 2(03) Journalist and academic; 2(09) Journalist and gender rights activist; 2(20) Journalist 
139 2(04) Rastriya Janmorcha District Representative; 2(13) UML District representative; 2(14) Nepali 
Congress District representative 
140 2(41) Senior business representative; 2(56) Medical business owner; 2(83) Bank Clerk 
141 2(29) Maoist Centre District representative; 2(33) Maoist Centre District representative 
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The quote below from 2(33), a senior Maoist figure at the District level, encapsulates this tension, and 
what they see as yet to be delivered of the promises made during the conflict: 
 
“The main achievement of the conflict was its political achievements - the political system was 
transformed. At the moment when we talk about the ordinary life of the common people, we 
don’t see so many changes in general life. But the political change will lead to changes in 
everyday life - political change will create economic improvement, and change in the everyday 
status of the people.” 2(33) - Maoist Centre District representative  
  
  Whilst in many cases acknowledging the scope of political change in Nepal since the end of 
the conflict, for the respondents as a whole the continuity in everyday life acknowledged by respondents 
such as 2(33) drives a sense of unmet expectations of the Maoists in government. Specific to governance, 
there is a common sense that, despite the changes in the centre, experiences of government services at 
the local level have largely remained constant for ordinary people. Central to this is continuity in 
experiences of bribery when accessing local government services, the single most common form of 
corruption directly experienced by the respondents, which is seen as having survived the transition 
unchanged.142 Given the radical ideology the respondents associate with the Maoists from the conflict, 
this continuity has led to a sense of unmet expectations for change in everyday life since the conflict.  
 
“We’ve seen political change, and change in the overall system, but from the perspective of the 
ordinary people they don’t see practical changes in their daily lives. When we go to the 
government office … we face the same problems we always have. There is not a good response 
from the bureaucrats, and there is not a systematic way to do their work. This type of problem 
is still there.” 2(51) Bookshop owner 
 
 The sense of continuity in everyday life, and therefore of unmet expectations for radical change 
by the Maoists, is also informed by the manner in which conflict-era land capture has been resolved 
across Dang District. Whilst direct experience of land return is confined to a small sub-set of the 
respondents, the issues of land redistribution and access are central in how many respondents describe 
the ideology of the Maoists as an armed group. The perception that Maoist-led governments have 
facilitated the return of lands to wealthy landowners, and that this has been at the expense of farmers 
from marginalised communities,143 therefore stands in direct contrast to the motivations they ascribe to 
 
142 2(17) Landlessness activist; 2(43) Hotel owner 2(51) Bookshop owner 
143 2(03) Journalist and academic; 2(11) Legal professional; 2(17) Landlessness activist 
 
 
137 
the Maoists during the conflict. This, in combination with the sense that the Maoist party had an 
opportunity to govern, reinforces to the perception that the Maoists abandoned their principles.  
 
“The landlords have got the property back, and the documents that some people were given by 
the People’s Courts in the conflict mean nothing. Not even the Maoist party will recognise the 
documents from the People’s Courts now they are in government. If they don’t recognise these, 
no one will.” 2(03) Journalist and academic 
 
 The continuity of everyday life and accounts of the land return process serve not only to limit 
the achievements of the Maoists in the eyes of many of the respondents, but through this also exacerbate 
the perception of corruption specific to Maoist elites in Ghorahi. Most directly, the lack of radical land 
redistribution by Maoist-led governments in Kathmandu exacerbates the perception of corruption 
associated with Maoist elites in the city. Here, the wealth of the mid-level Maoist elites who have 
assumed a broker (dalal) role stands in contrast to the perceived fortunes of landless and other 
marginalised peoples.144 This contributes to the sense of injustice and inequality central to the 
understanding of corruption amongst the respondents, as I discussed in Chapter Five.  
 A final nuance in the effects of the changing principles of the Maoists on the perception of 
corruption focused on the Maoist elite in Ghorahi comes in the comparison between the Maoist party 
and the splinter parties which have emerged since 2006. Amongst the many groups active across Nepal 
(Hachhethu, 2008), Nekra Bikram Chand’s Nepal Communist Party, widely referred to as the ‘Biplap 
Maoists’, is used as a common point of comparison by respondents. As well as through the theoretical 
sampling process I described in Chapter Four, I developed this theme through drawing the attention of 
respondents to graffiti painted by cadres of the Biplap Maoists across the city.  
 Whilst a fringe political force with little support amongst the respondents, the Biplap Maoists 
are significant because they are seen by some to embody the revolutionary nature of the Maoists during 
the conflict. Echoing the actions ascribed to the Maoists during the conflict,  efforts by the Biplap Maoist 
cadres to inflict symbolic punishments on those linked with prominent corruption scandals in Ghorahi 
and to capture lands were highlighted by a small group of respondents.145 This particularly concentrated 
 
144 2(13) UML District representative; 2(15) Tharu community representative; 2(41) Senior business 
representative 
145 1(09) Journalist; 2(06) Senior Business Representative; 2(11) - Legal professional 
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on the punishment applied by cadres of the Biplap Maoists to the contractor involved in a delayed road 
building project on a major route out of the city, as described by 2(06) below. This punishment is seen 
as having been delivered in lieu of effective action by the city government.146  
 
“[T]his Maoist faction, the one led by Biplap, punished him by smearing oil on his face, 
symbolically. They said that he was a corrupt man, so they punished him like this. This was a 
punishment like what was handed out during the conflict time by the People’s Governments” 
2(06) Senior Business Representative 
 
 As a whole, the respondents do not view the type of direct action and symbolic punishments 
associated with the Biplap Maoists as a sustainable solution to corruption. However, to some the 
comparison of this group to the mainstream Maoist party further highlights the extent to which the 
Maoists have failed to deliver radical change since the conflict, including on corruption, despite their 
opportunity to govern. It also highlights the extent to which the Maoist party has dropped their ‘radical’ 
approach toward historically margined communities, and have abandoned their principles through the 
transition. In this regard, the responses from those within and outside of the Biplap Maoists are alike; 
both emphasise that, through their transition to the political mainstream, the Maoists themselves are 
seen to have become part of the corruption problem. 2(83) summarises this as follows: 
 
 “There were so many errors and problems with the governance system, and most people 
thought that the Maoists could change that. The Maoist demanded these changes in the system. 
Most people thought that they would change this system, and other problems in the society. But 
the Maoists became the problem.” 2(83) Bank clerk  
 
6.4.3 Summary 
 The final component of this first element of conflict-induced change in corruption linked the 
abandonment of the principles that the respondents associated with Maoists during the conflict with 
contemporary perceptions of corruption amongst the mid-level Maoist elite. The clash between the 
expectations of change specific to the Maoists with the reality they have been seen to deliver whilst in 
government reinforces to the respondents the sense that the Maoists, as 2(83) put it, “became the 
problem”.147 This shares a symbiotic relationship with perceptions of corruption specific to mid-level 
 
146 2(07) Journalist; 2(24) Civil society organisation leader; 2(57) Grocer 
147 2(83) Bank clerk 
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Maoist elites in Ghorahi: perceptions of the failure of Maoist governments to control corruption and to 
deliver the broader changes expected are reinforced by experiences of corruption amongst their cadres 
locally. Simultaneously, the involvement of mid-level Maoist elites in Ghorahi in land brokerage and 
the radical transformation in their wealth is particularly illegitimate because of the failings of the party 
to deliver on these promises whilst in government.  
 
6.5 Conclusions 
 In Chapter Five, I showed that the respondents view the Maoists as a transformed force - 
associating the movement with party politics far more than its insurgent past, both at the central level 
and in their view of Maoist cadres in Ghorahi. I concluded from this that one of the central successes of 
the peacebuilding process in Nepal highlighted by the literature largely resonates with the experience of 
those that I interviewed. In this chapter, I have demonstrated how perceptions of corruption among those 
I interviewed have been shaped by the actions of the Maoists during the conflict, and this otherwise 
successful transformation from an armed to a political force.  
 The link developed in this chapter started with one of the most common experiences of the 
Maoists during the conflict - the demand for donations. Here, I highlighted that for many, the payment 
of donations was justified by the escape from violence that it facilitated, and that these payments formed 
a means by which the respondents coped with the conflict. I went on to show, however, that the radical 
transformation of the wealth of mid-level Maoist elites in Ghorahi since 2006 has meant that these 
demands for donations now represent the perceived roots of corruption in the conflict. The framing of 
this as corruption reflects the contrast the respondents draw against the lack of radical change in their 
own livelihoods since the conflict, and the conditions of the former rank and file of the PLA.  
 The second element of the relationship focused on land capture. Whilst secondary to the 
influence of forced donations, I showed how the management of lands captured by the Maoists during 
the conflict has led to Maoist elites in Ghorahi being further associated with corruption in the post-
conflict period. Drawing on the characterisation of the broker (dalal) role I discussed in Chapter Five, I 
showed how this informs the construction of corruption in Ghorahi both in the sense that it contributes 
to perceptions of an illegitimate transformation of elite wealth, but also that it leads the respondents to 
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liken the Maoist elites with a category of business seen to be fundamentally corrupt. Far from being 
confined to lands captured during the conflict, I showed how this has been seen to enable the permanent 
transformation of these elites into brokers.  
 In the final area of the discussion, I expanded on the sense of illegitimacy underlying the link 
from land control and forced donations to the respondents’ perception of corruption. I did so by 
exploring the set of motivations and ideologies that the respondents ascribed to the Maoists in initiating 
the conflict, and in the post-conflict period. Here I showed that, despite the complete transformation of 
the system of government, the respondents see the Maoists as failing to deliver on key promises to 
marginalised communities. This failure exacerbates the sense of illegitimacy associated with the 
transformation of the wealth and lifestyles of the Maoist elites within Ghorahi, which is central to the 
widespread framing of this transformation as corrupt. As I have discussed throughout, conflict-induced 
change in corruption in Ghorahi is thus far from purely financial, but is constructed through standards 
of legitimacy, equality and political principles, as well as observable changes in wealth and status.    
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Chapter Seven: Corruption and governance 
“What’s happening in Nepal - Congress will have the power for 6 months, and there will be a 
gentleman’s agreement. The Congress will lead for 6 months, they’ll make an agreement with 
the opposition. And they just close their eyes for 6 months, and think ‘my turn will come’.” 
2(40) Agricultural business owner 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 In discussing the effects of Maoist transformation in Chapter Six, I referenced the effects of the 
conflict on local government. As was the case across Nepal (UNOCHA, 2007), the respondents indicate 
that the Maoists displaced members of rival political parties, local government and others deemed to be 
part of the traditional structures of power. I also set out how reflections on Maoist-led governments 
contributed to the respondents’ perceptions of corruption, owing to failed expectations for change in 
everyday life, despite radical change in the structure of national and sub-national governance. In this 
chapter, I examine the impact of conflict on the respondents’ perception of corruption through changes 
in the governance system – building on these elements of change specific to the Maoists.  
 I discuss conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi through changes in the governance 
system through two key themes: First, I link the destabilising effects of the conflict on local and national 
governance to the respondents’ perception of corruption during and after the period of ongoing violence. 
Here, I focus on the legacies of bureaucratic control of local governance and the impacts of unstable 
coalition politics in the centre on perceptions of corruption in Ghorahi. Second, I discuss the closure of 
political space during the conflict and the politicisation of local government during the transition. I link 
this to the development of what the respondents perceive as a corrupt elite network between political 
party representatives, bureaucrats and businessmen under the post-conflict system of local government. 
 The relationship I develop in this chapter is informed by 1,081 coded statements from 89 
respondents. As in Chapter Six, I detail the elements of the respondent group which inform each of the 
themes discussed in a table in each section. Whilst sharing much in common, in this chapter the 
distinction between those with and without insider knowledge of local government during the conflict 
is particularly significant. Given the proximity of my fieldwork to the elections held in 2017, throughout 
this chapter I also consider the influence of the timing on this element of conflict-induced change in 
corruption. I return to the broader impact of timing on this analysis in Chapter Nine. 
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Diagram 7.1A - Elements of the relationship 
 
 The broader context of changes in local government during the conflict and transition are vital 
to the discussion to follow: The PLA were highly effective in displacing local government officials and 
destroying government buildings in rural areas (Pasang, 2008). Rural officials across the country fled 
for the relative safety of the urban District headquarters, leaving these areas cut off from services and 
development budgets (UNOCHR, 2007). Maoist control over rural Nepal also made the 2002 elections 
for local officials impossible. In reaction to this, from 2002 government-appointed officials were granted 
control of Village Development Committees (VDC) and District Development Committees (DDC) 
(Byrne & Shrestha, 2014). By the end of the conflict, rural local government was decimated across the 
majority of the country (UNOCHR, 2007), compounding the historic neglect of rural development. 
  The compromise over local government made in the conflict meant that, in many cases, officials 
due for election in 2002 served until the end of the conflict (Asia Foundation, 2012). Recognising the 
lack of accountability and capacity this had created, in 2006 the Ministry of Local Development 
implemented the All-Party Mechanism (APM), which granted political party officials a limited formal 
oversight role in local decisions (Dix, 2011). The APM was abolished in 2012, under widespread 
criticism of corruption and abuse in local government, however the political parties generally retained 
a significant informal role (Strasheim, 2018). Owing to political divisions over the federal system in 
Kathmandu, particularly over the drawing of federal state boundaries in the Terai (Breen, 2018), state-
appointed bureaucrats controlled VDC and DDC level government from 2002 until 2017.  
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7.2 Corruption and instability in local and national governance  
 In this section, I link the instability in the governance system across the conflict and transition 
to perceptions of corruption in Ghorahi. I do so in two parts: In Section 7.2.1, I discuss how the impacts 
of conflict on everyday life led many respondents to be separated from local government, and from the 
corruption dynamics otherwise commonly associated with these services. I then compare this to the 
perception of those involved in the media and local government during the conflict, whose insider status 
leads to a contrasting construction of corruption during this period – focused on the growing dominance 
of appointed officials after 2002. I go on to show, however, that these two contrasting visions of conflict-
induced change in corruption in local government have converged during the transition.  
 In Section 7.2.2, I then discuss the impacts of instability in national level governance in the 
aftermath of the conflict. Here, I link the chaotic nature of post-2006 politics and the demands of 
institutional reform to what it is widely perceived as a missed opportunity for effective anti-corruption 
policy from successive governments since 2008. This builds on the discussion specific to the post-2008 
Maoist governments in Chapter Six, and shows how instability in the central political system is seen to 
have perpetuated a cycle of corruption in the local governance system. The responses which inform 
these two links and themes within each are summarised in Table 7.2A.  
 
Table 7.2A - Respondents & themes 
 Sources References 
Themes 80 487 
Conflict-induced instability in local governance 44 135 
Instability and corruption in local governance 58 225 
Central government stability & coalitions 28 80 
Central government policy 23 46 
   
Sources 80 487 
Journalists 16 83 
Business 33 172 
Business representatives & civil society 13 66 
Political party representatives 11 124 
Legal representatives 3 18 
Police & local government 4 24 
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7.2.1 Corruption & instability in local governance  
 The respondents’ accounts of local government in the conflict highlight the extent of disruption 
in the rural areas surrounding Ghorahi, and do so in a manner closely comparable to the national picture 
which I described previously. The subset of respondents involved in political parties or local government 
in rural areas in the early phases of the conflict tell of violent displacement of local government officials 
and political rivals as Maoist influence grew, with the police unable to provide effective protection in 
the rural areas of the District.148 Consequently, they describe that many rural populations were entirely 
isolated from local government during the conflict, with displaced officials being concentred in urban 
centres, particularly around the District administration in Ghorahi.149 Particularly after 2001, those in 
rural areas seeking to access government services are described by these respondents as exposed to an 
arduous and dangerous journey, resulting in the de facto exclusion from all services for rural populations 
across Dang. 2(19), himself a member of the DDC during the conflict, summarises this as: 
 
“The offices were centralised in the urban areas. This wasn’t just the VDC offices, but all 
functions of the government, such as the postal offices, and agricultural development banks. So 
the people could only get their services by coming to the urban areas. But this was very difficult. 
The Maoists were dominant, and they made the people afraid of coming to get services from 
the government offices.” 2(19) UML District representative 
  
 As 2(19) states, the separation of rural populations from local government during the conflict is 
seen by those in party politics as having primarily resulted from Maoist pressure on officials and from 
their suspicions that those seeking to travel to urban areas would report the movements of the PLA. 
However, it is clear from the wider respondent group that the actions of the security forces also 
contributed to the exclusion of rural people from local government. Accounts from respondents of a 
range of backgrounds stress the suspicion among the police of potential spies in Ghorahi, and an 
assumption that those in rural areas had greater ideological affinity to the Maoists. This is despite the 
greater exposure of rural populations to Maoist violence throughout the conflict (OHCHR, 2015). Rural-
 
148 1(22) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(13) UML District representative; 2(14) Nepali 
Congress District representative. 
149 1(07) Journalist; 1(13) Journalist & former PLA combatant; 2(16) Journalist. 
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urban separation, and the resultant barriers to accessing local government services, are thus seen to have 
stemmed from pressures from both parties to the conflict.  
 From the perspective of those working in150 or reporting on151 local government during the 
conflict, the separation of urban and rural not only limited the capacity of rural populations to access 
services, but was fundamentally prohibitive of the developmental functions of local government. These 
respondents suggest that the implementation of infrastructure and other development projects was near-
impossible outside of the major urban centres after 2001. As well as the general risk of violence, the 
Maoists are described as actively repelling efforts by local government to engage in areas under their 
control, or as permitting projects only on the condition of donations. This, along with the destruction of 
government buildings,152 severely constrained local government across rural Dang.  
 Accounts of local government during the conflict by those involved in party politics and the media 
are informed by a combination of experiences of urban and rural areas, and an insider perspective on 
the intended functions of local government. By contrast, those respondents whose views are informed 
principally by their personal experiences place less emphasis on disruption in local government in 
response to questions specific to the conflict. Indeed, some like 2(55) suggest that services largely 
functioned normally throughout the conflict, with the curfew imposed by the security forces the most 
significant barrier to accessing services.153 Whilst the majority of respondents do not explicitly reject 
disruption in this way, there is a clear disparity between respondents with and without an occupational 
connection to local government in these descriptions of local government in the conflict.   
 
“To register I had to get a recommendation from the chamber of commerce, then from the 
municipality office, and I had to register to the tax office. It wasn’t difficult - I just collected the 
documents and registered. They did it in time[.]” 2(55) Electrical business owner 
  
 
150 1(18) District Peace Committee member; 1(28) Senior police officer; 2(19) UML District 
representative 
151 2(09) Journalist and gender rights activist; 2(11) Legal professional; 2(16) Journalist 
152 1(07) Journalist; 2(19) UML District representative. See also Pasang, 2008: 113. 
153 2(53) Electrical business owner; 2(54) Senior business representative; 2(55) Electrical business 
owner 
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 Reflecting the contrasting accounts of the impacts of the conflict, perceptions of corruption in 
local government during the conflict are stratified between respondents with and without connection to 
political parties and the media. The dominant perception amongst those with these connections is that 
instability during conflict led to the growth of corruption amongst VDC and DDC officials. The theme 
of rural-urban separation is central to this, with these respondents suggesting that budgets intended for 
development in areas under Maoist control were abused by officials in Ghorahi.154 Consistent with the 
framing of conflict-induced change in corruption as the exploitation of fragility, as I discussed in Chapter 
Two, this is rooted in references to the lack of oversight from the central to the local and at the intra-
local level under the system implemented in 2002, and the broader chaos of the emergency period.  
 The forms of conflict-induced corruption highlighted by the subset of respondents in the media 
and party politics echoes the financial dimensions of bhrastachar which I set out in Chapter Five. This 
includes the abuse of budgets intended for rural communities cut off from the urban centres by the PLA 
and an increase in demands for bribes in frontline services, exacerbated by rising absenteeism amongst 
officials in the District administration.155 Underlying this are references to the lack of local elections, 
meaning that officials could be relatively assured of their ongoing access to power, and a lack of concern 
from a central government now fully occupied with dealing with the Maoist threat.156 As 2(16) describes, 
the fact that officials relocated to urban areas also means that they are seen as having been relatively 
protected from the Maoists, and thus operated with relatively unchecked power. 
 
“[I]n the bureaucracy and in the regular development works, there was a great deal of corruption. 
There was no one to control the bureaucrats at that time. The government was not focused on 
them, and the Maoists did not have a way of controlling that. So they got a great chance to be 
involved in corruption during that time.” 2(16) Journalist 
 
 As I discuss below, control of local government by unelected officials also informs perceptions 
of corruption of respondents of a range of backgrounds in accounts of the transition. However, for those 
without close connection to local government, references to the corrupt exploitation of conditions of the 
conflict by local officials are infrequent. This is certainly the case when compared to the prevalence of 
 
154 2(09) Journalist and gender rights activist; 2(16) Journalist; 2(20) Journalist 
155 2(09) Journalist and gender rights activist; 2(11) Legal professional; 2(16) Journalist 
156 2(07) Journalist; 2(18) Nepali Congress District representative 
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experiences of forced donations by Maoists cadres, as I discussed in Chapter Six. Those who I asked to 
explain this lack of reference to corruption in local government suggest that during the conflict the focus 
of the ordinary people was on survival and everyday needs, and that local government was largely 
irrelevant to these needs.157 Indeed, as with 2(59) below, several respondents explicitly reject the 
possibility of focusing on corruption in local government, given the challenges they faced in daily life 
after the 2001 PLA attack.  
 
“Was there corruption in the conflict time?” 
“I don’t have any exact information … I didn’t know anything about it at that time. No one used 
to talk about corruption then, I didn’t have any information … The focus was only on life and 
property. Everyone was scared of losing their life, and their property, and just worried about 
these things. No one took interest in corruption. It wasn’t an important issue compared to this.” 
2(59) Auto business owner 
 
 The conflict is therefore viewed as a period of heightened corruption in local government only by 
the minority of respondents with a direct connection to these institutions. Elements of the wider 
respondent group indicate some suspicion of corruption in local government during the conflict when I 
questioned them on this directly,158 but the majority were insulated from these impacts by their urban 
location, and were focused on factors immediately relevant to everyday life. Unlike the demand for 
donations by the Maoists, the effects of the conflict on local government therefore had little direct impact 
on many respondents. However, these divisions in the respondent group lessen when considering the 
legacies of instability in local government for corruption after 2006.   
 The end of the conflict and the progressive reassurances that the violence would not return after 
2006 brought a gradual end to the pressures on everyday life. As I detail in Section 7.3, with this came 
the re-opening of political space in Ghorahi, and heightened attention to the structure and nature of 
government. However, rather than as a separate phenomenon, the respondents widely frame the 
instability in local government which has followed as an ongoing legacy of the conflict. In particular, 
the respondents link the control of local government by unelected officials during the transition to the 
Maoists opposition to elections during the conflict, and to divisions in central government over 
 
157 2(35) Tharu community representative; 2(44) Bookshop owner; 2(58) Auto business owner 
158 2(49) Animal supplies business owner; 2(58) Auto business owner; 2(84) Legal professional 
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federalism.159 Knowledge of these processes is necessarily concentrated among those connected to 
politics and the media,160 however perceptions of a link from the conflict to instability and bureaucratic 
control in local government during the transition is common across respondents of all backgrounds.161  
 As I discussed in Chapter Five, bribes (ghus) to access local government services are the single 
most widespread aspect of corruption described by the respondents. Explanations of this prevalence 
widely invoke the mindset of those in local government, which is seen as focused more on accumulation 
than public service. In explaining this mindset, the respondents widely reference the unelected nature of 
officials for a decade after the end to the conflict.162 As well as the direct effects of a lack of electoral 
accountability on the ability of the public to punish corrupt officials,163 the lack of elections is seen to 
drive a mindset of superiority and separation from the public amongst officials. This is encapsulated in 
the contrast between descriptions of officials before and after the 2017 elections by 2(50) and 2(37) 
respectively: 
 
“In the conflict time there was … a common mindset amongst the bureaucrats that they were 
superior, and above the ordinary people. This type of mentality is still there amongst some of 
the bureaucrats now - they will create problems for businessmen to get more tax or create delays 
in the services, and get extra money indirectly.” 2(50) Business community representative 
 
“[N]ow there is a clear way to go and get the service. There is a Ward Office in the village, and 
a Ward Chairperson elected by the people. We can directly go to him. He is from the Tharu 
community in this Ward. The mayor is also from the Tharu community - I can go there and talk 
to him in the Tharu language.” 2(37) Tharu community representative 
 
 The statements from 2(50) and 2(37) emphasise the role of the external and unfamiliar nature of 
unelected officials in driving their engagement in corruption. In a context in which social connectedness 
is highly valued,164 the perception that officials sourced their authority from elsewhere and were not 
from the communities they served undermines their legitimacy. The respondents link this to the 
willingness of these officials to engage in bribery and budgetary abuse, but is also linked to bhrastachar 
 
159 2(08) Journalist; 2(12) Disability rights activist; 2(81) NGO representative 
160 2(03) Journalist; 2(13) UML District representative; 2(31) District government representative 
161 2(37) Tharu community representative; 2(45) Publisher; 2(50) Business community representative 
162 2(36) Tharu community representative; 2(45) Publisher; 2(81) NGO representative 
163 2(03) Journalist; 2(08) Journalist; 2(15) Tharu community representative 
164 Based on my observations across two stages of fieldwork, my prior experience of research in 
Nepal, informal discussions in Ghorahi, and discussions with LD. 
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directly through references to the bad conduct (kharab acharna) and attitudes of these officials.165 The 
widespread expectations of change in corruption with local elections in 2017 is thus not only related to 
the empowerment of ordinary people through the electoral process, but also through the social proximity 
of the newly elected officials. This is expressed through references to ‘knowing’ the new officials, in 
contrast to the corrupt ‘unknown’ officials of the previous system.166  
 The responses from those connected to the political parties complement the emphasis on the 
separateness of local government officials in corruption under the transitional structure. Whilst initially 
positive about the prospect for inter-party cooperation under the APM, these respondents describe a 
growing feeling of exclusion of party representatives from local governance in the years after the 
conflict.167 Alongside references to budgetary corruption, the construction of corruption in local 
government during the transition is linked to the feeling that party representatives were unable to engage 
in the decision making process, and were excluded by officials who source their authority from 
elsewhere. This is reflected in the contrast between two statements from 2(18) below, who is comparing 
his experiences in the early and latter stages of local government between 2006 and 2017:   
 
“The all-party structure encouraged mutual respect at the local level. All of the parties would 
come together and talk about local issues, we would make a common agreement, and there was 
no bad intention between us.” 2(18) Nepali Congress District representative  
 
“We were supporters, not planners, or power holders who could make the final decision. The 
documents could go ahead without our agreement … We could only complain, but the 
bureaucrats had all the power at that time. They controlled it from the centre to the local level.” 
2(18) Nepali Congress District representative 
 
 As I discuss in Section 7.3, those without a direct connection to party politics contradict the 
narrative on the role of the political parties in corruption in local governance from 2(18) and others. 
Indeed, the majority see political parties as at the centre of a corrupt elite network which emerged as 
political space re-opened after the conflict, rather than acting in the preventative role that party 
representatives ascribe to themselves. The respondents do, however, share an emphasis on the distant 
 
165 The link between bhrastachar and kharab acharna is explained in Chapter Five  
166 2(37) Tharu community representative; 2(76) Clothing business owner; 2(79) Factory owner 
167 2(13) UML District representative; 2(18) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(19) UML 
District Representative 
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nature of local government officials as a legacy of the instability in the conflict. In addition to 
exacerbating perceived abuses in development and infrastructure projects, this distance between 
officials and the population also informs the construction of corruption directly through its impacts on 
the attitudes of the officials which the respondents encounter.168  
 Given the proximity of the local elections, the period in which I conducted fieldwork was one of 
optimism for change, and for a break with the corrupt legacies of the conflict. The elections are widely 
seen by the respondents to have offered an opportunity for the re-empowerment of the people, with 
appointed bureaucrats being replaced by representatives of and from communities in the city. Given the 
role of the ‘external’ nature of these bureaucrats in informing perceptions of corruption in local 
government, this replacement is significant for corruption in itself. However, the proximity of the local 
elections also meant that, for many, it is simply too early to tell how effective these new officials can be 
in tackling what they see as the rampant corruption in local government. As I discuss in Section 7.3, this 
cautiousness is also informed by the links between local officials, political parties and business. Before 
discussing this, however, I consider the role of national level instability on corruption in Ghorahi.  
 
7.2.2 Corruption & instability in central governance 
 Whilst seeking to follow the respondents’ prioritisations in line with the principles of theoretical 
sampling which I set out in Chapter Four, my focus on conflict-induced change in corruption at the sub-
national level meant that the majority of my questions focus on the local dimension of changes in the 
governance system. However, many respondents also linked elements of corruption in Ghorahi to 
instability in the central government after the conflict. Reflecting this, I now turn to the impact of 
instability in central level governance for corruption at the sub-national level.  
 As with local government, the responses describe a sense of separation from the government in 
Kathmandu during the conflict. The flow of information from Kathmandu was restricted during the 
emergency period, travel became hazardous and the respondents focus on their basic needs. As such, 
with the exception of the initiation of emergency powers after the 2001 attack and King Gyanendra’s 
coup in 2005, even major political changes in the centre during the conflict rarely feature in the 
 
168 2(17) Landlessness Activist; 2(20) Journalist; 2(43) Hotel Owner 
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respondents’ accounts. Further, the impact of these two major events are principally described with 
reference to the implementation by the security forces, who to many came to represent the state during 
the height of the conflict.169 As such, even for those in party politics and the media, corruption in central 
government during the conflict is not a common feature of the responses.  
 Turning to the post-conflict period, the respondents are broadly positive about the direction of 
change in the central governance system. In addition to the Maoists entering the political mainstream, 
this includes broad approval of the federal structure and the establishment of a republic.170 The 
attribution of these changes is necessarily contested amongst the respondents, particularly between 
different political party representatives, however none but the representative of the Biplap Maoists171 
reject the general direction of reform. Attribution for these reforms closely follows the political loyalties, 
although many acknowledge the political motives of the Maoists in initiating the conflict,172 and the 
opportunity for reform that the conflict has created.    
 Whilst agreeing with the general direction of reform since the conflict, there is a similar degree 
of consensus that the instability in central level governance during the transition has exacerbated 
corruption in Ghorahi. Instability in the centre is linked to corruption at the local level in two respects: 
First, the respondents see the lack of stable government in the centre as a barrier to effective 
policymaking.173 In particular, the chaotic changes of coalition agreements since the 2008 election174 are 
seen to have resulted in a lack of focus on corruption in policy, and the lack of implementation of existing 
policy. Governments of all parties are seen as Kathmandu-centric and focused on the short term demands 
 
169 1(18) District Peace Committee member; 2(12) Disability rights activist; 2(16) Journalist 
170 2(13) UML District representative; 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(33) Maoist 
Centre District representative 
171 The Biplap Maoists oppose the parliamentary system and the transformation of the Maoist 
movement into party politics. 2(10) Nepal Communist Party District representative 
172 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(51) Bookshop owner; 2(54) Senior business 
representative 
173 2(06) Senior business representative; 2(20) Journalist; 2(38) Agricultural business owner 
174 Between the 2008 election and my first period of fieldwork in February 2017, the Prime Minister of 
Nepal and the governing coalition of major parties changed seven times.  
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of coalition-building. This leads both those within175 and outside176 of the political class to view the 
period of change since the conflict as a missed opportunity for change in corruption led by the centre.  
 
“There isn’t control from the government because the government is not stable, and there is no 
control from them over the ministers. The ministers know that they won’t be there for a long 
time. The bureaucrats also don’t care, because they also know they can be replaced soon”. 2(55) 
Electrical business owner 
 
 
 The perceived failure of successive post-conflict governments to focus on and deal with 
corruption, and the roots of this in the instability of the post-conflict political context, is further reflected 
in the solutions the respondents pose to corruption. Whilst diffuse across the different forms of 
corruption experienced in Ghorahi, respondents across backgrounds177 stress the need for further central 
government invention specific to corruption, and for the government to ensure the implementation of 
existing rules and procedures, particularly within the bureaucracy. Indeed, despite the diverse set of 
experiences of corruption in Ghorahi, the respondents see action by the central government as a 
necessary first step. The fact that this is absent is, to many,178 a reflection of short termism amongst the 
unstable coalition governments which have persisted since the end of the conflict.  
 Second, as well as underlying the lack of effective policy action against corruption, the 
respondents point to the unstable nature of coalition politics as directly contributing to corruption in 
central government. Many outside of the political class view Ministers as engaging in opportunistic 
financial corruption during their limited period in office.179 Indeed, for those outside of party politics, 
each of the three major parties is described as content to allow others to engage in corruption whilst in 
government, knowing that access to these benefits will quickly be transferred. Rather than necessarily 
through examples of scandals, this is seen to be a fundamental feature of Nepali politics since 2008, 
 
175 2(13) UML District representative; 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(33) Maoist 
Centre District representative 
176 2(24) Civil society organisation leader; 2(40) Agricultural business owner; 2(55) Electronical 
business owner 
177 2(03) Journalist; 2(18) Nepali Congress District Representative; 2(24) Civil Society Leader 
178 2(41) Senior business representative; 2(78) Factory Owner; 2(80) Agricultural business owner 
179 2(06) Senior business representative; 2(24) Civil society organisation leader; 2(40) Agricultural 
business owner 
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linked both to corruption in the centre and the distribution of corrupt benefit to cadres at the local level. 
2(40) likens this to a gentleman’s agreement, in which future opportunities breed collective silence: 
 
“What’s happening in Nepal - Congress will have the power for 6 months, and there will be a 
gentleman’s agreement. The Congress will lead for 6 months, they’ll make an agreement with 
the opposition. And they just close their eyes for 6 months, and think ‘my turn will come’.” 
2(40) - Agriculture Business Owner 
 
7.2.3 Summary 
 The impacts of the conflict on the respondents’ perceptions of corruption through changes in local 
and national governance in some respects resembles the focus on the exploitation of fragility in the 
literature. Respondents within and outside of political parties and the media highlight the effects of 
bureaucratic dominance at the local level on corruption in local development; an outcome of destruction 
by the PLA and the instability in the centre as the governance system has been transformed. Further 
echoing this common framing of conflict-induced change in corruption in the literature, the respondents 
focus on financial abuses in the public sphere, and associate this with a lack of popular accountability 
and an environment of impunity. In these respects, the experiences of those in Ghorahi mirrors the 
default account of conflict-induced change in corruption in the literature, set out in Chapter Two. 
 Whilst the exploitation of the instability of the central government during the transition is an 
important component of the respondents’ perceptions, this section also shows that this is a far from 
complete picture of this aspect of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi. Notably, with the 
exception of those in party politics and the media during the conflict, the conflict period itself is not seen 
as a period of rampant exploitation of fragility in central government. Rather, these effects of instability 
in the centre on the respondents’ perception of corruption emerged only as a result of the transition, 
during which the flow of information from Kathmandu returned, and demands on everyday life became 
comparatively less pressing. These central level dynamics are, however, secondary to the role of local 
level instability in the governance system which, despite local elections, continues to impact how the 
respondents understand and experience corruption in Ghorahi.  
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7.3 Corruption and politicisation 
 In this section, I link the closure and re-opening of political space during and after the conflict to 
the respondents’ perceptions of corruption in Ghorahi. I do so in three parts: First, I discuss how the 
conflict led to the closure of political space – limiting the activity of political parties, the media and the 
general population – and how this was reversed with the intense politicisation of the transition. Second, 
I link the re-opening of political space to the perceived development of corrupt elite networks in local 
government – integrating officials, political elites and elements of the business community. I contrast 
this to the accounts of party representatives who see themselves as having acted in a preventative 
capacity under the APM. Finally, I discuss perceived politicisation of the Commission for Investigation 
of Abuse of Authority (CIAA), Nepal’s central anti-corruption agency, and the role of this in the 
respondents’ accounts of account locally.  
 The responses which inform this discussion are summarised in Table 7.3A. As with the discussion 
of instability in central and local governance, the nature of the link between politicisation and corruption 
during and after the conflict is divided between those with and without connection to the major political 
parties. Central to this is the contrast of the notion common amongst party representatives that they acted 
as a limit on corruption by state-appointed officials at the VDC and DDC levels under the transitional 
system against the perceptions of those outside of party politics. I discuss these competing constructions 
throughout.  
Table 7.3A – Respondents & themes 
 Sources References 
Themes 73 572 
Closure & re-opening of political space in conflict 36 93 
Corruption & political networks 54 242 
Corruption & the CIAA 45 233 
   
Sources 73 572 
Journalists 16 122 
Business 33 226 
Business representatives & civil society 8 89 
Political party representatives 10 81 
Legal representatives 3 43 
Police & local government 3 11 
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7.3.1 The closure and re-opening of political space   
 As well as separating the population from local government, the conflict led to broader closure of 
political space in the Ghorahi. In the years before the 2001 PLA attack on the city, those in party 
politics180 and the media181 describe that the security forces sought to limit publication of any reports 
which exposed their losses on the battlefield, or which portrayed the PLA in a positive light. These 
effects were, however, confined to those of political and media backgrounds, with the general population 
being largely unaware of much of the impacts of the conflict before 2001. With the 2001 PLA attack 
and the emergency period which followed, these restrictions expanded to include reporting on any 
potentially contentious political issues, and took a direct toll on the wider population.182  
 Several journalists describe the extremes of the pressure exerted by the security forces during the 
emergency period. This includes direct censorship of their reports by senior RNA officials, brief blanket 
bans on local newspapers and the arrest of journalists accused of breaking restrictions.183 Similarly, 
political activists like 2(13) below describe having to seek permission from the RNA and police for any 
gatherings, and that unsanctioned meetings of activists were targeted by searches and arrests.184 These 
and other respondents broadly engaged in the political sphere also allege that the RNA were involved in 
the torture of those detained in the city barracks.185 Independently corroborating these claims is outside 
of the scope of my research, however it is clear that fear of the security forces after 2001 rapidly closed 
opportunities for independent reporting and political activism in Ghorahi.  
 
“The security forces controlled our activities. If we wanted to perform any activities or 
programmes then we had to go to the administration office. The security forces would also target 
those staying in hotels for our programmes, and any cadres of the political parties. The 
government would target any grouping of the people, from any of the political parties. So we 
couldn’t conduct our activities freely[.]” 2(13) UML District representative 
 
 
 
180 2(13) UML District representative; 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(19) UML 
District representative 
181 1(34) Journalist; 1(35) Journalist; 2(16) Journalist 
182 2(44) Bookshop owner; 2(51) Bookshop owner; 2(82) Bookshop owner 
183 1(08) Journalist and activist; 1(12) Journalist; 1(29) Journalist  
184 2(13) UML District representative; 2(19) UML District representative 
185 1(34) Journalist; 1(35) Journalist; 2(12) Disability rights activist 
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 Amongst those without a direct connection to politics and the media, there is a comparable sense 
of disengagement from political life after 2001, driven by restrictions from the security forces. As well 
as the curfew from sunset to sunrise and bans on gatherings,186 respondents like 2(58) below describe 
how chance encounters with the security forces reinforced the extent of their control during the 
emergency period.187 These pressures added to the disengagement from political life driven by the 
effects of the conflict exerted on livelihoods, as I discussed in Section 7.2.188 This is a common feature 
of the responses as a whole, despite the lack of direct knowledge of the specific pressures faced by 
journalists and activists at the hands of the security forces.  
 
“A truck from the army hit a person, and he was killed on the road. The police came and asked 
about the incident, and I told them. I said the army truck hit him. But the army then came and 
questioned me. They told me I had to say that something else had happened, that it was different. 
Not by the army vehicle”. 2(58) Auto business owner 
 
 The RNA barracks and District Police Headquarters in Ghorahi means that the respondents’ 
experiences of accounts of the closure of political space are closely tied to the actions of the security 
forces. The PLA widely displaced members of rival political parties and prevented journalists from 
operating in rural areas,189 but did not have this direct influence in Ghorahi. Whilst the level of violence 
outside the city and the emergency provisions in Kathmandu varied, the inability to freely assemble, 
travel and work were thus a defining feature of the experience of the conflict from 2001 onwards.  
 As I discussed in Chapter Five, the formal end of the conflict was precipitated by significant 
popular mobilisations and protest in Kathmandu, motivated by the emerging republican consensus 
among political parties (Whitfield, 2012). Demonstrations occurred in Ghorahi during this time, but 
were far from on the scale of those in Kathmandu. As such, despite the intense politicisation of the 
centre, the respondents describe an incremental re-opening of political space in Ghorahi as restrictions 
from the security forces were scaled back and as news came of the PLA entering cantonment.190 For 
 
186 2(49) Animal supplies business owner; 2(51) Bookshop owner; 2(56) Medical business owner 
187 2(39) Agricultural business owner; 2(58) Auto business owner; 2(43) Hotel owner 
188 2(51) Bookshop Owner; 2(58) Auto Business; 2(59) Auto Business 
189 1(12) Journalist; 1(34) Journalist; 2(07) Journalist 
190 2(44) Bookshop owner; 2(75) Clothing business owner; 2(80) Agricultural business owner 
 
 
 
157 
those in the media and political parties, the combination of this with the cooperation between parties in 
republican movement and the Maoists’ electoral success in 2008 steadily bolstered confidence to return 
to working in rural areas.191 Whilst some faced threats when returning to areas of Dang which had been 
under Maoist control, this further supported the re-opening of political space in Ghorahi.  
 In addition to the local impacts of the early phases of the transition in the centre, those connected 
to party politics also stress the role of the VDC system of local governance in encouraging political 
activity and cooperation.192 Bolstered by mutual feelings of exclusion from power by state-appointed 
officials in local government and the legal authority of the APM, party representatives describe the 
improvement of relations between political parties in Ghorahi and across Dang. Despite the violence 
against political cadres by the PLA during the conflict, with the Maoists in government after 2008 this 
slowly came to incorporate Maoist party representatives.193 This cooperation and the reopening of rural 
areas as the security situation improved led to a newly invigorated political environment in Ghorahi.  
 
“The relationship between the parties was destroyed in the conflict time, but we came together, 
and had a good relationship locally. It was inclusive, and we had a mutual respect.” 2(18) Nepali 
Congress District representative 
 
 The re-opening of political space after the conflict is described by those in party politics as having 
offered an opportunity to improve the system of local governance. As I discussed in Sections 7.1 and 
7.2, control of VDC and DDC-level governance by state-appointed bureaucrats is widely seen as a 
significant source of corruption, something which politics party representatives see themselves as 
challenging as political space re-opened after the conflict.194 However, whilst those outside of party 
politics welcome the openness of the post-conflict period, their accounts stress the corruption through 
politicisation which has followed. In Sections 7.3.2 and 7.3.3, I link the closure and re-opening of 
political space with corruption at two levels. First, I discuss the politicisation of local governance, and 
 
191 1(22) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(03) Journalist; 2(13) UML District representative 
192 2(13) UML District representative; 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(19) UML 
District representative 
193 This is confirmed by Maoist party representatives 2(29) & 2(33), as well as by those from UML 
[2(13); 2(19)] and the Nepali Congress [2(14); 2(18)]. 
194 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(19) UML District representative; 2(29) Maoist 
Centre District representative 
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the formation of a corrupt elite network between the political parties, bureaucrats and business. Second, 
I discuss perceptions of the politicisation of the CIAA, linking central and local level dynamics.  
 
7.3.2 Corruption & the politicisation of local governance  
 The view emanating from the political leaders and cadres I interviewed is that the closure of 
political space during the conflict further undermined accountability in local government officials.195 
They also describe that, under the transitional system of local government, they were largely unable to 
prevent ongoing corrupt exploitation of budgets and of the population through bribery because of their 
limited powers under the APM. These respondents thus link the lack of party political influence to the 
corruption dynamics discussed in Section 7.2. However, for the majority of respondents, the growing 
influence of political parties in the re-opening political space exacerbated corruption in local government 
and elsewhere. Here, I focus on those respondents without close political party affiliations.   
 The link between politicisation and corruption in the post-conflict period is first informed by 
perceptions of nature of the political leaders active at this time. Against the backdrop of the transforming 
system of local governance and improving stability, the respondents describe political leaders as 
returning to power with unreformed mindsets. This is commonly expressed in references to the nature 
of the thought and belief systems of the political leaders which emphasises factionalism between parties 
and a short term outlook, both of which are seen to result in financial forms of corruption.196 As 2(06) 
expresses below, this draws on a sense of the historic nature of political elites in an unspecified past 
period, to which they have returned unchanged with the re-opening of political space.    
 
“I don’t think there’s been any change in corruption because of the conflict or after the conflict. 
There is the same types of corruption, because the political leaders have the same type of 
thinking and are engaged in the same type of activities.” 2(06) Senior business representative 
 
 The respondents link the unreformed mindsets of political party leaders to the ongoing problem 
of bribery in local government services since the end to the conflict. Despite the radical transformation 
 
195 2(13) UML District Representative; 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(19) UML 
District representative 
196 2(06) Senior business representative; 2(11) Legal professional; 2(21) Journalist 
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to the governance system,197 the respondents describe a lack of will amongst the re-emerging political 
elite to change this manifestation of corruption. The return of political party influence in Ghorahi is thus 
seen to have limited the impact of changes in the governance system on everyday experiences of 
corruption. However, while bribery represents the most common experience of corruption described by 
the respondents, it is the perceived growth of corrupt networks between political leaders, business and 
bureaucrats which captures the majority of the respondents’ attention to politicisation.  
 The link the respondents define between political leaders, business and bureaucrats is most 
commonly expressed in relation to local development processes. Most directly, the respondents describe 
attempts by re-empowered political leaders to dominate the committees designated with the oversight 
of construction works led by local government.198 Consistent with the often financial construction of 
corruption as bhrastachar which I set out in Chapter Five, the consequences of politicised dominance 
of these user committees is most commonly described in terms of its impacts on budgets and delayed 
projects. Informed by the media, personal experience and a wider public discourse, political leaders are 
widely seen to be both the beneficiary of funds corrupted from development projects, and to offer 
protection for corruption by the contractors delivering the projects.199  
 
“Political parties are heavily involved in corruption. [T]he Nepal government has a system to 
implement development projects by the user committees. Not by the contractors entirely. But 
they pressure the user committees, and provide money to some in the user committees, and this 
allows them to the control the project”. 2(15) Tharu community representative 
 
 The politicisation of local development during the transition is particularly significant to the 
respondents’ experiences of corruption because of the numerous visual reminders of failed infrastructure 
projects which surround Ghorahi. Most notably, political protection is seen to have contributed to the 
delays and budgetary corruption affecting the construction of bridges on the highways between Ghorahi 
and Tulsipur to the west and between Ghorahi and Lamahi to the east.200 The respondents describe the 
contractors seemingly as immune to investigation and popular pressure, and see the political parties as 
 
197 2(02) Journalist; 2(24) Civil Society Leader; 2(40) Agriculture Business 
198 2(11) Legal Advocate; 2(15) Tharu Community Representative; 2(20) Journalist 
199 2(06) Senior Business Representative; 2(08) Journalist; 2(84) Legal Advocate 
200 2(03) Journalist; 2(06) Senior business representative; 2(57) Grocer 
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responsible for this. The consequences of this for travel from Ghorahi to the second and third largest 
population centres in Dang District exacerbates the sense of injustice linked to widespread perceptions 
of budgetary corruption in these projects.201 Photograph 7.3A below shows one of several examples of 
part-completed projects near Ghorahi.  
 
Photograph 7.3A - Ghorahi-Tulsipur highway, October 2017 
 
 
 The political protection of contractors and the wider politicisation of development projects since 
the conflict are the primary means by which the respondents describe the link between these actors. 
However, alongside this, the respondents also describe reciprocal arrangements between political 
leaders and contractors. At the centre of this is the widespread perception that the political protection 
offered to contractors like those involved in the delayed highway construction projects comes at the 
expense of significant donations and support during elections.202 Far from passive recipients of funds, 
political leaders are seen to cultivate these relationships in order to enhance electoral success, with local 
 
201 2(24) Civil society organisation leader; 2(40) Agricultural business owner; 2(57) Grocer 
202 2(20) Journalist; 2(33) Maoist Centre District representative; 2(77) Petrol station worker 
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development suffering as a consequence.203 Given the proximity of my fieldwork to the 2017 local 
elections, these links were a common element of public and media discourse.  
 To cultivate these reciprocal relations, political leaders, contractors, and elements of the wider 
business community are commonly described as relying on a new class of broker (dalal). Informed by 
knowledge of protection to those involved in corruption in local development, the re-opening of political 
space after the conflict is associated with the growth of brokers because of what is perceived as the 
growing need for connection to political leadership.204 Those with connections to political leadership 
are thus seen not only to exploit the protection offered for their own financial gain, but also to engage 
what is viewed as a fundamentally corrupt activity through brokering these connections to others. This 
is seen to be particularly relevant to larger industries such as cement and brick production, of which 
there has been substantial growth in Dang District in years since the conflict.205  
 
“Big businessmen donate to the political leaders, then they get access and influence in the policy 
level, and regular help for their business. It’s very transparent, everyone knows about this 
relationship, everyone sees the benefits they get.” 2(78) Factory owner 
 
 In addition to its impact on local development, the formation of these elite networks between 
political parties, business and brokers is linked to corruption because it is seen to have come at the 
expense of the ideological integrity of the parties. This is commonly expressed in references to the 
selection of prominent ‘big men’ (thulo manchhe)206 for electoral candidates in the 2017 local elections, 
replicating the problems associated with higher level elections. These selections are seen to have come 
at the expense of those with long term involvement in party politics, and to many outside of the political 
sphere represents the increasingly blurred line between the political parties and business.207 As well as 
supporting financial abuses in construction, this is described as fundamentally disrupting the electoral 
 
203 2(08) Journalist; 2(11) Legal professional; 2(17) Landlessness activist 
204 2(16) Journalist; 2(20) Journalist; 2(24) Civil society organisation leader 
205 2(38) Agricultural business owner; 2(52) Medical business owner; 2(78) Factory owner 
206 ठुलो माने्छ 
207 2(02) Journalist; 2(19) UML District representative; 2(38) Agricultural business owner 
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process through limiting the choice available to the public, and as cementing political party dominance 
in elements of the new structure of local government.208  
 The link that many of the respondents draw between the demands of fundraising for elections and 
political protection for corruption in business and elsewhere points to one of the major contradictions 
evident from responses on this theme. Namely, the respondents describe the build-up to the various 
elections held since 2008 as one in which political leaders in Ghorahi are particularly tied to the demands 
of donors, and thus in which there is significant corruption.209 However, the respondents also express 
faith in the capacity of elections to limit some manifestations of corruption, including that linked to 
politicisation.210 Elections are thus seen by the respondents as both a cause and a limit of corruption 
under the reforming post-conflict system of local governance.  
 The contradiction over the role of elections in corruption reflects the nature of politicisation which 
the respondents have experienced during the reforms to the governance system at different levels. 
Specifically, those outside of party politics see political leaders in Ghorahi as benefiting from their links 
to party networks in Kathmandu, and as gaining their authority from the relative power of their party in 
central government throughout the transition.211 The responses thus express the contrast between the 
drivers of politicisation in Ghorahi and the broader deficit of local accountability. Elections for local 
government are seen as a means of orientating party representatives back towards the population, rather 
than their source of power lying with their links to political patronage from the centre.212  
 The re-opening of political space after the conflict has thus been a signal of the return to normality 
after the restrictions of the conflict period, but also impacts upon corruption. Despite the changing 
institutional structure, the respondents see continuity in the mindsets of the political leadership since the 
conflict, the increasing integration between politics and business, and the relative isolation of the 
political parties from the population. The respondents link this to budgetary corruption in development 
 
208 2(09) Journalist and gender rights activist; 2(37) Tharu community representative; 2(47) Furniture 
business owner 
209 2(20) Journalist; 2(23) Maoist Centre District representative; 2(76) Clothing business owner 
210 2(03) Journalist; 2(06) Senior business representative; 2(15) Tharu community representative 
211 2(20) Journalist; 2(48) Dairy products business owner; 2(54) Senior business representative 
212 2(03) Journalist; 2(13) UML District representative; 2(37) Tharu community representative 
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projects, reinforced by visible reminders of failed infrastructure development in Ghorahi, and to the 
broader sense of party dominance in the context of a decade of limited local accountability.   
 
7.3.3 Corruption & the politicisation of the CIAA 
 As I discussed in introducing the impacts of national level instability in Section 7.2, the questions 
I posed across interviews in both phases of my fieldwork focused on the local dimensions of conflict-
induced change in corruption. This is reflected in the information I gathered on the impacts of 
politicisation, which focuses on the local factors most immediately relevant to the respondents. To place 
this in broader context, I now turn to the impacts of post-conflict politicisation at the central level on the 
respondents’ perceptions of corruption in Ghorahi, focusing on the CIAA. 
 Across respondents of all backgrounds, the theme of impunity is one of the central explanations 
for the prevalence of corruption across Nepal. At the everyday level, impunity is linked to the ongoing 
prevalence of bribery in access to government services,213 and the lack of enforcement action against 
those responsible for failed local development projects. A sense of widespread impunity is also linked 
to the frequency with which corruption is highlighted by the media, and conventional wisdom on the 
scale of corruption in Nepal.214 This is seen to have persisted despite the advent of the CIAA and 
legislative provisions against corruption since 2008 (Transparency International Nepal, 2013).  
 Awareness of the CIAA was widespread across respondents of all backgrounds, although several, 
like 2(57) below, suspect that many ‘ordinary’ people in the city would be unaware of the organisation 
if asked.215 Underlying this, the CIAA is widely described as disconnected from the local level. This 
sense of separation from the CIAA is in part a physical one, with the Commission being based in 
Kathmandu and its local representatives largely unknown to the respondents, and therefore 
unapproachable.216 However, this feeling of distance also reflects perceptions of politicisation of the 
CIAA, linked to impunity from legal action for those who can draw on political connections. The 
remoteness of the CIAA is thus tied to the post-conflict political dynamics set out above.  
 
213 2(43) Hotel owner; 2(60) Electronics business owner; 2(79) Factory owner 
214 2(06) Senior business representative; 2(08) Journalist; 2(24) Civil society organisation leader 
215 2(10) Nepal Communist Party District representative; 2(45) Publisher; 2(58) Auto business owner 
216 2(04) Rastriya Janmorcha District representative; 2(11) Legal professional; 2(57) Grocer 
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“Ordinary people don’t know about the CIAA, their process, and how to complain. Some people 
know that the CDO office is where they can complain to the CIAA, but there is the same problem 
here. They won’t get an application, they won’t hear the complaint, so how then can they send 
it to the CIAA? We don’t have access to the CIAA from here.” 2(57) Grocer 
 
 When discussing the enforcement actions of the CIAA, a common narrative is that the 
Commission targets those at the lower levels of the public sector, whilst allowing those at the higher 
level to escape unpunished.217 The strength of this theme is most evident when discussing bribery in 
local government services which, as I discussed in Chapter Five, is the most common experience of 
corruption reported. In the discussion of bribery, the exploitation of the people by those in positions of 
relative power is significant. However, the respondents do not see CIAA action against low level 
bureaucrats as a legitimate response to their needs.218 Rather, instances of low level bureaucrats being 
targeted by the CIAA highlight what they see as the lack of action against those at the higher level.  
 The distinction between the unconnected and therefore vulnerable lower level bureaucrat and the 
connected elite above them is described by the respondents in almost entirely political terms. Rather 
than a reflection of wealth or social status in isolation of party politics, lower level bureaucrats working 
in service offices in Ghorahi are seen to be vulnerable to investigation by the CIAA specifically because 
of their lack of access to political leaders.219 As expressed in metaphor by 2(02) below, this is something 
widely seen to be a deliberate strategy of the CIAA leadership, and reflective of the extent of politicised 
control of the central governance system emerging after the conflict.  
 
“When a fisherman goes to fish in the sea, he catches the fish from the hook he uses. He will 
only catch the small fish because of his hook. He can’t catch a whale. But he says ‘look I’ve 
caught a fish’, but it is only the small fish. In this way, the CIAA representatives are only 
arresting the powerless bureaucrats without access[.]” 2(02) Journalist 
 
 The respondents’ accounts of the politicisation of the CIAA, and of immunity to investigation and 
prosecution from corruption, centres on the distinction between those with and without access to the 
major political parties. Indeed, whilst as I discussed in Chapter Six the respondents perceive a 
 
217 2(13) UML District representative; 2(38) Agricultural business owner; 2(45) Publisher 
218 2(02) Journalist; 2(11) Legal professional; 2(24) Civil society organisation leader 
219 2(15) Tharu community representative; 2(17) Landlessness activist; 2(22) Legal professional 
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concentration of corruption amongst the former mid-level Maoist elite in Ghorahi, they draw no 
distinction between the protection offered by connection to the Maoists verses connections to the Nepali 
Congress or UML. Rather, the politicisation of the CIAA is seen to reflect the common empowerment 
of political parties in the post-conflict period, as political space has re-opened. The changing and 
unstable nature of coalition politics I discussed in Section 7.2 is thus seen to bring change to the specific 
groups empowered at the local level, but is not fundamental to the extent of corruption. Rather, the major 
political parties are seen as content to allow corruption amongst their rivals to go unchallenged, knowing 
that the nature of coalition politics in the centre will change the structure of beneficiaries over time.  
 
7.4 Conclusions 
 In Chapter Six, I discussed the corruption dynamics which have followed from Maoist demands 
for donations during the conflict, and from their transformation into a mainstream political party. In 
doing so, I referenced the targeting of political opponents, landowners and local government during the 
conflict, and the central place of political change in the respondents’ understanding of the motivations 
of the Maoists. Expanding from the set of impacts specific to the Maoists, in this chapter I have explored 
the influence of conflict-induced changes in the governance system at the central and local levels on the 
respondents’ perceptions of corruption in Ghorahi. This link combines instability and politicisation.  
 The impacts of conflict on perceptions of corruption established in this chapter share much in 
common with the broader literature on conflict-induced change in corruption. As I discussed in Chapter 
Two, the exploitation of fragility in the public sector is the single most common theories of this 
relationship across studies of ongoing conflict and post-conflict transition. The exploitation of unstable 
conditions by an empowered elite, which commonly includes political actors, is a similarly common 
element of the literature, and one which is affirmed by the experiences of those in Ghorahi. However, 
whilst affirming the role of instability and politicisation through conflict in corruption, the relationship 
I have set out in this chapter also contrasts to that common in the literature in two respects:  
 First, I do not find that the conditions of instability during the conflict resulted in widespread 
experiences of corruption in local government across the diverse respondent group. Rather, with the 
exception of those involved in party politics and the media, the respondents’ accounts of the conflict 
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period characterise it as one of disengagement from local government, and a focus on everyday needs. 
For the majority, the corrupt consequences of this instability only became evident with the ongoing 
instability of a changing institutional structure during the transition, as the challenges in everyday life 
faded. This revealed to the respondents the corrupt overspills of bureaucratic dominance of local 
governance, and the failures of government-led anti-corruption.  
 Second, the discussion of corruption through politicisation demonstrated the closure of political 
space during the conflict, and with this a lack of attention to corruption amongst the political elite by 
many of those I interviewed. As with the effects of the conflict-induced instability on perceptions of 
corruption in local government, the conflict period itself is not described by the respondents as one of 
heightened corruption through politicisation, but rather as one of a collective disengagement from 
politics. By contrast, the growing stability of the post-conflict period is seen to have brought with it the 
expansion of political party control in local and central governance, and with this the growth of corrupt 
elite networks at the local level, and impunity for corruption amongst the politically connected.  
 In Chapter Nine, I compare the effects of the conflict on corruption specific to the governance 
system to those relating to the Maoists. This focuses on the relative influence of each on the respondents’ 
everyday lives during and after the conflict, and with this their relative role in determining the 
contemporary nature of corruption. I also further examine the role of corruption in the governance 
system in reinforcing corruption specific to the Maoists, given the expectations for radical change 
amongst many of the respondents. However, prior to this, I discuss the final element of conflict-induced 
change in corruption in Ghorahi – which centres on coping and social change.  
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Chapter Eight: Coping, social change and corruption  
 
“[T]here’s been great change in the society - the education level, the awareness level - most 
people are educated now. There is a culture of studying, and most people are more aware 
about their different rights. … There is self-confidence.” 2(44) Bookshop owner 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 In Chapters Six and Seven, I showed how Nepal’s conflict impacted the respondents’ 
perceptions of corruption among two relatively elite sets of actors – the Maoists who resettled in Ghorahi 
after the conflict, and the political, local government and business elites in the city. My analysis of these 
elements of conflict-induced change in corruption focused on how these elite groups are perceived by 
the diverse set of respondents I interviewed, the majority of whom are not part of this elite. In this 
chapter I discuss how the conflict has impacted engagement in corruption and the vulnerability to 
corruption amongst ‘ordinary’ people, including the respondents themselves. As summarised in Diagram 
8.1A, I do so by focusing on the impacts of the conflict on livelihoods in the city, and on perceptions of 
empowerment and vulnerability amongst rural populations in Dang District and elsewhere in Nepal.  
 
Diagram 8.1A – Elements of the relationship 
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 This chapter has two main parts. In Section 8.2, I show how the conflict affected the livelihoods 
of ordinary people in Ghorahi, expanding the discussion of restrictions imposed on the population by 
the Maoists and the security forces in Chapters Six and Seven respectively. I then link these impacts of 
the conflict to two contrasting sets of corruption perceptions: First, I discuss how a small subset of the 
business community used what they saw as clandestine but legitimate trade as a means of coping with 
the effects of the conflict on their livelihoods. I then contrast this to the wider perception that elements 
of the business community engaged in black market trade during the conflict; exploiting their 
connections to the Maoists and security forces for corrupt gain. In contrast to the effects discussed in 
the previous chapters, I show that these effects were confined to the period of crisis at the height of the 
conflict, and have not created long term legacies for corruption.  
 In Section 8.3,  I show how the conflict has led to change in the respondents’ perceptions of  
historically marginalised rural communities. These changes reflect how those in Ghorahi view the 
interaction between the Maoists and rural communities in Dang and elsewhere, and the perception that 
these interactions and the changes in the governance system in the transition have accelerated 
incremental gains in the empowerment of these communities. I link these effects of the conflict to the 
perception that rural communities are increasingly able to challenge the routine forms of corruption they 
experience, and to the respondents’ expectations for long term change in the prevalence of corruption. I 
contrast this to a minority perception that the conflict has instead led to an anarchic mindset amongst 
rural populations, accompanied by an increase tolerance of elite corruption.  
 This chapter is informed by 1,049 coded statements from 83 respondents, following the 
procedure I set out in Chapter Four. As in Chapters Six and Seven, throughout I highlight contrasts in 
how this element of conflict-induced change in corruption is understood across the different elements 
of the respondent group. In this chapter, I particularly focus on the contrast between those directly 
involved in clandestine trade during the conflict and those who were not, and between the political 
opponents of the Maoists and the wider respondent group. As I discuss in concluding this chapter and 
in Chapter Nine, this differentiation highlights the sensitivity of conflict-induced change in corruption 
to the diverse experiences of conflict-affected populations.  
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8.2 Clandestine trade and black markets 
 In this section, I show how elements of the respondent group adapted to the pressures they faced 
during the conflict through clandestine trade, and how this is seen by others as part of corrupt black 
market activity (kalo bazaar). I argue that these contrasting interpretations reflect the proximity of 
respondents to clandestine trade, perceptions of the level of elite connections required to facilitate it, 
and reflections on the levels of profits obtained. I further show that both of these interpretations are 
significant in the respondents’ reflections on the conflict period, but have not impacted corruption in the 
long term. Rather, these dynamics were the product of crisis, and are confined to a period distinct from 
the post-conflict reality. The respondent groups and themes which inform this are shown in Table 8.2A.   
 Throughout this discussion, I use the term ‘clandestine trade’ to denote business activity which 
is hidden and outside of regular channels, but which is seen as distinct from corrupt black market activity 
by some of the respondents. I do so to acknowledge the contestation between respondents over the 
actions of business and others involved in this type of trade during the conflict, which to those involved 
is fundamentally distinct from the features of black market activity which I introduced in Chapter Five. 
Unlike kalo bazaar and the other Nepali terms I set out in Chapter Five, ‘clandestine trade’ is a term 
which I have imposed to differentiate how different forms of activity are interpreted, rather than a 
translation of a Nepali term found in the responses.  
 
Table 8.2A – Respondents and themes 
 Sources References 
Themes 51 448 
Pressure on business 45 240 
Clandestine trade & coping 17 85 
Black markets & exploitation 22 123 
   
Sources 51 448 
Journalists 8 55 
Business 27 278 
Business representatives & civil society 9 101 
Political party representatives 5 12 
Legal representatives 2 2 
Police & local government 0 0 
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8.2.1 Coping with the conflict through clandestine trade 
 In Chapter Seven, I described the closed environment which emerged in Ghorahi as a result of 
the conflict, particularly following the 2001 PLA attack. In doing so, I highlighted the separation from 
the rural areas of Dang that the respondents associate with this period. In addition to the consequences 
for political and media activities as I discussed previously, the separation of the city from rural areas 
posed a significant barrier to many businesses. Indeed, the conflict is described by respondents across a 
range of backgrounds as a period of decline in the local economy which, whilst not posing a threat to 
survival, affected the respondents’ standard of living.220 This reflects the comparatively wealthy nature 
of the respondent group, as I discussed in Chapter Four and reflect on further in Chapter Nine.  
 Among those active in business during the conflict, those seeking to transport goods to rural 
areas were particularly affected by the closed environment which emerged after 2001. This subset of the 
respondents describe arduous checking and permission procedures for travel, restrictions on the 
transportation of goods, and brief periods of outright bans on travel instigated by the security forces and 
city government.221 These restrictions are in part seen as a reflection of the location of the city. As I 
discussed in Chapter Five, PLA attacks spread from Rolpa and Rukum Districts, which lie directly to 
the northern border of Dang. This proximity, combined with the direct impact of the 2001 PLA attack 
on the RNA, is described by the respondents as having driven the security forces’ suspicion of those 
seeking to travel to the rural areas to the north.222 2(06)’s account is typical of this:  
 
“We could not import or export goods out of the District, or out of the valley area at all. I wanted 
to move goods from here in Rolpa, Rukum and the other hill Districts, but there was such tight 
security on the way. I had to show and have all of my goods searched whilst I was transporting 
them.” 2(06) Senior business representative 
 
 The efforts of the security forces to restrict the flow of goods to rural areas is seen by the 
respondents to have stemmed from their need to limit equipment required for the improvised explosives 
commonly used by the PLA (International Crisis Group, 2005). This included the pots, wiring and 
 
220 2(06) Senior Business Representative; 2(16) Journalist; 2(39) Agricultural Equipment Business 
221 2(51) Bookshop Owner; 2(52) Medical Supply Business; 2(54) Consumer Goods Business 
222 2(16) Journalist; 2(41) Senior Business Representative; 2(49) Poultry Business 
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batteries required for pressure cooker bombs, restrictions on which placed a particular burden on those 
involved in the repair and sale of electronics.223 In addition to military-related equipment the security 
forces also implemented an array of restrictions to limit the flow of basic necessities to the PLA. After 
the escalation of the conflict in 2001, this included restrictions on the transportation of fast food, clothing 
and medical supplies to areas under Maoist control, and to the rural Hill areas in general.224  
 The respondents describe the combination of restrictions from the security forces with demands 
for donations by the Maoists as having significantly inhibited the livelihoods of many in Ghorahi. 
Leaders of the business community during the conflict describe a near-total shut down of much of the 
local economy, with those ordinarily involved in trade to rural areas either forced to close or significantly 
scale back their activities.225 The scarcity of goods in rural areas contributed to the pattern of 
displacement from rural areas to Ghorahi and from Ghorahi to Kathmandu; joining those seeking places 
of stability as the violence spread. The 2001 PLA attack removed the sense of immunity from the conflict 
which had been present in the city, and pushed many to consider relocation to Kathmandu.226 
 As well as internal migration, several of those directly affected by restrictions of their business 
report having either considered or sought employment in foreign countries for themselves or members 
of their families. In a context of economic decline, foreign employment offered a means of coping with 
the effects of the conflict through remittances.227 However, given the cost and administrative 
requirements of foreign travel, the restrictions the security forces placed on travel out of Ghorahi and 
the risk of falling victim to Maoist violence in the vast rural areas between Ghorahi and Kathmandu, 
this was far from a viable option for all.228 As such, despite the scale of economic decline and the 
contemporary prevalence of foreign employment in Nepal (Sapkota, 2013), references to this means of 
adjusting to the effects of the conflict are present only amongst a handful of respondents.  
 
223 2(53); 2(55); 2(60) Electronics business owners 
224 1(25) Former senior business representative; 2(74) Clothing business owner; 2(75) Clothing 
business owner 
225 2(06) Senior business representative; 2(41) Senior business representative; 2(43) Hotel owner 
226 1(18) District Peace Committee member 1(25) Former senior business representative; 2(54) Senior 
business representative 
227 2(06) Senior business representative; 2(15) Tharu community representative; 2(74) Clothing 
business owner 
228 2(13) UML District representative; 2(39) Agricultural business owner; 2(43) Hotel Owner 
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 Whilst also in the minority of the respondent group, engagement in clandestine trade also 
provided a means by which a subset of the respondents adjusted to the impacts of the conflict.229 Given 
the nature of restrictions imposed by the security forces in Ghorahi, references to this means of coping 
is particularly present amongst those whose businesses involved the transportation of goods by road into 
rural areas. In some instances, efforts to bypass restrictions imposed by the security forces simply took 
the form of hiding goods amongst other items being transported out of the city. However, given the 
scope of restrictions imposed at the height of the conflict, those seeking to transport restricted goods 
also sought to draw on connections to the security forces.230 
 Those involved do not describe clandestine trade as having required a close connection to senior 
members of the security forces through kinship. Rather, those whose businesses were affected by 
security force restrictions sought to engage any potential contacts as a means of influence.231 The 
account set out by 2(52), the owner of a small medical supplies distributor during the conflict, is typical 
of the type of connections used by those affected. Here, these connections to the security forces are not 
described as having provided a fool proof means by which any restricted goods could be transported 
into Maoist-controlled areas at any time. Rather, they are described as having been one tool of those 
affected by restrictions, the reliability of which varied with time and the nature of the goods involved.  
 
“My elder brother was working in the hospital, and the army would regularly use the hospital. 
When the army needed medicine, they would regularly get it from me and from my elder brother. 
… If I couldn’t get [access] another way I would request it [from] them. If the army commander 
was available and ready to talk, and in a good situation, it might be possible. Sometimes they 
were too busy patrolling, and couldn’t give any time. It wasn’t easy to do regularly.” 2(52) 
Medical business owner 
  
 The combination of the respondents’ experiences of bribery in local government services which 
I set out in Chapter Five with the expectations from the literature set out in Chapter Two led me to 
suspect that informal payments could also have played a role in facilitating access to rural areas for those 
transporting restricted goods. As is the case in the local government, I particularly suspected bribes may 
 
229 2(20) Journalist; 2(41) Senior business representative; 2(52) Medical business owner 
230 2(52) Medical business owner; 2(53) Electronics business owner; 2(54) Senior business 
representative 
231 2(52) Medical business owner; 2(54) Senior business representative; 2(56) Medical business owner 
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have offered a means of substitution if connections failed to the security forces, and I directed a number 
of questions which reflects this. However, whilst 2(52) and 2(54) makes some reference to informal 
payments as a last resort, others explicitly reject this possibility,232 and references to informal payments 
do not widely appear across the responses. Rather, clandestine trade predominantly consisted of 
connections to the security forces and the option of hiding goods amongst those of other businesses.  
 The factors underlying the lack of references to bribery as a means of coping with effects of the 
conflict on business are inherently difficult to assess. However, it is necessary to consider these given 
the extent to which it contradicts the role of bribes (ghus) which I set out in Chapter Five. Given the 
openness with which the respondents discuss bribery in other settings233 and their willingness to discuss 
clandestine trade facilitated via connections,234 I do not find it realistic that this absence is driven by 
reluctance to discuss bribery in relation to the security forces. Nor do I find it realistic that this is simply 
a missing aspect of the responses because of the number of interviews conducted, again given the 
exposure of the respondents to clandestine trade in general. Rather, I find that this reflects the nature of 
relations between the respondents and members of the security forces during the conflict.  
 Whilst often critical of the capacity of the security forces to protect the city, the respondents 
perceive that the security forces genuinely feared the PLA, and were acting to protect themselves from 
a position of weakness.235 In particular, they see the security forces as having been exposed by the 2001 
attack. The restrictions imposed on businesses are therefore likely to have been seen as necessary 
adaptations by the security forces, rather than orders from elsewhere which could be exploited.236 
Consequently, small financial payoffs potentially available from businesses would not provide a 
sufficient motivation for those facing the Maoists to waver over provisions significant to their own 
security. The incentives that the respondents ascribe to local government officials taking bribes are thus 
different from the motives they ascribe to the security forces during the conflict.  
 
232 2(39) Agricultural business owner; 2(59) Auto business owner; 2(60) Electronics business owner 
233 2(21) Journalist; 2(22) Legal professional; 2(29) Maoist Centre District representative 
234 2(11) Legal professional; 2(16) Journalist; 2(52) Medical business owner 
235 2(08) Journalist; 2(41) Senior business representative; 2(47) Furniture business owner 
236 2(16) Journalist; 2(39) Agricultural business owner; 2(41) Senior business representative 
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 The second factor underlying the absence of experiences of bribery in dealing with the security 
forces is the widespread fear of the RNA, particularly under the 2001 emergency provisions. This is a 
common feature of respondents across backgrounds and, as I discussed in Chapter Seven, is particularly 
prominent amongst those in the media.237 The combination of this fear with how the respondents 
interpreted the motivations of the security forces is likely to have precluded approaches to members of 
the security forces without some level of connection. The existence of a connection thus facilitates the 
exchange, but also lessens the necessity of bribery which typically acts as a substitute for a lack of 
personal connections to facilitate a task or favour in other contexts.  
 
“There was a problem with the security forces too. The security forces would come and pressure 
to close the hotel in the evening, and tell us not to have guests in the hotel. They would regularly 
pressure. I would talk to them, and sometimes they would question me. I told them that you are 
representatives of the government, and you have duty to provide security to businessmen, not 
to torture us.” 2(50) Hotel Owner 
 
 The combination of feelings of fear with the motives the respondents ascribe to members of the 
security forces does not entirely negate the possibility of bribes forming some part of efforts to cope 
with the impacts of the conflict through clandestine trade. However, it does explain the lack of 
prominence given to this by the respondents through reducing the kind of encounter in which bribes are 
otherwise seen to occur - namely those of unconnected individuals interacting with an imbalance of 
power, with the bribe taking the place of a connection. Reflecting this, the small group of respondents 
who engaged in clandestine trade as a means of coping with the restrictions of the conflict emphasise 
the role of connections to the security forces and a willingness to attempt to evade detection, rather than 
the widespread use of bribes.  
 For the subset of the respondent group upon which I have focused thus far, clandestine trade 
offered a means of coping with the restrictions that the security forces placed on their livelihoods. 
However, as I discussed in Chapter Five, the respondents as a whole associate many of the features I 
have described as clandestine trade with black markets (kalo bazaar), and from this to corruption 
(bhrastachar). This raises the question of why some respondents were willing to engage in this type of 
 
237 1(08) Journalist; 1(12) Journalist; 2(07) Journalist 
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activity during the conflict, and how this relates to corruption during and after this period. Next, I discuss 
the judgements attributed to clandestine trade by those involved to justify their actions, and then contrast 
this against perceptions of conflict-era black markets by those without this direct involvement.  
 
8.2.2 Clandestine trade, black markets and corruption 
 The distinction that those involved in clandestine trade draw between their actions and a corrupt 
black market is informed by three factors. First, through references to the  restrictions imposed by the 
security forces, the respondents characterise the resort to clandestine trade as an unavoidable necessity. 
Given the relative wealth of many of those I interviewed, this necessity is typically framed in terms of 
the survival of a business, rather than the fulfilment of basic needs. Consequently, for these respondents, 
clandestine trade has the same sense of legitimacy as offering bribes to public officials,238 as they are 
seen as a necessary adjustment to conditions outside of individual control. This reflects the power of the 
security forces over the population of Ghorahi, particularly during the emergency period.  
 The second set of justifications that those involved in clandestine trade offer focuses on the 
needs of those in rural communities. As I discussed previously, clothing, medicines and other basic 
necessities were restricted by security forces at the height of the conflict, in an effort to limit the 
resources available to the PLA. Those involved in the supply of these goods describe this as having 
exacerbated the already significant toll of the conflict on those populations under Maoist control.239 
Those involved in clandestine trade thus see their actions as having been a legitimate response to the 
needs of rural populations, as well as necessary for their livelihoods. The combination of these 
justifications, and the legitimacy of clandestine trade that they suggest, is typified by 2(54):   
 
“I thought it wasn’t good for the ordinary people to not get the food that they needed, and that 
it was creating a more aggressive feeling towards the government. It was a basic need for the 
people to get food. I also wanted to continue my business. I had invested in my business, and I 
needed to do business.” 2(54) Senior business representative 
 
 
238 See the discussion of bribes (ghus) in local government services in Chapter Five. 
239 2(52) Medical business owner; 2(54) Senior business representative; 2(56) Medical business owner 
 
 
176 
 The final set of justifications centre on the contrast between those involved in supplying basic, 
if restricted, goods to rural areas in order to support themselves and rural populations, against those who 
engaged in the trade of explicitly banned goods. This distinction is particularly focused on pressure 
cookers, wiring and other components which the PLA uses to make improvised bombs, the supply of 
which to areas under Maoist control was banned from early in the conflict.240 In addition to the 
consequences of supplying such goods to the Maoists, those who did so are characterised as profiting 
beyond that needed for survival, and therefore as exploiting the conflict. This exploitation and the motive 
of profit rather than coping leads such activity to be perceived as corrupt, and provides legitimacy to the 
actions of those who engaged in clandestine trade in goods with less direct military value.  
 
“Some businessmen were selling pressure cookers at that time for a very large amount, and they 
got a lot of benefit from that. It was only possible with connections to the Maoist party, not all 
businessmen could do that.” 2(55) Electronics business owner 
 
 For those involved in clandestine trade during the conflict, the combination of necessity, the 
needs that they judged to exist in rural communities and the contrast between their motives and the 
motives they ascribe to those supplying banned goods to the Maoists provides justification to acts which 
would otherwise fall outside of the bounds of acceptable behaviour. This element of conflict-induced 
change in corruption closely resembles the theme of coping within the literature which I discussed in 
Chapter Two, and demonstrates the capacity of conflict to transform attitudes regarding otherwise 
unacceptable corrupt behaviours. For those involved, this was a temporary shift in response to intense 
pressures, and ceased with the return to ‘normal’ conditions early in the transition.241  
 The justifications applied to clandestine trade by those involved reflect a combination of 
conditions only directly experienced by a small sub-set of the respondents. Indeed, whilst there is 
consensus across those in business and the wider respondent group on the level of economic decline in 
Ghorahi as a result of the conflict, the specific pressures described by those who engaged in clandestine 
 
240 I could not determine a specific year in which this ban was initiated, but it was prior to the wider 
set of bans imposed on consumer goods under the 2001 emergency provisions. 2(38) Agricultural 
business owner; 2(52) Medical business owner; 2(54) Senior business representative 
241 2(52) Medical business owner; 2(54) Senior business representative; 2(56) Medical business owner 
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trade are concentrated amongst those whose businesses required internal trade with rural areas under 
Maoist control. This leads to a contrasting set of judgements of clandestine trade in the conflict amongst 
the remaining majority of respondents, which frames these acts as part of a corrupt black market. 242   
 In contrast to the small group of respondents who directly engaged in clandestine trade as a 
means of coping with the conflict, other accounts of how business adjusted to the conflict stress the 
importance of connections to the Maoists.243 This stands apart from the accounts of those directly 
involved in clandestine trade, who stress the bypassing of the security forces as the main barrier to trade 
in restricted goods, and who describe the Maoists as welcoming the flow of goods into areas under their 
control.244 In lieu of direct experience, this reflects the common impression amongst the respondents 
that the rural areas of Dang and elsewhere were the Maoists’ domain, even where their presence was 
infrequent. This emphasis is expressed by 2(20), as part of his account of the growth of corrupt black 
markets during the height of the conflict.   
 
“Generally, those who were involved in the black market had to maintain a good relationship 
with the Maoist party. Without that relationship with the Maoist party, they could not continue 
their business at the village level. It was impossible to continue independently”. 2(20) Journalist 
  
 The emphasis that those who did not rely on clandestine trade during the conflict place on the 
role of connections with the Maoists is significant in the construction of these activities as part of a black 
market. Specifically, given the distance between the Maoists and those in Ghorahi,245 the perception that 
trade in rural areas was dependent on connections to the Maoists contributes to the sense of exploitation 
of the conflict by a well-connected and entrepreneurial elite. This is typically described in combination 
with references to the profits available via these connections,246 consistent with the financial 
construction of bhrastachar which I set out in Chapter Five. As well as a common theme amongst 
journalist and political party representatives, this is emphasised by those in business who, like 2(51) did 
not themselves engage in clandestine trade as a means of coping with the impacts of the conflict.  
 
242 2(08) Journalist; 2(12) Disability rights activist; 2(19) UML District representative 
243 2(20) Journalist; 2(51) Bookshop owner; 2(55) Electronics business owner 
244 2(38) Agricultural business owner; 2(52) Medical business owner; 2(54) Senior business 
representative 
245 The exception to this is the demand for donations, as I discussed in Chapter Six.  
246 2(16) Journalist; 2(20) Journalist; 2(43) Hotel Owner 
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“It was an opportunity for some businessmen who made a connection to the Maoist party and 
who could then sell goods to the Maoist party. Some businessmen regularly sold medicines, 
clothes, and fast food. That type of business flourished at that time. They got a lot of profit from 
that connection.” 2(51) Bookshop owner 
 
 The framing of clandestine trade as black market activity is also informed by the theme of fear. 
Rather than connections providing facilitation alone, a minority of respondents also emphasise the 
immunity from criticism granted to those businesses with connections to the security forces and to the 
Maoists during the conflict.247 This is explicit in the quote from 2(58) below, and consistent with the 
wider closed environment emerging during the conflict I discussed in Chapter Seven. This reinforces 
the contrast many respondents see between the experience of the conflict for ‘normal’ unconnected 
businessman, and the experience of those able to draw on connections to the Maoists and the security 
forces.248 The feeling of injustice associated with this reinforces perceptions of corruption stemming 
from references to profit and exploitation of the conditions of the conflict.  
 
“No one could speak against those businessmen. They had a good relationship with both sides, 
and they could make someone a target. Everyone was frightened of them. If anyone tried to 
speak, the security forces or the Maoists could attack them.” 2(58) Auto business owner 
 
 The degree to which the conflict is seen to have generated corrupt black markets is thus distinct 
between those with and without direct experience of clandestine trade. For those who relied on 
clandestine trade, the restrictions by the security forces and the demands of livelihoods justified 
engagement in this irregular business activity. References to the lack of profits and the needs of rural 
communities under Maoist control support this notion of hidden but legitimate activity. By contrast, 
those without this direct experience stress the exploitation of these conditions of conflict, emphasising 
the connectedness required by those involved in the levels of profit available for doing so. This is further 
ratified by contrasts to the conditions facing ‘normal’ - unconnected - businesses in Ghorahi.249  
 The respondents who frame clandestine trade as part of a corrupt black market view changes in 
the wealth of those involved as the principle legacy of corruption in this form. However, like those 
 
247 2(11) Legal Advocate; 2(58) Auto Sales Business; 2(60) Electronics Business; 
248 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(16) Journalist; 2(20) Journalist 
249 2(43) Hotel owner; 2(55) Electronics business owner; 2(56) Medical business owner 
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directly involved, the conditions which led to the emergence of corruption in this form are seen to have 
been specific to the conflict, and not transformative of corruption in the long term. As I set out in Chapter 
Five, the contemporary context in Ghorahi is described as entirely apart from the period of crisis between 
2001 and early 2006, and with this the drivers of this form of black market activity have been lost. 
However, as I discuss next, other elements of conflict-induced attitudinal change are seen to have 
persisted beyond the conflict, and remain significant to corruption in Ghorahi.  
 
8.3 The empowerment of rural communities 
 In discussing clandestine trade and black markets, I focused on how the respondents interpreted 
the impacts of the conflict on corruption amongst themselves and others in the urban setting. In this final 
section of empirical analysis, I turn to how the respondents reflect on conflict-induced changes amongst 
rural populations, and the effect of these changes on the construction of corruption in Ghorahi. Here, I 
focus first on how the respondents describe the impacts of the conflict on rural populations, second on 
the theme of rural empowerment and awareness, and third on the theme of anarchy and exploitation. 
These latter two themes provide competing visions of long term change in the vulnerability of rural 
communities to corruption, and are differentiated primarily by the political affiliations of the 
respondents. The themes and respondent groups which inform this are summarised in Table 8.3A.  
 
Table 8.3A Respondents and themes 
 Sources References 
Themes 72 515 
Rural empowerment during the conflict 45 196 
Rural empowerment since the conflict 51 213 
Anarchy and exploitation in rural areas 33 106 
   
Sources 72 515 
Journalists 17 120 
Business 28 140 
Business representatives & civil society 14 153 
Political party representatives 10 70 
Legal representatives 2 8 
Police & local government 1 24 
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8.3.1 Empowerment of rural populations through the conflict and transition 
 In Chapter Six, I highlighted the set of motives that the respondents ascribe to the Maoists in 
initiating the conflict. Whilst Maoist elites are seen as a driver of corruption in the post-conflict period, 
the respondents’ accounts of the conflict frequently reference the empowerment of marginalised 
communities by the Maoists, particularly in rural areas. The gap between these expectations and the 
changes the respondents experienced since 2006 contributes to contemporary accounts of corruption 
specific to the Maoist elites. However, as I now discuss, the respondents’ reflections on conflict-induced 
change amongst marginalised rural communities are comparatively positive.  
 Among the small group of respondents who were involved in the PLA or Maoist political 
movement during the conflict, the empowerment of marginalised rural communities is a central theme 
in responses specific to the motivations of the movement. Consistent with statements made by the top 
level Maoist leadership in the lead up to the conflict (Bhattarai, 1996) and since 2006 (Bhushan, 2016: 
161), it is the social and economic condition of those in rural areas which they see as motivating the 
conflict.250 Communist principles and changes to the governance system are described by these 
respondents as a means to this end, rather than themselves being the primary motive. This is common 
in the accounts of those who have remained connected to the Maoist party throughout the conflict and 
transition, and of those who joined breakaway factions during the transition, like 2(10):  
 
“We discussed the everyday condition of life with the ordinary people. We wanted to change 
their lives, and wanted to do this by transforming the society. We focused on poverty, 
particularly on the differences between the rural areas and the urban areas, and wanted to solve 
that problem.” 2(10) Nepal Communist Party District Representative 
  
 The Maoist party representatives I interviewed describe efforts to improve conditions in rural 
communities in terms closely comparable to those found in the literature (Lecomte-Tilouine, 2010; 
Schneiderman & Turin, 2004). 251 Alongside ideological education, this includes references to symbolic 
punishments and the threat of violence against those seen to have perpetrated discrimination against 
 
250 2(10) Nepal Communist Party District representative; 2(29) Maoist Centre District representative; 
2(33) Maoist Centre District Representative 
251 1(14) Social activist and former PLA combatant; 1(15) Social activist and former PLA combatant; 
2(29) Maoist Centre District representative;  
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Dalits, indigenous groups, linguistic minorities and other historically marginalised communities. As I 
discussed in Chapter Six, landlords and representatives of the rival political parties were widely targeted 
throughout the conflict because of their association to what is seen to have been a feudalistic and 
repressive state. Unsurprisingly, the Maoist representatives emphasise the role of education in achieving 
change, and stress that violence was used only as a last resort.  
 
“We tried to empower the lower caste people. If anyone was still involved in discriminatory 
practices, then we used to punish them. There were different types of punishment - we would 
blacken their face with ink, or make them walk through the village wearing a garland of shoes, 
to show them to the society, and show that this discrimination was wrong.” 2(29) Maoist Centre 
District representative 
 
 Accounts from representatives of historically marginalised communities, including the Tharu 
and Magar ethnic groups252 and the Dalit community,253 are largely consistent with accounts of action 
to empower rural peoples described by Maoist party representatives. In particular, representatives of the 
Tharu community with intimate knowledge of rural areas outside of Ghorahi describe how the Maoists 
acted against discriminatory practices perpetrated by landlords. This included ending requirements for 
unpaid work during the Dashain and Tihar festivals in exchange for access to lands, and acting against 
sexual exploitation.254 Whilst part of the ongoing improvement in the conditions of these communities, 
the conflict is thus seen as a period of increasing empowerment for historically marginalised rural 
communities by those respondents with a direct connection to these communities.  
 The theme of empowerment from the accounts of those representing marginalised rural 
communities is qualified by the sense that it was also these communities which bore the brunt of conflict-
era violence. As described by 2(23) below, the security forces were aware that the Maoists sought the 
support of specific communities in rural areas, and this is seen as having led to suspicion that all those 
within such areas were aligned with the Maoists. The combination of these assumptions with pressures 
for recruitment, support and donations by the Maoists are seen to have resulted in the greater exposure 
 
252 2(15) Tharu community representative; 2(23) Magar community representative; 2(36) Tharu 
community representative 
253 2(31) Senior member of District government 
254 2(35) Tharu community representative; 2(36) Tharu community representative; 2(37) Tharu 
community representative 
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to violence amongst members of the Tharu, Magar and Dalit communities in rural areas.255 This is 
consistent with the geographical pattern of violence across Nepal present in the Transitional Justice 
Reference Archive (OHCHR, 2014).  
 
“The security forces targeted the Magar community as Maoist cadres. There was also the 
problem that there was the Magar community in the PLA and in the Nepal Army too. Most of 
the Magar youth were there in the government army, and most of the Maoist combatants were 
Magar as well. So who was killed in the war? The majority were from the Magar community.” 
2(23) Magar community representative 
 
 The tension between these two effects of the conflict on marginalised communities in rural areas 
- Maoist empowerment and high levels of exposure to violence - is evident in the manner in which 
empowerment amongst rural communities is described by the wider respondent group. For those without 
direct experience of rural areas during the conflict, changes amongst marginalised communities are 
frequently discussed in terms of the awareness of the people, rather than with reference to specific 
material change.256 Here, awareness denotes the knowledge rural populations have about their own 
conditions, and of the practices by which discrimination is enacted. These references to conflict-induced 
changes in awareness are a common feature of accounts from those of a range of backgrounds, in lieu 
of specific examples of change in rural areas.  
 Precise attribution of the changes in awareness of rural populations is often lacking in the 
accounts of those unconnected to rural areas. In many instances, respondents link change with the 
presence of Maoists, but this is based on references to their broad ideological orientation rather than 
detail of their actions.257 Unsurprisingly, those representing the Nepali Congress, UML and other 
political parties place less emphasis on the Maoists as a driver of awareness and empowerment. As I 
discuss in Section 7.3.3, they also qualify this through references to what they see as the growing 
anarchy in rural communities during the conflict.258 Where they are positive, this is principally discussed 
 
255 2(15) Tharu community representative; 2(23) Magar community representative; 2(36) Tharu 
community representative 
256 2(02) Journalist; 2(41) Senior business representative; 2(48) Dairy products business owner 
257 2(51) Bookshop owner; 2(54) Senior business representative; 2(81) NGO Representative 
258 2(10) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(13) UML District representative; 2(14) Nepali 
Congress District representative 
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with reference to the re-opening of political space and institutional changes which, whilst facilitated by 
the conflict, they see as being brought about in part through the efforts of their parties.  
 Whilst a significant driver of change, both those connected to communities in rural areas and 
the wider respondent group do not see the conflict and transition as the only factor underlying the 
growing awareness of marginalised communities in rural areas. The growing access of rural youth to 
education, including in the most impoverished areas of Nepal, is also a key aspect of this theme across 
the respondent group.259 This is commonly described in terms of a broader pattern of intergenerational 
change in Nepal, including references to the growing aspirations, access to technology and employment 
opportunities open to the youth.260 Many still see the urban population as apart from those in rural areas 
in terms of education and other opportunities, however across the majority of the respondents there is a 
clear direction of change in the awareness of rural populations over time.  
 
“[T]here’s been great change in the society - the education level, the awareness level - most 
people are educated now. There is a culture of studying, and most people are more aware 
about their different rights … There is self-confidence.” 2(44) Bookshop Owner 
 
 Despite the lack of radical change in their own material conditions and widespread 
acknowledgement of the exposure of marginalised rural communities to violence from both sides, rural 
empowerment is thus a significant aspect of how those in Ghorahi understand the effects of the conflict 
and transition. The specific expression of this in terms of the awareness of marginalised populations in 
rural areas reflects this contradiction, and is present across the diverse level of exposure to these 
communities amongst the respondent group. As I discuss next, despite the picture of worsening 
corruption in Ghorahi itself established by the Chapters Six and Seven, the idea of a growing rural 
awareness leads many of the respondents to be optimistic over the direction of future change in 
corruption amongst rural communities in Dang District and across Nepal.  
 
 
259 2(19) UML District representative; 2(42) Factory owner; 2(44) Bookshop owner 
260 2(47) Furniture business owner; 2(55) Electronics business owner; 2(75) Clothing business owner 
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8.3.2 Rural empowerment and corruption 
 The transformation of the wealth of the mid-level Maoist elite and the politicisation and 
instability in local governance paint a largely negative picture of changes in corruption resulting from 
the conflict. These changes reflect the direct experiences of those within Ghorahi, and are central to how 
the respondents connect the conflict to the impact of corruption in their direct surroundings. However, 
many also connect the conflict with a more positive transformation in the vulnerability to corruption 
amongst populations in rural areas. As I now discuss, this reflects perceptions of conflict-induced 
changes in awareness, and the link of these changes to determinants of corruption.   
 In Chapter Five, I discussed the role of relative power and knowledge in the construction of 
corruption in Ghorahi. These factors are central to the respondents’ accounts of bribery (ghus), in which 
an empowered official is seen to exploit the necessity with which ‘ordinary’ people seek services, and 
the inconvenience many would face if forced to repeatedly travel to a government office from rural 
areas. These factors are also invoked in discussions of brokers, who are seen to exploit their access and 
knowledge to elites and state institutions.261 Whilst bribery is largely seen to be inescapable for all but 
a small elite, references to the relative disempowerment of marginalised communities are commonly 
used to account for the different manifestations of corruption faced by different groups.262 This is 
encapsulated by 2(17)’s account of bribery in local government offices in Ghorahi: 
 
“They see that the landless people are uneducated, and that they have no power, so they can 
directly ask the for money. But when they come across a representative they say ‘I am busy 
now, and I cannot do this work. Come back after a few hours or after a day’. This creates a 
dilemma - either they pay, or the process won’t get done.” 2(17) Landlessness Activist 
 
 The role of power in how the respondents understand common acts of corruption, combined 
with the effects of the conflict on awareness, leads many to be positive about the scope for change in 
the vulnerability of rural populations to corruption. Across the respondents, this is typically framed 
through references to the growing capacity of rural populations to challenge corruption amongst local 
government officials.263 Consistent with the nature of awareness which I set out above, this is typically 
 
261 2(11) Legal professional; 2(38) Agricultural business owner; 2(40) Agricultural business owner 
262 2(02) Journalist; 2(15) Tharu community representative; 2(17) Landlessness activist; 
263 2(04) Rastriya Janmorcha District Representative; 2(08) Journalist; 2(44) Bookshop owner 
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articulated through references to rural peoples ‘speaking out’ when asked for bribes (ghus) when 
accessing local government services. This is seen to contrast a past in which social marginalisation 
prevented rural peoples challenging those in power,264 the precise expression of which varies depending 
on the level of connection of the respondent to such communities as follows: 
 For those respondents directly connected to rural communities, particularly the representatives 
of the marginalised groups I discussed above,265 the growing capacity to challenge corruption is typically 
expressed in terms of the removal of specific manifestations of discrimination. The removal of 
exploitative landholding practices for the Tharu community is, for example, seen to have removed a 
significant barrier to Tharu people raising challenges to local power holders by limiting the 
precariousness of their livelihoods.266 This is not seen to solely reflect the effects of the conflict, but 
rather places the actions of the Maoists against the landlords implementing these practices as one 
significant element in a broader pattern of change in the empowerment of Tharu people over time.  
 For those respondents without direct connection to marginalised rural communities, the notion 
that rural populations have a greater ability to speak against routine forms of corruption is rarely tied to 
specific changes amongst these communities. Rather, as 2(42) describes, it is informed by references to 
the emerging political openness and institutional changes since the conflict, and the increasing 
interconnectedness of rural and urban areas after a period in which these domains were largely 
separated.267 For others, this is tied to broad references to the aims of the Maoists regarding rural and 
marginalised communities, and the changing political environment, both of which have challenged 
previously dominant power structures.268 The outcome for the respondents’ perceptions of corruption is, 
however, the same across those with and without connection to rural communities. 
 
“I’m positive, I’m not seeing a worsening trend. Most people are getting educated, and have 
access to technology, and they know about the whole country, and about the world. So they can 
raise questions about corruption issues - if a leader has a high standard of life, or a very 
unexpected lifestyle - they can question that.” 2(42) Factory owner 
 
264 2(48) Dairy products business owner; 2(81) NGO Representative; 2(84) Legal professional 
265 2(15) Tharu community representative; 2(23) Magar community representative; 2(36) Tharu 
community representative 
266 2(15) Tharu community representative; 2(35) Tharu community representative; 2(36) Tharu 
community representative 
267 2(06) Senior Business Representative; 2(07) Journalist; 2(42) Factory Owner 
268 2(09) Journalist & Gender Rights Activist; 2(16) Journalist; 2(41) Senior Business Representative 
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 Combined with growing access to education and the expansion of the media since the end of 
the closed environment of the conflict, respondents across backgrounds thus describe a decreasing 
vulnerability of rural populations to common forms of corruption. Whilst outside of the direct experience 
of the majority of the respondents, this informs perceptions of the direction of change in corruption since 
and as a result of changes in the conflict, and their optimism for future change. However, while the 
respondents are often optimistic about future change, the changes they describe are not always linked to 
declines in corruption in a straightforward manner. Indeed, for some, these changes are also seen to have 
influenced the manner in which routine forms of corruption are performed.  
 Consistent with the broader picture of change in the awareness and empowerment of rural 
peoples, a subset of the respondents describe a growing secrecy of demands for bribes in local 
government contexts.269 This includes reference to bureaucrats being increasingly unable to present 
demands outright, given the growing confidence of rural peoples to challenge the demand for bribes. 
However, rather than reducing the overall scope of the problem, this pressure is associated with the 
perceived growth of brokers (dalal) as a means of delivering the demand for bribes in local government 
services, one of the many functions of brokers which I set out in Chapter Five. Both the corrupt nature 
of the demand for bribes and the exploitation linked to this are seen to have remained constant, however 
the performance of corruption has changed.  
 
“The awareness of the people must have affected those who are involved in corruption. They 
are aware of the complaints, so they try to do corruption more secretly … Before the conflict 
time people could openly carry out these corrupt activities and the people could not complain, 
but now they are having to do corruption in a more secret way.” 2(07) Journalist 
 
 As I discuss next, the growing role for brokers as a means of delivering demands for bribes in 
a context in which open demands are increasingly difficult is not the only limit that some respondents 
place on the effects of empowerment on corruption. Rather, some also see the conflict as leading to the 
growth of a mindset of anarchy and exploitation in rural areas. However, this does not detract from the 
wider perception amongst the respondents of an increasing capacity to resist routine forms of corruption 
amongst those in rural areas. As I discuss in Chapter Nine, this demonstrates that conflict-induced 
 
269 2(07) Journalist; 2(43) Hotel Owner; 2(50) Hotel Owner 
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change in corruption is not limited to the respondents’ reflections on their own experiences, but also 
draws on perceptions of change in areas outside of their direct experiences.  
 
8.3.3. Anarchy, exploitation and corruption 
 Amongst the political opponents of the Maoists, particularly those who were victims of 
displacement and violence by the PLA, there is a common emphasis on the rise of anarchy in the rural 
areas during the conflict.270 The logic underlying this is straightforward - these respondents see the 
Maoists as having displaced the traditional sources of authority in the villages, leading to anarchy. Like 
2(19) below, they also see the conditions of the conflict as leading some villages to align with the 
Maoists for corrupt financial gain, rather than principally as a reaction to discrimination and the structure 
of power which supported it. The connection to the Maoists is seen to be significant to this because of 
the protection it provided amid the lack of presence of the state.  
 
“[T]he common people saw that they could join with the Maoist party and get access to the 
crops, and maybe also get access to the money as well. They became greedy, they wanted to 
capture the property of others. This mindset spread throughout the people - the mindset to get 
property freely.” 2(19) UML District Representative 
 
 Unlike the effects of rural empowerment, the corruption that is seen to have resulted from an 
ascendant mindset of anarchy in the conflict is not predominantly tied to bribery. Rather, the anarchy in 
the rural areas is seen to have led to the illicit extraction of natural resources, impunity for a range of 
crimes and the abuse of any development funds which managed to reach these areas.271 Comparable to 
the factors underlying the broker (dalal) and black market (kalo bazaar) concepts which I set out in 
Chapter Five, what ties this to corruption is the sense of exploitation of the conditions of the conflict, 
particularly connections to the Maoists, and gains beyond that reasonably obtained through work.  
 The political opponents of the Maoists and others critical of them do not see the mindset of 
exploitation as something solely confined to the conflict period. Rather, they view the exploitation of 
 
270 2(13) UML District representative; 2(14) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(19) UML 
District representative 
271 2(13) UML District Representative; 2(14) Nepali Congress District Representative; 2(19) UML 
District Representative 
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the conflict by a minority as leading to the long term growth of a mindset focused on wealth and 
accumulation. Whilst present in various guises amongst these respondents, the most common expression 
of this is in characterisations of the attitudes of rural peoples towards development projects.272 As with 
2(18) below, ‘ordinary’ people are characterised as focusing only on the outcomes of development and 
on what they can gain through bargaining. This notion of illegitimate gain and its roots in the rejection 
of traditional power structures links such attitudes to corruption (bhrastachar). 
 
“[N]ow there is a mindset amongst the people. If any project is going to be launched, or any 
budget becomes available for a road or a project … [t]hey will say we have been affected by 
the project, and want some money as compensation. They bargain like this. This is the same 
mindset that was in the conflict time. But there is not blocking like there was before. People 
want to bargain now.” 2(18) Nepali Congress District Representative 
 
 
 Critiques of the legacies of the conflict in rural areas from District-level elites of the Nepali 
Congress and UML are unsurprising. Broadly speaking, these elites had benefitted from the pre-conflict 
structure of local power, and were disempowered through the conflict. However, they are not the only 
respondents who qualify the theme of awareness with references to the growth of a mindset focused on 
wealth. Rather, several of the journalists and small business owners I interviewed also describe the 
growth of such a mindset.273 This is not linked to an idea of anarchy in the rural areas because of the 
displacement of the state by the Maoists, but is instead described as an overspill from otherwise positive 
changes occurring because of the conflict and transition. 
 For those not connected to the political parties opposed by the Maoists, concern over a growing 
materialistic mindset is linked to growth of access to education and non-agricultural employment across 
Nepal.274 As 2(51) describes, this mindset is seen as providing incentives for financial forms of 
corruption motived by increasingly complex and aspirational lifestyles, but also shares a more direct 
connection to corruption. This direct connection is rooted in the idea that people across Nepal 
increasingly prioritise wealth and lifestyle above family and kin.275 Whilst relevant to the urban setting, 
 
272 1(22) Nepali Congress District representative; 2(14) Nepali Congress District Representative; 
2(19) UML District Representative 
273 2(03) Journalist and academic; 2(21) Journalist; 2(51) Bookshop owner 
274 2(42) Factory owner; 2(43) Business community representative; 2(47) Furniture business owner 
275 2(09) Journalist and gender rights activist; 2(20) Journalist; 2(38) Agricultural business owner 
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many particularly lament the loss of an imagined ideal of rural life through this emergent materialism.276 
This is not to say that the respondents object to these changes in the conditions of rural communities, 
but rather that they observe these changes as a dark side of overall positive shift.  
 
“Our lifestyles are getting more expensive and we’re spending more in daily life. We are 
celebrating festivals with more and more money. The common people and the bureaucrats need 
more money these days. So this has created more of a problem for corruption. Everyone is trying 
to get more and more to be comfortable in their everyday lives”. 2(51) Bookshop owner 
 
 The account of anarchy and exploitation given by those outside of the political parties is not a 
direct dismissal of the theme of awareness and empowerment I discussed in the previous section. Indeed, 
many of those in this group also stressed the positive dimensions of change in rural communities, and 
the roots of this in the actions of the Maoists and the transformation of the political system since the end 
of the conflict. Rather, they engage the idea of anarchy and exploitation to explain the lack of radical 
change in the exposure of rural populations to corruption in the post-conflict period. This is in some 
respects self-limiting, with the growth of education and empowerment limiting the vulnerability to 
corruption, but also supporting a mindset increasingly focused on wealth.  
 
8.4 Conclusions  
 In Chapters Six and Seven, I discussed the impacts of the conflict on the respondents’ 
perceptions of corruption among two relatively elite sets of actors – the mid-level Maoist elite who 
relocated to Ghorahi during the transition, and the set of  political, local government and business elites 
who are seen to have benefitted from instability and politicisation in the governance system. In this 
chapter, I completed this picture by setting out conflict-induced change in the respondents’ perceptions 
of corruption among ‘ordinary’ people in Ghorahi and the rural areas which surround the city. I have 
done so with a focus on two contested themes: First, I discussed clandestine trade as a means of coping 
with the pressures of the conflict, and the contrasting framing of this activity as a corrupt black market. 
Second, I discussed the widespread perception that the actions of the Maoists and changes to the 
 
276 1(26) Civil society organisation leader; 2(03) Journalist and academic; 2(09) Journalist and gender 
rights activist 
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governance system have led to the increasing resilience of rural peoples to corruption, and the critique 
that challenges to the traditional power structure have led to a mindset of anarchy and exploitation. 
 The discussion of clandestine trade demonstrated how the exceptional pressures on the 
respondents’ livelihoods led some to engage in otherwise unacceptable acts. The most direct of these 
pressures were the restrictions the security forces placed on trade during the emergency period, however 
other reflections were also significant to engagement in this means of coping. These included reflections 
on the needs of those in rural areas, who the respondents saw as cut off from basic necessities, and on 
the lack of exceptional profits obtained through this. These pressures and reflections served to legitimise 
acts including the use of connections to the security forces to bypass checkpoints, and the smuggling of 
goods where connections failed. I also demonstrated that the fear of the security forces and the role of 
connections served to limit the use of bribes (ghus) to facilitate clandestine trade, despite its prevalence 
as a means of overcoming barriers posed by officials.   
 Clandestine trade provided a minority of respondents with an additional means of coping with 
the challenges they faced during the height of the conflict. However, the bypassing of restrictions 
imposed by the security forces to facilitate trade to rural areas was also framed by many as corrupt black 
market (kalo bazaar). This framing reflects perceptions that such activity was the domain of a well-
connected elite group of businessmen, able to influence both the security forces and the Maoists, that 
doing so led to profits beyond that legitimately arising from the work involved, and that it included the 
sale of banned military goods. The competing framing of acts as clandestine trade and as black markets 
highlights the extent to which conflict-induced change in corruption is contested in similarly affected 
populations, and amongst those of similar backgrounds. As I discuss in Chapter Nine, this offers a 
significant nuance to how this relationship has been approached in the literature.  
 The second link I developed in this chapter focused on the respondents’ perceptions of change 
amongst rural populations in Dang District and elsewhere in Nepal. Rural-urban separation was one of 
the defining features of the conflict after 2001, but the construction of corruption in Ghorahi is 
nonetheless influenced by perceptions of change in these areas. Here, I linked the focus of the Maoists 
on historically marginalised rural populations and political reforms of the transition with perceptions of 
the empowerment of rural populations. I demonstrated how this has informed perceptions of an 
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increasing ability of rural peoples to challenge routine forms of corruption, and with this expectations 
of the future direction of change in corruption across Nepal. These perceptions are consistent with those 
of respondents directly connected to historically marginalised communities, who describe the conflict 
as an acceleration of incremental improvements in the capacity of rural peoples to challenge corruption. 
 As with clandestine trade, I demonstrated how conflict-induced change in corruption through 
rural empowerment is contested by a minority of the respondent group. For those politically opposed to 
the Maoists, the displacement of the pre-conflict structure of rural power is instead seen to have 
generated anarchy in rural areas, and a mindset focused on wealth. Whilst the extremes of this critique 
are clearly motivated by party-political divides, I also showed how the theme of rural empowerment is 
qualified across the respondent group. This included perceptions of the growing secrecy of routine forms 
of corruption as rural peoples have becoming increasingly willing to speak out, and the growing role of 
brokers as a means of facilitating corruption. In Chapter Nine, I further discuss the complex influence 
of perceptions of rural change on the construction of corruption in urban Ghorahi, and integrate this with 
the elements of conflict-induced change in corruption I set out in Chapters Six and Seven.   
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Chapter Nine: Discussion 
9.1 Introduction 
 In Chapters Six to Eight, I set out the three elements of conflict-induced change in corruption 
evident from those I interviewed in Ghorahi. I focused first on the transformation of the mid-level Maoist 
elite, second on instability and politicisation in the governance system, and third on coping and social 
change. Reflecting the constructivist grounded theory approach at the centre of my analysis, I did so 
without imposing the theories of conflict-induced change in corruption evident in the literature, and 
instead focused on developing each element of this relationship in context. To complete this process, in 
this penultimate chapter I integrate the three elements of conflict-induced change in corruption into a 
single account of this relationship, and discuss the contribution of this to the literature.  
 This chapter has two main parts: In Section 9.2, I discuss the relative prominence of the three 
elements of conflict-induced change in corruption which I developed over Chapters Six to Eight, and 
compare this to the broader nature of corruption in Ghorahi which I set out in Chapter Five. Following 
this, in Section 9.3, I compare the nature of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi to the 
outcomes of the literature review in Chapter Two. Here, I discuss the implications of my analysis for 
both the four theories of this relationship in the literature, and the broader study of this relationship. In 
Chapter Ten, I use this discussion as the basis of a number of recommendations for further research, and 
reflect on the transferability and limits of my analysis.  
 
9.2 Conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi 
 The research question I posed in Chapter One asked “how has armed conflict in Nepal affected 
corruption at the sub-national level and in the long term?”. Over chapters Six to Eight, I argued that 
there are three areas in which conflict impacts corruption amongst those I interviewed in Ghorahi. In 
this section, I summarise these three elements and set out how conflict-induced change relates to the 
broader construction of corruption in this context. Following this, I discuss the relative prominence of 
each of these elements in the period in which I undertook fieldwork and over time. Through this, I set 
out the combined and contextualised account of this relationship in Ghorahi.  
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9.2.1 The three elements of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi 
Chapter Six demonstrated that the transformation of the mid-level Maoist elites who relocated 
to Ghorahi following their exit from the PLA influenced the respondents’ perceptions corruption across 
the transition. Underlying this are experiences of forced donations to the Maoists during the conflict, 
the respondents’ comparisons of the fortunes of these elites to those of ordinary people and rank and file 
ex-combatants and the sense that the Maoists abandoned their focus on social change. These 
comparisons provide a socially contingent standard of fairness, rooted in reflections on the conflict and 
transition, which this transformation is judged to have violated. For a minority, this sense of corrupt 
transformation is exacerbated by the involvement of Maoist elites in brokering the sale of captured lands.  
 Broadening from the focus on the Maoists, Chapter Seven linked instability and politicisation 
in the governance system during the conflict and transition to the respondents’ perceptions of corruption. 
Across respondents of all backgrounds, the lack of local electoral accountability and the chaotic nature 
of coalition politics in the transition are seen to have entrenched corruption in the local governance 
system. This includes perceptions of budgetary abuses, the failure of infrastructure projects and the 
formation of elite networks which undermine electoral processes. For those not directly involved in 
politics, the political parties have been a central beneficiary of this, and have orchestrated corrupt elite 
networks between business and state-appointed officials. This contrasts to the perception of those 
involved in party politics, who see themselves as having been disempowered by the transitional structure 
of local governance, and as attempting to limit corruption amongst state-appointed officials.  
 Finally, Chapter Eight demonstrated how pressures on everyday life during the conflict led some 
in Ghorahi to resort to clandestine trade. Whilst a justifiable means of coping with the effects of the 
conflict for some, many of those not involved frame this as part of a corrupt black market during the 
conflict. These perceptions are differentiated by reflections on the connections necessary to facilitate 
trade, the profits obtained, and nature of the goods traded. Broadening from the focus on the urban 
experience alone, Chapter Eight also linked the actions of the Maoists during the conflict to the 
perceived capacity of rural populations to challenge routine forms of corruption. This contrasts with the 
perceptions of a politically-engaged minority, who see the conflict as leading to an anarchic and wealth-
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focused mindset. Whilst outside of the direct experiences of those in the city, these changes impact the 
respondents’ expectations for future change in corruption.  
 
9.2.2 Conflict-induced change in the broader context of corruption in Ghorahi 
 In Chapter Five, I argued that corruption in Ghorahi is constructed by a complex set of 
judgements across different actors and contexts, and is expressed through a diverse set of concepts. 
Whilst significant, the three elements of conflict-induced change in corruption which I summarised 
above are far from the sole drivers of corruption, and should be seen in this broader context. Reflecting 
this, here I compare conflict-induced change in corruption to the broader nature of corruption in Ghorahi.  
 Of the three elements of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi, the transformation 
of the Maoist elite is unique in that it has introduced a distinct set of beneficiaries into the forefront of 
the respondents’ perceptions of corruption. While now part of the political class which the respondents 
associate with corruption in general, these elites are distinct because they are seen as having come from 
backgrounds of rural poverty which are entirely apart from the urban experience. Further, they are seen 
as rapidly transforming into among the wealthiest elites in the city. These reflections on the background 
and scope of transformation of these elites sets them apart from the broader set of beneficiaries from 
corruption in politics and local government who, while engaged in comparable patterns of behaviour, 
are perceived to have historically benefited from the structure of local power.  
 In contrast to Maoist transformation, the second and third elements of conflict-induced change 
in corruption relate to actors that the respondents associate with corruption more generally. In the second 
element, the principal beneficiaries of instability and politicisation in the governance system are 
perceived to be those elites who are long seen to have benefitted from corruption. This is principally the 
local representatives of major political parties, and the brokers and business elites with which they are 
connected. It is also these elites who are seen as exploiting historically marginalised rural communities 
in element three. Similarly, the framing of clandestine trade as a corrupt black market focuses on a sub-
group of the business community who are generally seen as beneficiaries of black markets. These two 
elements of conflict-induced change in corruption thus centre on the changing capacity of existing 
beneficiaries to engage in corruption, rather than the growth of a new set of beneficiaries.  
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 Turning from the beneficiaries of corruption to standards and judgements underlying it, the 
nature of Maoist transformation reflects many of the broader judgments central to the respondents’ 
perceptions of corruption in Ghorahi. As I discussed in Chapter Five, the construction of corruption in 
Ghorahi draws on expectations of legitimate gain, underlying which are comparisons between the 
fortunes of elites and ordinary people. The gap between this standard of legitimate gain and the 
perceived reality of elite wealth is acute in the case of the Maoist elites, given how the respondents 
reflect on the background of these elites. However, the judgements which link this transformation to 
corruption are comparable to those applied to corrupt political elites and local bureaucrats in general.  
 The widespread perception that Maoist elites have engaged in the same corrupt practices as 
other elites in Ghorahi is, however, also distinct from the broader construction of corruption because of 
the expectations for change which were associated with these elites. Despite the political diversity of 
the respondent group, there was widespread optimism for positive change in the governance system as 
the Maoists transitioned into party politics. These expectations have not been fulfilled, and indeed have 
been directly contradicted by the transformation of Maoist elites in the city. The framing of Maoist 
transformation as corruption in part reflects this gap between the expectations and reality which have 
emerged in the transition. These judgements are less significant to the broader construction of corruption 
because of the lack of expectations for radical change associated with other elite groups.   
 By contrast, conflict-induced change through instability and politicisation more closely reflects 
the broader nature of corruption in Ghorahi that the respondents describe. The respondents see the 
compromises over local government during and after the conflict – and the dominance of state-appointed 
officials in particular – as having exacerbated the imbalance of power between local government elites 
and ordinary people. This imbalance is central to the broader construction of corruption, particularly in 
their exposure to bribery (ghus) to access local government services. The role of political connections, 
and in particular the link between access to corrupt benefits locally and political power centrally, 
similarly resemble the political impunity that the respondents associate with corruption generally. In 
this regard, the conflict has exacerbated corruption, but not fundamentally transformed it.  
 The accounts of the engagement of businesses in black markets during the conflict is similarly 
aligned with the broader construction of corruption. As I set out in Chapter Five, the black market (kalo 
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bazaar) concept is one which is broadly used to describe what are seen as the corrupt acts of those in 
the private sector, and is based on perceptions of a well-connected sub-group of the business community 
exploiting conditions of scarcity and the lack of access to markets. The conflict exacerbated the value 
of these connections and generated new scarcities, particularly in rural areas, but did not fundamentally 
transform this category of corrupt activity. Indeed, there are close parallels between perceptions of black 
market activity during the conflict and that during other periods of crisis, such as during the scarcities 
caused by the 2016 blockade on the India-Nepal border.  
 The nature of clandestine trade as a means of coping is also one which is closely comparable to 
the broader construction of corruption. Whilst engagement in this type of activity was confined to the 
period of crisis in the conflict, the justifications presented by those who engaged in clandestine trade 
resemble those which legitimise engagement in bribery (ghus). Specifically, these respondents see 
themselves as exposed to conditions outside of their control, and as reacting only to the extent necessary 
to conduct an activity without which they would suffer significant hardship. As with the payment of 
bribes to access government services, the combination of a reasonable entitlement and an imbalance of 
power legitimise engagement in an activity which is otherwise deemed corrupt. This is more disputed 
in the case of clandestine trade than bribery, but reflects the same underlying nature of corruption.  
 Finally, the respondents’ focus on the changing levels of empowerment of historically 
marginalised rural peoples is also one which reflects the broader nature of corruption in Ghorahi, rather 
than a fundamental transformation of the nature of corruption. Whilst a significant part of the changing 
environment of Nepali society, the changing vulnerability of rural populations to corruption is part of a 
historical process of empowerment for marginalised populations in rural areas. These changes are 
significant to perceptions of corruption because of their effects on the imbalance of power between 
officials and service seekers, and on impunity with which demands can be made. The growth of brokers 
(dalal) to facilitate demands for bribes is similarly aligned with the characteristics of this role in general, 
with rural empowerment exacerbating rather than causing the emergence of this role.   
 Through the combination of these three elements, the conflict has thus been central to changes 
in the extent of corruption. However, the conflict has primarily affected factors already relevant to the 
broader nature and determinants of corruption, rather than being fundamentally transformative of how 
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corruption is constructed in all cases. The primary exception to this is the transformation of the Maoist 
elite, in which a new set of actors were introduced as the principal beneficiary of corruption, and around 
whom there were significant positive expectations for change. As I discuss next, the distinct nature of 
Maoist transformation amongst the broader corruption dynamics in Ghorahi has meant that this impact 
of the conflict is particularly prominent, and has remained so across the transition.  
 
Table 9.2A – Conflict-induced change and the broader context of corruption 
The transformation of the mid-level Maoist elites 
New beneficiaries: The Maoist elites are a new group of beneficiaries of corruption, and are 
distinct from the broader set of elite beneficiaries because they are seen to have come from 
backgrounds of rural poverty and to have rapidly transformed their lifestyles.  
New elements of the construction of corruption: A clash between the principles associated 
with the Maoists in initiating the conflict and the reality after the conflict, in a context where 
corruption is otherwise part of the expected behaviour of elites.  
Existing elements of the construction of corruption: Corruption amongst the Maoist elites 
is related to the unexplainable scope and speed of the transformation of wealth, and to the 
comparison between an elite group and the lives of ordinary people.  
Instability and politicisation in the governance system 
Existing actors: Local political party representatives, local government officials and wealthy 
elements of the business community are seen as the primary beneficiaries of corruption, as 
has historically been the case in Nepal.   
Existing elements of the construction of corruption: Local elites as unaccountable to the 
people and separate from them, exacerbated by conflict and instability in the transition. 
Political empowerment in the centre protecting cadres on the periphery. 
Coping and social change 
Existing actors: The involvement of elements of the business community in black market 
activity, and perception of historically marginalised rural communities as particularly 
vulnerable to corruption perpetrated by political leaders and government officials.  
Existing elements of the construction of corruption: The acceleration of a historical process 
of empowerment amongst rural peoples, and the worsening of opportunities for exploitation 
by businesses involved in black markets during the conflict.   
 
9.2.3 The prominence of the three elements of conflict-induced change in corruption 
 Of the three elements of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi, the transformation 
of the Maoist elite is the most prominent in the responses. This is evident in the frequency and depth of 
comment on Maoist transformation across the respondent group, and in the relative lack of contestation 
over this effect across respondents of different backgrounds. Indeed, only those connected to the Maoist 
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party directly dispute this link, and it appears even amongst those who are otherwise sympathetic to the 
aims of the Maoists. The prominence of this element reflects three factors. 
 First, while the respondents now see the Maoists as a transformed political force, the conflict is 
synonymous with their actions in an armed insurgency. In addition to holding the Maoists responsible 
for starting the conflict, this reflects the fact that many of the respondents were only directly exposed to 
large scale violence during the 2001 PLA attack on Ghorahi, and did not experience the level of violence 
from the security forces common in rural areas (OHCHR, 2014). Given this, my questions regarding the 
conflict were widely interpreted with reference to the actions of the Maoists, rather than those of the 
security forces. The early phases of the post-conflict transition are also most immediately associated 
with the influx of former PLA combatants, and with concerns over the threat of further escalations of 
violence by the Maoists. The respondents’ memories of the conflict and transition are therefore first 
associated with the actions of the Maoists, which influences their perceptions of corruption.   
 The relative prominence of Maoist transformation over the other two elements of conflict-
induced change in corruption also reflects the extent and visibility of corrupt benefits that the 
respondents associate with this group. The mid-level Maoist elite in Ghorahi are seen to have rapidly 
emerged as a central beneficiary of corruption, the gains from which are seen as concentrated in a short 
period of time, and which are publicly displayed through houses, businesses and vehicles. This stands 
in contrast to the respondents’ perceptions of corruption in local government which, whilst also affected 
by the conflict, is also where corruption is historically seen to be concentrated. The contemporary 
prominence of Maoist transformation over the other two elements therefore also reflects the rapid and 
public gains which are seen to have emerged among this new beneficiary group.  
 The final factor underlying the prominence of Maoist transformation is the contradiction that 
corruption by this group offers to the respondents’ expectations of the Maoists from the conflict period. 
With the exception of those from rival political parties, the majority of the respondents do not view the 
Maoist leadership as motivated by corrupt ends. Indeed, the respondents’ views of the Maoists’ motives 
are broadly aligned with how the leadership presented itself - focusing on the empowerment of rural 
communities. The fact that the experience of the Maoist elites since the conflict is dominated by the 
transformation of wealth, alongside the perception that corruption has gone unchallenged by Maoist-led 
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governments, contradicts these expectations. This contradiction is not evident with corruption 
perceptions in local government. Indeed, the respondents see corruption as intrinsic in this domain. 
 Of the two other elements of conflict-induced change in corruption, the effects of the conflict 
on the governance system has a comparatively larger role than the effects of coping and social change. 
In part, this reflects the concentration of experiences of clandestine trade during the height of the 
conflict. Indeed, both those who engaged in clandestine trade as a means of coping and those who frame 
this as a corrupt exploitation of instability see this effect as tied to a period of crisis, something which 
is seen as entirely apart from the current conditions. As I discussed above, these behaviours also align 
with the respondents’ expectations regarding the well-connected subset of the business community. As 
such, whilst significant to the respondents’ accounts of corruption during the conflict, this has little 
impact on the contemporary perception of corruption in Ghorahi.  
 In addition to the link between clandestine trade and crisis, the prominence of instability and 
politicisation in governance system over conflict-induced social change reflects the directness of the 
impacts of each on everyday life. Whilst the empowerment of rural communities is widely discussed, 
the effects of the conflict and transition on local government have a comparatively direct impact on the 
respondents’ everyday experiences of corruption. This reflects the general context of corruption in 
Ghorahi, which is closely tied to routine experiences of bribery in local government services. By 
contrast, reflections on social change amongst rural populations are peripheral to the everyday reality of 
the respondents, and are part of the broader pattern of change occurring in Nepal over time.  
 Finally, the relative significance of changes in the governance system over social change 
amongst marginalised populations also reflects the proximity of my fieldwork to the 2017 local elections 
and the build-up to the federal elections in 2017/18. Because of this context, issues relating to the 
structure and effectiveness of government at all levels were particularly salient in media and public 
discourse. As such, this was a period in which the flaws of the system of local government which 
emerged through the conflict and which persisted for a decade of the transition were widely debated. 
These debates were not confined to the political and media class, but were a widespread feature of 
everyday conversation – something which inevitably influenced the prominence of this element.  
 
 
200 
 The contemporary picture of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi is thus influenced 
first by Maoist transformation, second by changes in the governance system, and finally by coping and 
social change. Underlying the relative prominence of these three elements are: [1] the nature of the 
respondents’ experiences of the parties to the conflict, [2] the pace and scope of change in corrupt 
benefits associated with different groups, [3] reflections about where corruption has historically been 
concentrated, [4] the extent to which different corruption dynamics impact everyday life, and [5] the 
political context. The combined picture of this relationship does, however, vary based on the period 
under consideration. To close this discussion, I now summarise the prominence of these elements during 
the conflict itself, and their influence on the respondents’ expectations for future change.  
 For those outside of party politics and the media, the nature of conflict-induced change in 
corruption in Ghorahi was dominated by the pressure that conflict placed on livelihoods. The growth of 
clandestine trade and black market activity was a direct consequence of these pressures, and it is this 
element of corruption which is most prominent in the conflict itself. However, the combination of threats 
to livelihoods with the closure of political space also meant that the respondents were disconnected from 
local government, one of the key sites of corruption subsequently. These conditions also legitimised the 
payment of donations to the Maoists as a means of avoiding violence, and isolated those in Ghorahi 
from the change in rural areas. As such, whilst creating the conditions for change in the respondents’ 
perceptions of corruption, the conflict is not itself the period in which these changes were most evident.   
 The three elements of conflict-induced change in corruption come to the fore in the period after 
2006. Rather than as an escape from violence, donations to the Maoists became part of a wider 
perception of an illegitimate transformation of wealth which has left former combatants and ordinary 
people behind, and which represents a betrayal of the movements’ principles. Concurrently, instability 
in local governance and the re-opening of political space led to perceptions of a corrupt elite bargain at 
the local level, bolstered by the nature of central coalition politics and the weaknesses of the Commission 
for Investigation of Abuse of Authority (CIAA). The result is a reconnection with corruption in local 
government, an area in which it has historically been concentrated, but which has been exacerbated by 
the conflict and transition. The conflict has thus introduced a new corruption dynamic in the form of 
Maoist exploitation, and heightened perceptions of existing corruption in local government.  
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 Whilst Maoist transformation and the effects through the governance system are the most 
prominent elements of conflict-induced change in the respondents’ perceptions of corruption in the 
current period, the conflict has also generated expectations for future change in corruption. In addition 
to the expectations for change evident from the 2017 elections, the respondents are optimistic about the 
growing resilience of rural communities to corruption. This reflects expectations over the capacity of 
marginalised communities to challenge elite abuses and the routine forms of corruption which affect 
everyday life. In this regard, the conflict is seen to have accelerated the incremental empowerment of 
marginalised communities over time, the effects of which on corruption are only beginning to be 
realised. The combined picture of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi is therefore a three-
stage effect across the conflict itself, the transition and the future direction of change.  
 
Table 9.2B – Conflict-induced change in corruption over time 
The conflict (2001 to 2006) 
The majority of respondents were separated from corruption in local government as a 
result of the pressures on everyday life and the closure of political space.  
Clandestine trade was a means of coping with the effects of the conflict on livelihoods for 
a minority, interpreted by many as the growth of black market exploitation.  
Payments to the Maoists were a legitimate means of avoiding PLA violence, and the 
respondents lacked knowledge and concern over the use of these donations.  
The transition (2006 to 2017) 
The emergence of a corrupt transformation of the mid-level Maoist elite, drawing on 
comparisons to everyday life, political principles, forced donations and land control.  
A corrupt local elite bargain involving political parties, bureaucrats and contractors, which 
emerged through local and central instability and politicisation.  
The beginnings of change in the vulnerability of historically marginalised rural peoples to 
corruption, because of the actions of the Maoists during the conflict.  
Future change (after 2017) 
Expectations for newly elected local officials to improve the quality of governance – both 
formally through the electoral process and through their relations to the people.  
Expectations over the growing capacity of historically marginalised rural peoples to 
challenge everyday manifestations of corruption.  
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9.2.4 Summary 
 In this section, I integrated the three elements of conflict-induced change in the respondents’ 
perceptions of corruption, and compared conflict-induced change in corruption to the general nature of 
this socially constructed phenomenon in context. Through this, I argued that the transformation of the 
wealth of the Maoist elite is both the most prominent of the three forms of conflict-induced change in 
corruption in the period in which I conducted interviews, and is also the most distinct from the general 
nature of corruption experienced by those I interviewed. By contrast, the effects of the conflict on 
corruption through local government and through coping and social change align more closely with the 
areas in which corruption has historically been located, and have acted through the broader set of 
determinants of corruption. Based on this integrated account, in the section to follow I compare the 
nature of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi to the literature on this relationship.  
 
9.3 The literature on conflict-induced change in corruption 
 Here I discuss the implications of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi for the 
literature on this relationship. I do so in two parts. First, I discuss the contribution of my analysis to four 
under-explored dimensions of this relationship: [1] the duration and level of conflict-induced change in 
corruption, [2] the extent to which conflict represents an entirely distinct set of determinants of 
corruption, [3] the relative prominence given to effects at the central and local levels, and [4] the limits 
to how corruption has been conceptualised in studies of conflict-induced change. Following this, I 
discuss how conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi compares to the four theories of this 
relationship in the literature. Here, I argue that whilst this case does not provide a new category of 
conflict-induced change in corruption, it expands and refines elements of each of the four theories of 
this relationship, and demonstrates concurrent effects across these categories.  
 
9.3.1 The multiple elements of long-term change at the sub-national level  
 One of the primary limitations of the literature on conflict-induced change in corruption which 
I set out in Chapter Two is the lack of attention to the long term dynamics of this relationship. I further 
argued that, owing to the influence of the peacebuilding literature and approaches to corruption focused 
on the public sector, this deficit is particularly acute at the sub-national level. Indeed, whilst the 
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expectations of long term change at this level are widely suggested (see, for example, Cheng & Zaum, 
2008; Goodhand, 2008; Looney, 2008), only Smith’s (2014a) study of the ethnicisation of corruption in 
Nigeria is based on empirical material drawn from populations during a period of post-conflict stability.  
 The lack of direct empirical examination of the long term effects of conflict on corruption at the 
sub-national exacerbates the issues that are more widely present in the literature on this relationship. As 
I set out in Chapter Two, the literature on conflict-induced change in corruption is fragmented, with 
studies typically focusing on only one of the four theories of change, rather than the more holistic 
assessment of changes in corruption. Indeed, whilst the sole example of a study of long term change in 
corruption through conflict directly through the experiences of a conflict-affected population, Smith’s 
(2014a) study purely considers identity-based change. The question of the multiple dynamics of this 
relationship in the long term and at the sub-national level therefore remains open, and was one of the 
main influences on the design of this thesis.  
  Consistent with Smith’s (2014a) study and the largely unexplored expectations of the group of 
recent studies of this relationship cited above, my analysis of Ghorahi demonstrates that conflict has 
long term consequences for corruption at the sub-national level. Eleven years after the end of the 
conflict, its impacts remain evident in perceptions of corruption relating to the Maoists, the instability 
and politicisation of the governance system and the perceived empowerment of rural communities. 
These effects persist despite the fact that the current context is entirely apart from the pressures the 
respondents faced during the conflict, and the extent to which the successes of the peacebuilding process 
resonate with the experiences of this peripheral population. This leads to the first implication of this 
thesis for the literature – that there are long term consequences of conflict for corruption at the sub-
national level, even with conditions of stability and a lack of ethnic polarisation.  
 
Finding One: Conflict has long term impacts on corruption at the sub-national level, 
as analysed through the perceptions and experiences of an affected population. This 
effect exists even where stability has been achieved and where the conflict was not 
stratified along ethnic or communal lines. This confirms a commonly assumed but 
rarely explored expectation of the literature on this relationship.  
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 In addition to the general lack of direct inquiry into long-term change in corruption at the sub-
national level, in Chapter Two I argued that the literature is fragmented between four theories – the 
exploitation of fragility, illiberal responses to conflict, conflict economies and social change. Within 
studies of the sub-national level in particular, there is a tendency to focus only one of these theories, 
such as the ethnicisation of corruption (Orjuela et al 2016; Smith, 2014a) and conflict economies 
(Goodhand, 2008; Looney, 2008). I responded to this fragmentation by engaging a grounded theory 
approach to investigating this relationship, such that I could compare the prominence of different 
elements of this relationship in context. Through this, my analysis demonstrates multiple concurrent 
long-term effects that conflict has on corruption at the sub-national level.  
 The contemporary picture of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi is comprised of 
three concurrent elements. As I discuss in Section 9.3.2 below, these elements span the four theories of 
this relationship in the literature, with elements of Maoist transformation aligned with the conflict 
economies literature, the empowerment of historically marginalised communities aligning with accounts 
of social change through conflict, and elements of the instability and politicisation of local governance 
aligning with the illiberal response to conflict and the exploitation of fragility. As such, my analysis 
demonstrates that no single one of the four existing theories is a complete explanation of conflict-
induced change in corruption. Instead, these four theories should be viewed as overlapping components 
of a diverse set of interactions between conflict and corruption.  
 
Finding Two: Long-term change in corruption at the sub-national level can consist 
of multiple concurrent effects. These effects include elements from across the four 
theories of this relationship in the literature, none of which provide a comprehensive 
account of this relationship at this level and time period.  
 
 As well as demonstrating the multiple concurrent dynamics of conflict-induced change in 
corruption at the sub-national level and in the long term, the experiences of those in Ghorahi shows that 
these effects have differing levels of prominence over time. As I set out in Section 9.2, whilst the 
experience of Maoist transformation and politicisation of local government impact the contemporary 
experience of corruption amongst those in Ghorahi, the effects of black market activity and clandestine 
trade are confined to the period of ongoing conflict. Further, the impacts of the empowerment of rural 
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peoples are only beginning to be felt, and is expected to become a more significant limit on corruption 
over time. My analysis thus shows that the multiple effects of conflict-induced change in corruption are 
variable over time, and that some may come to prominence over a decade after the end to violence.  
 
Finding Three: The multiple elements of conflict-induced change in corruption at 
the sub-national level vary in prominence over time. Effects such as those relating 
to social change may only become evident in perceptions of corruption long after the 
end to conflict, whilst those relating to coping are confined to the period of crisis.  
 
  Demonstrating the existence of multiple, simultaneous dynamics of conflict-induced change in 
corruption in Ghorahi in the long term is the central contribution of this thesis to the literature. However, 
my analysis also has implications for how conflict should be understood relative to other determinants 
of corruption. Given that much of the literature on this link draws on empirical findings from the height 
of conflict, or at least from a period of ongoing crisis during transition, comparatively little has been 
said about how conflict compares to the other determinants of corruption in the contexts studied. This 
is particularly evident with regard to long term changes which, as discussed above, have received 
comparatively less attention across the literature as a whole.  
 As I summarised in Section 9.2, the exposure of those in Ghorahi to conflict and their 
perceptions of change during and after the conflict has led to fundamental change in how corruption is 
constructed. This is most evident in the ascendance of a new set of elite beneficiaries from corruption 
in the form of the mid-level Maoist elite. However, the conflict has not been transformative of all 
elements of corruption. Indeed, the single most common experience of corruption – bribes (ghus) to 
access local government services - has remained relatively unchanged as a result of the conflict in the 
urban setting. This is despite the changes in the perceived vulnerability of rural communities to routine 
forms of corruption and the context of instability and politicisation in the local governance system.  
 The fact that conflict may lead to long term changes in some but not necessarily all of the forms 
and determinants of corruption perceived by those in a given context links to a broader reflection on the 
nature of this relationship. Whilst a major driver of change, conflict can exacerbate existing elements of 
corruption, as well as providing new elements of how corruption is perceived. The case of change in 
corruption through the empowerment of historically marginalised rural communities in Ghorahi show 
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this, with the conflict increasing the pace of change in this determinant of corruption, but far from being 
the sole cause of this change when considered in historical perspective. This shows that conflict-induced 
change in corruption can be part of the long term evolutionary change, as well as radical transformation.  
 
Finding Four: In the long term and at the sub-national level, conflict may accentuate 
existing determinants of corruption, as well as fundamentally transforming elements 
of how corruption is constructed. Conflict-induced change in corruption should thus 
be seen amongst the broader construction of corruption in context.  
 
 The final implication of my analysis for the literature as a whole concerns the balance between 
influences on corruption at the central and the local levels. Despite the increasing number of studies 
which explicitly examine the sub-national dynamics of corruption after conflict (Goodhand, 2008; 
Looney, 2008; Orjuela et al, 2016), analysis of change at the central level has been the primary influence 
on the development of the body of theory around this relationship. This is particularly evident in the 
focus on government actors in the literature on illiberal transition and on the systems of informal 
economic activity across territories. This reflects the focus of the peacebuilding literature on the stability 
of central states in transition, to which corruption is seen as necessarily detrimental, and the legacy of 
prescriptive approaches to corruption focused on abuse in the public sector.  
 The case of Ghorahi shows that there is a role for central level factors in conflict-induced change 
in perceptions of corruption at the local level, but that these are far from the primary determinant. My 
analysis of Maoist transformation, for example, linked elements of this change to the respondents’ 
reflections on the Maoist party in government and the political protection offered to mid-level elites by 
the changing structure of power in the centre. Similarly, my analysis of instability and politicisation in 
the governance system included the remoteness of the CIAA, the impacts of unstable central coalition 
politics and the compromises made over the structure of local government during the transition. 
However, these central level effects acted only as complementary factors to local level dynamics.  
 Rather than principally through changes at the central level, the case of Ghorahi demonstrates 
the primary role of changes in everyday standards of living and lifestyles in determining conflict-
induced change in corruption. This is particularly evident in the case of Maoist transformation, in which 
the comparison between the lives of ordinary people and those of an empowered elite underpins 
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perceptions of an illegitimate transformation. The actions of the Maoist party in the centre complement 
this, but are peripheral. Similarly, the corrupt consequences of changes in the central-level governance 
system through the conflict and transition are interpreted primarily through their effects on the local elite 
corruption. As such, even where influenced through change in the centre, changes in lifestyles and the 
everyday experience are central to conflict-induced change in corruption.  
 
Finding Five: The role of central-level fragility has been overstated in the literature 
on conflict-induced change in corruption. For those in Ghorahi, reflections about 
changes in their immediate conditions, and in the institutions of local government to 
which they are directly exposed, are more significant.  
 
 By adopting a different level of analysis and theoretical and methodological approach to those 
common in the literature, the case of Ghorahi shows the significance of conflict for the long term nature 
and extent of corruption at the sub-national level, and that this effect is variable over time. This builds 
on the findings of the subset of the literature focused on the ethnicisation of corruption perceptions and 
the local dimensions of conflict economies by demonstrating the multiple diverse elements of conflict-
induced change which can simultaneously impact the nature and extent of corruption at this level. These 
findings also challenge the dominance of central level factors across the literature, showing how central 
level changes are mediated by local experiences.  
 
9.3.2 Ghorahi and the four theories of conflict-induced change in corruption 
 In Chapter Two, I argued that the literature on conflict-induced change in corruption has 
undergone significant development in the last decade, but that this has led to the fragmentation of the 
literature. Within this fragmented literature, I argued that there exists four main theories: [1] the 
exploitation of fragility, [2] illiberal responses to conflict, [3] conflict economies, and [4] social change. 
These four theories are distinguished by their underlying assumptions around the determinants of 
corruption and the nature of conflict and, as I set out in Chapter Two, are mid-level theoretical 
explanations rather than fully abstracted theories of change. Here, I discuss how conflict-induced change 
in corruption in Ghorahi relates to these theories, and discuss what my analysis adds to each.  
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 As I argued in Chapter Two, the expansion of the literature on conflict-induced change in 
corruption has been driven in part by critiques of the focus on the exploitation of fragility. Rooted in 
liberal assumptions (Smith, 2014; Soares De Oliveira, 2011), this theory sees conflict as undermining 
the capacity of the public sector to prevent corruption, and more broadly as producing a fragile 
environment open to exploitation. Consistent with the last decade of developments in the literature on 
this relationship (Day & Reno, 2014; De Waal, 2009; Lindberg & Orjuela, 2014), in Chapter Two I did 
not argue that the exploitation of fragility is not present in conflict-affected and transitional 
environments, but rather that this theory reflects a narrow and prescriptive framing of conflict-affected 
environments and the determinants of corruption. Whilst analytically inductive, I situated my analysis 
in the broad set of works which challenge these narrow assumptions.  
 On the surface, the nature of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi may be seen to 
conform to the framing of this relationship as the exploitation of fragility. The transformation of the 
wealth of the Maoist elite could, for example, be seen simply in terms of the rational exploitation of the 
fragility of the conflict, and in particular of the vulnerability of those in Ghorahi to pressure for 
donations, by an elite who were empowered by the strength of the PLA. However, given the many 
factors underlying this and the other components of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi, 
it would be an error to characterise this relationship in these terms. Rather, how these aspects of the 
conflict influence corruption is socially contingent, and dependent on more than public sector fragility.  
 The social contingency of what may otherwise be seen as the exploitation of fragility in the 
three elements of conflict-induced change in Ghorahi is particularly evident in the case of Maoist 
transformation. As I discussed in Section 9.2, the perception that mid-level Maoist elites have benefitted 
from forced donations during the conflict and from the displacement of landlords, is seen as corruption 
not only because of the financial benefits obtained, but also because of standards that this is seen to have 
violated. These standards include the principles that the respondents associate with the Maoists, the 
comparison to everyday life, and the relative fortunes of the elite and the rank and file of the PLA. 
Framing these dynamics purely in terms of the weakness of the public sector and the balance of payoffs 
and risk thus neglects the role of socially-contingent judgements in the construction of corruption.   
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 The limits of the exploitation of fragility as an explanation of conflict-induced change in 
corruption in Ghorahi is also evident when the time dimension of the three components of this 
relationship are considered. With the exception of the construction of clandestine trade as black market 
activity, which I discuss further below, my analysis shows that there is a significant lag between the 
period in which public sector fragility is at its peak, and the period in which perceptions of corruption 
peak. This is particularly evident in the case of corruption in local government, with perceptions of 
corruption peaking as the respondents were reconnected with these institutions and as political space re-
opened during the transition. This, along with similar dynamics of Maoist transformation, means that 
the peak of fragility is not the period in which corruption was at its height.  
 Both the significance of social value judgements and the mismatch between the peak of fragility 
and the perceived peak of corruption shows the limits of framing this relationship as the exploitation of 
fragility. Of the three components of this relationship in Ghorahi, the one which most closely aligns to 
this theory of conflict-induced change in corruption is the discussion of black markets. Unlike the other 
effects discussed, this effect is concentrated in the period of highest fragility, relates specifically to the 
lack of oversight, and in part reflects the profits available to those engaged in clandestine trade. 
However, as I showed in the discussion of clandestine trade in the conflict, these acts were also described 
in terms of coping with the effects of the conflict. The barrier between these is rooted in value 
judgements in context, particularly the needs of rural populations and the motives of those involved.  
 The case of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi therefore adds further weight to 
the literature critical of the framing of this relationship as one primarily of the exploitation of fragility. 
As I have argued here, conflict-induced change in corruption at the sub-national level is fundamentally 
dependent on social value judgements in context, which go beyond the extent of oversight and the 
benefits obtained. The lag between the period of greatest fragility in the public sector during the conflict 
and the perceived concentration  of corruption well into the transition also shows the limits of this theory 
of conflict-induced change in this case. As I discuss next, the dynamics of this relationship in Ghorahi 
better conform to the three alternative theories of conflict-induced change in the literature.  
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Finding Six: The exploitation of fragility is an inadequate explanation of conflict-
induced change in corruption in Ghorahi. This case provides further weight to the 
argument set out in the emergent literature on this relationship in a number of cases.  
 
Finding Seven: The barrier between exploitative corrupt activity and legitimate acts 
of coping with the effects of conflict is contingent on social value judgements in 
context, rather than focused on the fragility of the state alone.  
 
 The second theory of conflict-induced change in corruption in the literature, which I termed 
‘illiberal responses to conflict’, focuses on the deliberate use of corruption as a tool of stability. The 
majority of works which invoke this link do so from the perspective of existing or emerging state actors 
attempting to impose order (De Waal, 2009; Reno, 2008; Soares De Oliveira, 2011) but is also present 
in cases of rebel governance (Baaz & Verweijen, 2014; Mac Ginty, 2010; Mukhopadhyay, 2014). As I 
set out in Chapter Two, this theory reflects a direct critique of the assumptions underlying the framing 
of this relationship as the exploitation of fragility, namely the framing of conflict-affected states as 
fragile, and the assumption that corruption is necessarily destabilising (Boege et al,  2009; Smith, 2014).  
 In Chapter Five, I argued that the nature of conflict and recovery in Nepal, and the experience 
of this in Ghorahi, contrasted the type of case in which illiberal dynamics are commonly analysed. 
Specifically, Nepal has pursued domestically-led peacebuilding through democratisation and security 
sector reform (Whitfield, 2012), in contrast to the conventional case of illiberal peacebuilding through 
a combination of democratic and authoritarian mechanisms (Smith, 2014; Soares De Oliveira, 2011; 
Van Klinken & Aspinall, 2011). Reflecting this and the focus of my analysis on corruption at the sub-
national level, conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi largely falls outside of the bounds of 
this theory. Indeed, the patronage dynamics most associated with illiberal responses to conflict (Day & 
Reno, 2014) are absent from conflict-induced change in corruption in this case.  
 Whilst the purposeful use of patronage and similar networked forms of corruption as a means 
of attempting to impose order does not resonate with conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi, 
my analysis does have implications for this theory. Specifically, Maoist transformation and the 
instability in the governance system indicate the capacity of corruption to have stabilising consequences, 
even where these effects are inadvertent. Whilst the focus of this thesis is on conflict-induced change in 
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corruption, rather than on the capacity of corruption to impact the dynamics of conflict, this case 
therefore offers the following implications for this broader aspect of the corruption-conflict nexus.  
 Amongst the factors which informed the respondents’ perceptions of a corrupt elite 
transformation within the Maoists is the comparison to the rank and file of the PLA. In addition to the 
comparisons drawn between the fortunes of these elites and their own lifestyles, the ‘ordinary’ lives of 
the former PLA since the conflict reinforce the sense that access to lands, donated funds and political 
protection provided corrupt benefits to these elites. Whilst far from the sole factor responsible for the 
social reintegration of the former rank and file of the PLA (Subedi, 2018), one side effect of this 
comparison is that it reinforces the sense that the former PLA rank and file have integrated into the city. 
Indeed, in some instances, the comparison of the elite and former rank and file of the PLA is a cause of 
sympathy amongst the respondents and, more broadly, is a symbol of their separation from the Maoist 
movement. This separation and reintegration was amongst the central aims of the DDR process. 
 In addition to the stabilising overspills of the corruption dynamics concerning Maoist 
transformation, a similar dynamic is evident with the effects of instability in the governance system on 
demands for elections. Rather than undermining faith in emergent democratic institutions, as is 
commonly argued in accounts of corruption and peacebuilding within a liberal perspective (Le Billon, 
2008), instability and politicisation in Nepal’s governance system have increased the respondents’ 
demands for local elections. Indeed, when combined with reflections on changes amongst historically 
marginalised rural communities, future democratic participation is widely seen as central to the future 
management of corruption. As above, this is far from the sole or primary explanation for widespread 
acceptance of the emergent democratic system, and in part also reflects the nature of the respondent 
group. However, it represents a further inadvertent stabilising consequence of corruption.   
 The focus of this thesis on conflict-induced change in corruption rather than on the capacity of 
corruption to influence the outbreak and duration of conflict means that these factors are a minor point 
in my analysis. However, the factors which have nonetheless emerged from the study of conflict-induced 
change in corruption in Ghorahi demonstrate that corruption can have stabilising overspills. These 
overspills are in addition to the support that clandestine trade offers to those affected by conflict, which 
I discuss below in relation to conflict economies. As I discuss in Chapter Ten, the inadvertent stabilising 
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effects of corruption, as well as the deliberate engagement of corruption as an elite response to 
instability, is a theme requiring further investigation.  
 
Finding Eight: The deliberate use of corruption as a means of achieving stability, 
particularly through the use of patronage networks, was not an aspect of conflict-
induced change in corruption in Ghorahi perceived by the respondent group. This 
may have been significant at the elite level, but does not appear in the construction 
of corruption amongst those I interviewed.  
 
Finding Nine: Conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi, particularly 
elements of Maoist transformation and corruption in local government perceived by 
the respondents, have had inadvertent stabilising effects. However, more research is 
required into the scope of these effects, the details of which I set out in Chapter Ten.   
 
 The third theory of conflict-induced change in corruption in the literature focus on the inter-
related set of informal economic relations which constitute the conflict economy. This is typically 
broken down into the coping, informal and conflict economies; relating respectively to the efforts of 
populations to adjust to the impacts of conflict, to economic activity outside of the formal economy but 
not directly dependent on conflict, and to economic activity supporting or benefitting directly from 
conflict (Goodhand, 2004). These domains of activity are widely argued in the literature to be inter-
connected – creating mutual dependency between actors with vastly different motives (Baaz & 
Verweijen, 2014; Goodhand, 2008; Looney, 2008). As I argued in Chapter Two, this focus has meant 
that comparatively less is known about the experiences of those in these systems, and that the barrier 
between corruption and informal economic activity has often been poorly conceptualised.  
 The three forms of conflict-induced change in corruption evident in Ghorahi all contain 
elements which resonate with the framing of this relationship as part of a conflict economy. Maoist 
transformation includes the involvement of elites in the land business, politicisation and instability in 
the governance system includes the nexus of business, political elite and bureaucrats, and the focus on 
social change includes clandestine trade as a means of coping. Reflecting the critique of this segment of 
the literature which I set out in Chapter Two, I have not focused primarily on the systems of economic 
relations emerging through conflict, but rather on the experiences of these and other effects by a conflict-
affected population. Through this, I offer three findings to the conflict economies literature. 
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 First, the dynamics of clandestine trade during the conflict in Ghorahi demonstrate the extent of 
contestation possible over conflict-era corruption, even amongst a similarly affected population. Those 
in Ghorahi widely suffered the effects of security force restrictions on movement, the pressure for 
donations from the Maoists and the risk of Maoist violence in rural areas - the combination of which 
had a significant impact on everyday life. However, the resort to clandestine trade as a means of coping 
with this was far from universal, even amongst the business community. Indeed, many instead viewed 
clandestine trade as a form of black market activity, and condemned those involved as exploiting the 
conditions of the conflict. Conflict-era clandestine trade is thus subject to two competing constructions 
amongst a similarly-affected population; both a means of survival and of exploitation.  
 Second, my analysis shows that different elements of the conflict economy exhibit differing 
levels of significance for the experience of corruption in the long term. As I discussed in Section 9.2, 
engagement in the coping economy did not have long term effects on corruption after the period of 
crisis. Rather, clandestine trade is seen both by those involved in this activity as a form of coping and 
by those who saw this as a corrupt black market to have been concentrated to the period of crisis, 
particularly the post-2001 emergency period. By contrast, the informal economic activity surrounding 
Maoist elites, particularly with regard to land capture, has led to long term changes in the nature of 
corruption. As set out in Section 9.2, these long term changes include the actors which are seen to be the 
main beneficiaries from corruption, and the level of benefit obtained.  
 In combination, the concentration of the effects of clandestine trade during the conflict and the 
extent of division amongst the respondents over the ‘corrupt’ nature of clandestine trade means that the 
experience of those in Ghorahi contradicts elements of the conflict economies literature. Specifically, it 
contrasts the expectation from Looney’s (2008) study that engagement in the coping economy has long 
term impacts for the nature of economic activity in conflict-affected contexts. As I set out in Chapter 
Two, this is argued to occur through the effects of engaging in coping activity on the generalised trust 
necessary for conventional economic relations, and is one of a few studies to explicitly consider the long 
term consequences of conflict-era corruption dynamics at the sub-national level. My analysis contradicts 
these expectations, showing that in a comparatively less extreme case of the breakdown of economic 
relations, the effects of clandestine trade can be confined to the period of crisis.  
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 Third, Maoist transformation in particular shows how judgements regarding the conflict 
economy may shift over time. As I argued in Chapter Six, for many of those interviewed, informal 
payments to the Maoists during the conflict were legitimised by the protection from violence that these 
offered. It is only in the post-conflict period, in which the benefits that the Maoist elite gained from 
these payments becomes clear, that the respondents draw a link to corruption. The stability of the post-
conflict period distanced the respondents from the benefits obtained by the payments made to the 
Maoists, and increasingly exposed the extent of gain amongst the Maoist elite. This, along with 
comparisons made to everyday life and the fortunes of the former rank and file PLA over the post-
conflict period, led to changes in how this aspect of the conflict economy was understood.  
 The nature of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi therefore has the following three 
implications for the framing of the relationship as a conflict economy. These implications reflect the 
differing level of analysis I have undertaken compared to that common in this segment of the literature, 
the time period in which this has been considered, and the contrasting nature of Nepal’s conflict to those 
in which conflict economies have been widely studied. I reflect further on the impact of case selection 
on the transferability of my analysis in Chapter Ten.  
 
Finding Ten: Even amongst similarly conflict-affected populations, there can be 
significant contestation over the legitimacy of engagement in the coping economy. 
This contestation is bound in judgements of the motives of those involved, their 
connections and the level of benefits obtained.  
 
Finding Eleven: The different elements of a conflict economy can exhibit different 
prominence in the long term. In Ghorahi, the corrupt consequences of the coping 
economy are seen to have been confined to the period of crisis, whilst the informal 
and combat economies continue to shape perceptions of corruption over a decade 
after the end to violence.  
 
Finding Twelve: Judgements around the legitimate or corrupt nature of those 
involved in the conflict and informal economies are not static, but rather depend on 
changing assessments over time, and may be most evident in periods of stability.  
 
 The final theory of conflict-induced change in corruption in the literature is social change. As I 
set out in Chapter Two, much of this literature focuses on cases of ethnic conflict, in which the principal 
dynamic of conflict-induced change in corruption is the salience of ethnic identity. In addition to changes 
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in the manner in which corruption is perceived, in particular through the increasing stratification of 
corruption perceptions along ethnic lines, the literature shows that conflict has the potential to change 
the manner in which corruption is justified and performed (Nystrand, 2014; Orjuela, 2014; Orjuela et 
al, 2016). Unlike much of the literature on the other three theories of conflict-induced change in 
corruption, elements of this literature have explicitly considered the long-term change, indicating the 
potential for stratification to exist decades after the end to violence (Smith, 2014a).  
 As I set out in Chapters Two and Four, amongst the influences on the research design for this 
thesis was the selection of a country and sub-national context in which the conflict was not stratified 
along ethnic lines. I made this decision in order to explore the potential for social dynamics of conflict-
induced change in corruption not principally focused on the salience of ethnic identity. I have also 
engaged a constructivist approach to corruption, which locates the definition and determinants of 
corruption in the social domain. Given this, social determinants play a central role across the three 
elements of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi. 
 Of the three elements of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi, the perceptions of 
change in the empowerment of rural communities are most apart from the literature on this relationship. 
Whilst the conflict is in many ways seen to have made the corruption in Ghorahi worse, particularly 
through its impacts on local government and the Maoist elite, the respondents were also optimistic about 
future change in the level and nature of corruption. In addition to the gains to be had from institutional 
reform, including from the local elections held proximate to the period in which I conducted fieldwork, 
much of this optimism is driven by the sense that the conflict led to the empowerment of historically 
marginalised rural communities. These expectations reflect the efforts of the Maoists during the conflict, 
who are seen to have accelerated incremental improvements in rural life.  
 The fact that the respondents link the conflict to the prospect for positive change in the 
vulnerability of rural populations to routine forms of corruption is a significant addition to the literature 
on social change in corruption in itself. Rather than division, it shows the potential for conflict to lead 
to the increasing alignment of experiences of corruption between diversely affected populations. As I 
discuss in Section 9.4, the fact that this observation is based only on the perceptions of the urban 
population places some limits on the scope of this effect, and further research is required in this area. 
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However, there is a clear impact on the construction of corruption amongst the urban population, both 
with regards to expectations on the future change in corruption through the awareness and confidence 
of the rural population, and on how routine forms of corruption are performed.  
 The case of Ghorahi also demonstrates the long term potential of conflict-induced change in 
corruption through social effects, outside of conditions of ethnic polarisation. Whilst effects such as 
those of the coping economy are bound to the period of crisis, the empowerment of the rural populations 
through the effects of the conflict is significant over a decade after the end to violence, and has continued 
despite the corruption dynamics linked to the Maoists in the transition. Indeed, it may be expected that 
these effects of conflict on corruption become more significant over time, with the empowered rural 
population acting through an increasingly stable system of local and central governance. This further 
contradicts the implications of the literature on conflict-induced change in corruption through 
ethnicisation, in which these effects are shown to have become diluted over time.  
 
Finding Thirteen: Through social change, conflict can lead experiences of 
corruption amongst diverse populations to be increasingly aligned, rather than 
polarising how corruption is experienced.  
 
Finding Fourteen: In addition to remaining significant over a decade after the end 
to violence, the effects of conflict on the social determinants of corruption may 
become increasingly significant over the long term.  
 
 As I argued in setting out the implications of my analysis for the literature in general, the case 
of Ghorahi demonstrates that none of the four theories of conflict-induced change in corruption in the 
literature provides a complete explanation of this relationship. Rather, this relationship is comprised of 
multiple concurrent effects, the prominence of which vary over time. As I have discussed here, this case 
also offers a number of refinements to each of the theories of this relationship in the literature. This 
includes the potential for corruption to have inadvertent stabilising consequences, to be contested 
amongst similarly conflict-affected populations, and to lead to the alignment of experiences of 
corruption across diversely affected populations. This case also adds further weight to the criticism of 
framing of this relationship as the exploitation of fragility, and to the assumptions which underpin this.  
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 The comparison of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi to the theoretical landscape 
in the literature, however, also demonstrates the broad utility of these four theories in explaining 
elements of this relationship. Indeed, whilst I have shown that no single theory is an adequate 
explanation of this relationship as a whole, the case of Ghorahi does not pose a new theory on the level 
of those common in the literature. This is despite the contrasts between the nature of conflict in Ghorahi 
and those common in the literature, and my use of an analytical approach which prioritises the inductive 
development of new theory. This provides the final implication of my analysis for the literature.  
 
Finding Fifteen: Whilst no single one of the four theories of conflict-induced 
change in corruption evident in the literature provides a complete explanation of this 
relationship, these theories provide a useful basis by which to approach elements of 
this relationship in a diverse and contrasting case.  
 
9.4 Summary 
 In this chapter, I set out the combined picture of conflict-induced change in corruption in 
Ghorahi and discussed the implications of this case for the literature. I began by comparing conflict-
induced change in corruption to the broader nature of corruption in this case. Here, I demonstrated that 
Maoist transformation is distinct from the broader construction of corruption in that it has introduced a 
new set of elite beneficiaries into the forefront of corruption, and that the corruption amongst this group 
contrasts with the principles which had been associated with this group during the conflict. By contrast, 
whilst politicisation and instability in the governance system and coping and social change are 
significant elements of conflict-induced change in corruption, these elements more closely resemble the 
broader nature of corruption in this context. This demonstrates the capacity of conflict to accentuate 
existing determinants of corruption, and to transform elements of this phenomenon.  
 Building from the comparison of Maoist transformation, instability and politicisation and 
coping and social change to the general nature of corruption in Ghorahi, I then discussed the relative 
prominence of these elements. Here, I showed that Maoist transformation is the single most prominent 
element of this relationship in the period in which I conducted fieldwork. I argued that this prominence 
is a reflection of the respondents’ experiences of the PLA during conflict, the scope and concentration 
of corrupt benefits associated with this group and the sense of failed expectations associated with the 
Maoists after the conflict. This contrasts against changes in the governance system and social domain 
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which, whilst often involving comparable forms of corruption to those associated with the Maoist elite, 
closely align with established patterns of concentration and change in corruption.  
 In addition  to demonstrating the differing prominence of the three elements of conflict-induced 
change in corruption in the contemporary context, I also explored the changing prominence of these 
elements over time. During the period of ongoing conflict, I argued that the effects of the conflict on 
livelihoods served to highlight corrupt black market activity amongst those able to escape restrictions 
on trade, but that these same dynamics also limited exposure to corruption in other areas. This includes 
the separation of all but those involved in the political parties and the media from corruption in local 
government, which is otherwise seen as a key site of corruption. I further showed that, despite the lesser 
prominence of social change in the contemporary experience of corruption, the effects of the conflict on 
marginalised communities drives widespread optimism about change in corruption. In combination, this 
demonstrates the dynamism of conflict-induced change in corruption over time.    
 Based on the combined account of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi, I then set 
out the implications of this case for the literature on this subject as a whole. Here, I argued that this 
thesis demonstrates the long term impacts of conflict on corruption at the sub-national level in a case 
which has transitioned to stability, that the elements of conflict-induced change in corruption can vary 
in prominence over time, that the effects of conflict can accentuate existing forms of change in 
corruption as well as providing new determinants, and that the role of central-level fragility is overstated 
in how this relationship is constructed. Given the limitations of the literature which I set out in Chapter 
Two, this represents a significant evolution in the empirical examination of this relationship.   
 Finally, I set out the implications of the changes evident in Ghorahi for the four theories common 
in the literature. Here, I showed that the elements of conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi 
align with these theories, but that none provides a comprehensive account of the changes in this case. I 
then used the outcomes of my analysis to expand and nuance this fragmented body of theory. In addition 
to providing further weight to the argument that the exploitation of fragility is an inadequate explanation 
of this relationship, this included the social and temporal contingency of judgements over exploitative 
activity, the inadvertent stabilising consequences of corruption, and the divisions over coping activity 
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which can exist in an otherwise similarly affected population. In the chapter to follow, I use these 
findings and the reflections made across this thesis to provide recommendations for future research.  
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Chapter Ten: Conclusions and recommendations for further research 
 
 This thesis has explored the long term impacts of Nepal’s decade of armed conflict on corruption 
at the sub-national level. Through a constructivist grounded theory study of a heavily conflict-affected 
Terai city, I have demonstrated three areas in which the conflict has and continues to impact the 
corruption perceived and experienced by an affected population. I then used this case to refine the 
limited body of theory which exists on this relationship. In this chapter, I summarise these empirical and 
theoretical contributions, reflect on the limitations and transferability of my analysis, and provide 
recommendations for further research into this relationship.  
 For those I studied in Ghorahi, the 1996-2006 Maoist conflict led a minority to engage in 
clandestine trade as a form of coping. The conflict legitimised this for some, but for the many who did 
not face these livelihood challenges so directly this was seen as part of an exploitative black market. 
Concurrently, these pressures on livelihoods and the closure of political space separated those in Ghorahi 
from corruption in local government. In the transition, these effects linked to threats to everyday life 
lessened, and were replaced by growing perceptions of a corrupt transformation of the mid-level Maoist 
elite. Alongside this, the population were reconnected with corruption in local government, with the 
instability of the transition and the re-opening of political space facilitating the rise of corruption in local 
development projects - to the benefit of political elites, local bureaucrats and elements of business.  
 In the period of 2017 in which I conducted fieldwork, the transformation of the Maoist elite was 
the most prominent element of conflict-induced change in corruption. The prominence of this element 
is driven in part by the concentration of experiences of demands for donations from the Maoists during 
the conflict amongst those I studied. Given the proximity of the security forces throughout the conflict, 
for many this was the defining direct experience of the Maoists. However, the prominence of this link 
is also driven by the contradiction that it provides to the respondents’ expectations for positive change 
in the governance system through the conflict, and to their reflections on the impoverished backgrounds 
of these elites. Because of this, the newly acquired wealth of the Maoist elites is seen as particularly  
egregious, even where it is comparable to that of the broader set of elite beneficiaries of corruption.  
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 In addition to changes in corruption during the period of ongoing conflict and throughout the 
post-conflict transition, the conflict also shapes expectations for future change in corruption. Most 
directly, the conflict has shaped how those in Ghorahi view the vulnerability of the rural population to 
corruption. In the eyes of those in the city, the actions of the Maoists against traditional powerholders 
and their focus on the plight of rural areas accelerated the empowerment of historically marginalised 
communities. This perceived empowerment has imparted optimism around the capacity of rural 
populations to resist routine forms of corruption, to which power-differentials are critical. The effect of 
these conflict-era changes on corruption are yet to be fully realised and are peripheral to the  urban 
population I studied, but nonetheless shape the construction of corruption in Ghorahi.  
 The empirical findings I have set out in this thesis build upon the small group of studies which 
have considered conflict-induced change in corruption at the sub-national level (Baaz & Verweijen, 
2014; Goodhand, 2008; Looney, 2006), and under conditions of relative stability after conflict (Orjuela 
2014; Orjuela et al, 2016; Smith, 2014a). As I set out in Chapter Nine, to this I have added a case in 
which conflict was not principally fought along ethnic lines, and in which stability has been achieved 
through a domestically-led process of democratisation. This thesis represents a first empirical 
examination of conflict-induced change in corruption under these conditions, and thus expands the 
empirical base of the literature on this relationship. It also adds conflict dynamics at the sub-national 
level to the literatures on corruption in Nepal, which have been given little consideration beyond central 
government and PLA corruption scandals (ADB, 2013; Dix, 2011; Sharma, 2012; Subedi, 2014).  
 Through comparing conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi to the literature on this 
relationship, my analysis confirms the utility of the four broad theories present in the literature, and the 
transferability of these theories outside of the narrow set of empirical case on which they are based. This 
is despite the low level of development of these explanations and of the literature as a whole. Further, I 
have shown that long term change in corruption at the sub-national level can consist of multiple 
concurrent elements of change, acting through both new and existing determinants of corruption. These 
elements can vary across the period of ongoing conflict, transition and expectations for future change, 
with effects such as those relating to Maoist transformation becoming most evident years after the end 
to violence.  
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 This case also offers a number of implications of each of the four theories of conflict-induced 
change in corruption evident in the literature on this relationship. First, it adds further weight to the 
argument that this relationship cannot be reduced down to the exploitation of fragility, and that the 
theoretical underpinnings of this account are narrow and prescriptive. Second, while not directly affected 
by the illiberal responses to conflict seen elsewhere, this case indicates the potential for corruption to 
have stabilising overspills, including driving demands for local elections and aiding PLA reintegration. 
Third, it shows the potential for contestation over corruption as a form of coping, even amongst a 
similarly conflict-affected population, and the capacity of such effects to be confined to the period of 
ongoing crisis. Finally, it demonstrates alternative dynamics of social change, outside of the bounds of 
ethnicisation, including the capacity for conflict to generate positive expectations for future change in 
the exposure of vulnerable populations to corruption.  
 The new empirical evidence and the theoretical contributions which I have set out in this thesis 
represent an incremental step forwards in knowledge on this relationship. At the centre of this, I have 
shown the long term transformation of corruption which can occur through armed conflict in a case not 
polarised by ethnic divisions and which has transitioned to stability. I have further shown that this 
relationship is comprised of multiple concurrent elements, the nature of prominence of which vary over 
time. To close this thesis, I next reflect on the transferability and limits of my analysis, and use these 
reflections and the developments in the literature to set out recommendations for further research.   
 
10.1 Reflections on conflict-induced change in corruption in Ghorahi  
 My focus on Nepal reflected a desire to study conflict-induced change in corruption in a context 
different from those which underpin the current theoretical landscape on this relationship. I chose Nepal 
as an example in which the central state did not collapse as a result of the conflict, in which the conflict 
was not principally fought across ethnic divides, and in which stability has been achieved through 
domestically-led peacebuilding and democratisation. I subsequently selected Ghorahi as a sub-national 
city context which was heavily affected by conflict, but which was not exposed to violent disputes over 
federal boundaries during the transition, and which saw the influx of ex-combatants during the DDR 
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process. This focus has had several consequences for the type of relationship between conflict and 
corruption which emerged from my analysis. 
 Most significantly, the fact that Ghorahi saw the influx of a large number of former PLA 
combatants, including many of the mid-level elite of the post-conflict Maoist party, is reflected in the 
prominence of Maoist transformation in conflict-induced change in corruption in this case. The extent 
of media attention given to issues such as the abuse of funds during the cantonment period means that 
Maoist transformation may form part of accounts of conflict-induced change in corruption for many 
educated urban populations. However, the specific exposure of those in Ghorahi to PLA resettlement is 
central to the prominence of this component of conflict-induced change in corruption. With the 
exception of a small number of other Terai cities, including those which neighbour Ghorahi (Robins & 
Bhandari, 2016), this is unlikely to resonate to the same extent elsewhere.  
  The prominence of conflict-induced change in corruption specific to local government, and 
elements of the exposure to clandestine trade, is also in part a factor of the specific position of Ghorahi. 
The fact that I engaged with an urban population meant that the respondents were necessarily more 
exposed to corruption dynamics around local government than those in rural areas, from which the 
presence of local government is more remote. In addition to the prominence of experiences of bribery 
in bureaucratic settings and knowledge of the fragility of local government during and after conflict, 
this is reflected in the respondents’ exposure to political campaigning in the period in which I undertook 
fieldwork. This exposure influenced the respondents’ optimism about the outcomes of the electoral 
process, but also in their focus on corrupt networks between parties, bureaucrats and business. These 
dynamics are unlikely to be as prevalent for rural and semi-urban populations.  
 The final consequence of my focus on Ghorahi relates to the lack of exposure of the population 
I studied to post-conflict communal violence. Whilst containing a population diverse in language, 
ethnicity and caste, including many from historically marginalised communities (Nepal Map, 2017), I 
selected Ghorahi in part because it was not exposed to the communal violence seen in the Eastern Terai. 
Whilst not escalating into armed group conflict, the repressive actions of the security forces in these 
areas and efforts by political parties to mobilise support undoubtedly lead to the increasing salience of 
ethnic identity in these areas during key stages of the transition (Paudel, 2016). The focus of my analysis 
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on social changes outside of the realm of ethnic identity is therefore also something which is not 
universal to the Nepali experience, but rather represents the specific experience of Ghorahi.  
 The combination of these three factors reinforce the requirement that the specific outcomes of 
my analysis of conflict-induced change in Ghorahi be seen in relation to the context in which they were 
produced, rather than representative of the broader Nepali experience. This does not diminish the 
theoretical implications of this case for the literature on this relationship, which are based on the 
interface between this specific case and the many specific cases in the literature, but rather defines part 
of the boundaries of my empirical analysis. As I now discuss, the nature of the respondent group with 
which I engaged also poses limits on the transferability of my empirical findings to the broader 
experience of Nepal, or indeed the population of Ghorahi as a whole.  
 As I set out in Chapter Four, I selected the respondent group for my analysis via theoretical 
sampling, the use of which is one of the defining elements of grounded theory. This process is guided 
by the concurrent analysis and collection of information, so that sampling reflects the emergent themes 
of interviews and gaps in the researcher’s knowledge as these are identified. The sample population 
which I developed  through this process spanned a variety of occupational, communal and caste 
backgrounds amongst the population in Ghorahi. However, this respondent group is not, nor intended 
to be, a representative sample of this population in the statistical sense. The nature of the sample 
produced through this process has three main implications for the relationship between corruption and 
conflict I have set out, and the nature of the analysis more broadly. 
 First, relative to the population of Ghorahi in general, my respondent group is relatively well 
educated and comparatively more exposed to party politics and local government. In addition to 
exacerbating the consequences of the case selection for the prominence of links relating to local 
government corruption, this means that the respondent group often spoke of corruption and conflict in 
analytical terms, as well as in terms of their own direct experiences. Whilst in some respects this aided 
my analysis, this means that the view of corruption and conflict emerging from my respondent group 
may reflect a broader view of this concept than that of other elements of the population. In particular, 
this is likely to have influenced the prominence of financial elements in the construction of corruption 
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in this case which I discussed in Chapter Five, and may have provided additional prominence to the 
effects of Maoist transformation, given the coverage of this issue in the media.  
 Second, my respondent group is heavily male dominated, and the research was conducted by a 
man. Rather than a deliberate decision of the theoretical sampling process, this lack of gender balance 
was an unfortunate consequence of greater barriers to access to female participants, and the under-
representation of women in those occupational categories which I deemed most informative whilst 
conducting theoretical sampling. This imbalance is particularly apparent with the media and political 
party representatives, but is also evident in business. Consequently, my analysis reflects the male 
experience of conflict-induced change in corruption more than it does the female. This is particularly 
significant for the segments of the analysis which drew on the idea of changing principles within the 
Maoist movement, given that female empowerment was central to this. This also limited the possibility 
of gendered comparisons, which is significant given that the corruption studies literature has widely 
highlighted gendered effects on corruption (Ionescu, 2014; Stensöta et al, 2015). 
 Third, compared with the general population of Ghorahi, the sample is comprised of a relatively 
wealthy group, amongst the middle class of those in the city, and who would likely rank amongst the 
upper middle class in Nepal in general in many cases. This is in part a reflection of the occupational 
groups that I prioritised through theoretical sampling, but also reflects my focus on the city’s central 
bazaar area in which the middle class population is concentrated, rather than the comparatively poorer 
peripheral areas. As well as exacerbating the impacts of the relatively high educational status of the 
respondent group discussed above, the comparative wealth of this group is likely to have influenced the 
emphasis placed on corruption as a form of coping during the conflict. In addition to the effects discussed 
in Section 9.2, the lack of direct reliance on clandestine trade during the conflict is likely to have in part 
reflected the capacity of this population to survive without resorting to such tactics.  
 The account of conflict-induced change in corruption developed in this thesis must therefore be 
seen in the context of the respondent group with which it has been produced. Whilst far from the sole 
determinant of the relative prominence and broader set of components of conflict-induced change in 
corruption discussed, the nature of the sample is particularly significant in the prominence given to 
corruption dynamics around local government and corruption as a form of coping. As with the features 
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of the case in general, this does not diminish the implications of this case for the literature on this 
relationship discussed previously, but is significant to the transferability of these findings to other 
populations within Ghorahi or Nepal. Next, I set out a number of recommendations on how these 
limitations may be addressed through further research, including revisiting the potential for the type of 
comparative analysis between areas of Nepal which I discussed in Chapter Four.  
 
10.2 Recommendations for further research 
 Here I set out two sets of recommendations for further research based on the findings and 
reflections set out throughout this thesis. First, I discuss how future research on conflict-induced change 
in corruption in Nepal can address the limitations of this study. Here, I focus on the need for comparative 
analysis across multiple areas of Nepal, longitudinal comparison, and the expansion to the sample which 
I have considered. Second, I set out recommendations for research beyond the Nepali case. These focus 
on the need for further theoretical development through diversifying the empirical base of the literature, 
the utility of the constructivist grounded theory approach for examining this relationship, and the 
integration of conflict-related determinants into the broader corruption studies literature.  
 Of the modifications I made to the research design during my fieldwork, the single most 
consequential was having to abandon my study of Rolpa. This was the result of the challenging 
conditions I faced in this comparatively isolated area, and changes in the political conditions between 
my first and second stages of fieldwork. This change meant that I have been unable to undertake 
comparative analysis of two nearby but differently conflict-affected areas. Through this comparison, I 
had intended to develop theory around the causes of sub-national variations in conflict-induced change 
in corruption. To date, this has only been explored in cases of the ethnicisation of corruption through 
the comparison of different ethnic communities (Orjuela, 2014; Orjuela et al, 2016). Building on the 
outcomes of this thesis, future research should consider sub-national variations in other social dynamics 
of conflict-induced change in corruption, including the empowerment of rural communities.  
 As I discussed in Chapter Nine, timing is a key contextual influence on the outcomes of research 
into conflict-induced change in corruption. Within my analysis, this is particularly evident in the 
emphasis the respondents place on the corruption dynamics in local government and the prospects for 
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future change through local elections. Reflecting this, future comparative analysis should where possible 
examine conflict-induced change in corruption across multiple areas within a single research project, as 
was originally intended within each of my two stages of fieldwork. Whilst an additional case from a 
later time period could be compared to the empirical analysis in this thesis, the comparative element 
would necessarily be complicated by changes in the national and local political context. Comparisons 
to this case should also be mindful of the impact of positionality on the outcomes of the research, and 
the nature of the sample with which I engaged.   
 
Recommendation One: Comparative analysis of conflict-induced change in 
corruption between sub-national areas in Nepal would be likely to facilitate further 
theoretical development on this relationship, particularly on the alternative social 
dynamics beyond the ethnicisation of corruption perceptions.  
 
Recommendation Two: Any future comparative analysis should be conducted 
concurrently in order to minimise the impact of changes in the national political 
context on the comparison. Comparisons to the empirical material set out here should 
acknowledge the distinct political context in which information was gathered.  
  
 Amongst the key outcomes of this thesis has been to demonstrate the multiple long term impacts 
of conflict on corruption. These effects are evident eleven years after the end of the conflict, in a period 
of stability. In setting out this relationship, I discussed the respondents’ reflections on corruption during 
the conflict time and their expectations for future change. However, whilst demonstrating the variability 
of this relationship over time, these reflections must be viewed from the perspective of the context in 
which they were gathered. As well as a period of relative stability, as I discussed above this was a period 
of public debate over the nature of local government, of unstable coalition politics, and of intense 
political campaigning. The stability of the relationship between conflict and corruption over time 
remains an open question, and one which future research in Ghorahi should address.  
 The stability of the relationship between conflict and corruption in Ghorahi set out in this thesis 
is one which could be assessed relatively rapidly. Additional fieldwork conducted a year after the local 
elections would, for example, allow the optimism many had about these new officials to have diminished 
or expanded, based on their experiences of local government over this time. However, from the 
perspective of expanding the theoretical contribution of further empirical work, it would be particularly 
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beneficial to reconsider this relationship at the next round of local elections – due to be held in 2022. As 
with the period I studied, this would also be a period of heightened political awareness and campaigning, 
but one in which changes in the system of local government are likely to be less pronounced. 
Comparisons over such a duration would also facilitate a reassessment of the prominence of Maoist 
transformation and the empowerment of historically marginalised rural communities, and for theoretical 
development around the long term determinants of conflict-induced change in corruption.  
 In addition to examining the stability of the three elements of conflict-induced change in 
corruption in Ghorahi and the theoretical developments which could be obtained from this, further 
research in this context should be mindful of the possibility of inter-generation transfer in these 
corruption dynamics. The possibility of the transfer of perceptions of conflict-induced change in 
corruption from those who experienced conflict to those who did not is demonstrated by Smith (2014a), 
but as yet has not been explored outside of the bounds of ethnic conflict. Whilst the link is likely to be 
less straightforward in the case of non-ethnic conflict, this would be useful in either demonstrating the 
boundaries of this particular effect, or in demonstrating the long term persistence of these changes in a 
different case. In either respect, there is potential for further theoretical development.  
 
Recommendation Three: The long term stability of conflict-induced change in 
corruption in Ghorahi should be considered through further empirical work in this 
context. This future work should be mindful of the changing political context, and 
would be particularly beneficial if conducted in the run up to and aftermath of local 
elections, as was the case with the empirical work for this thesis.   
 
Recommendation Four: Future research on conflict-induced change in corruption 
in Ghorahi should consider the inter-generational transfer of this relationship to those 
who did not directly experience the conflict. This would complement or show the 
boundaries of effects demonstrated under conditions of ethnic conflict.  
 
 My final area of recommendations specific to conflict-induced change in corruption in Nepal 
relates to the respondent group with which I engaged. As I discussed in Section 10.1, the theoretical 
sampling process led me to engage with political, media and business representatives, as well as a 
number of ‘ordinary’ business owners and workers in the city. Compared with the population of the city 
as a whole, this group is comparatively wealthy, and often connected to the issues of conflict and 
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corruption through their occupation. Whilst the empirical and theoretical contributions of this thesis are 
not dependent on the representativeness of the sample to this wider population, future research in this 
context could benefit from engaging with a broader sample group. This should include those from the 
poorer and marginalised segments of society in Ghorahi, without elite connections.  
 Whilst it is difficult to speculate on the experiences of a comparatively less wealthy population, 
expanding the sample beyond the group considered in this thesis could be particularly useful in re-
examining the dynamics of corruption as a form of coping during the conflict. Many in the respondent 
group did not engage in clandestine trade as a means of coping with the conflict, and instead viewed 
this as a part of a corrupt black market amongst a comparatively well connected elite. The experiences 
of a less wealthy population could challenge this perception, with the precocity of their livelihoods 
leading to greater exposure in these ‘black market’ activities. This would enable further theoretical 
development around the causes of intra-population variations in conflict-induced change in corruption, 
beyond what is possible from the sample engaged in this thesis.  
 In addition to expanding the sample group, future research in Ghorahi and other areas of Nepal 
should more closely consider the gender dimensions of this relationship. Aspects of my positionality 
and that of my translator and facilitator LD, as well as the lack of female representation in political and 
media positions in Ghorahi, limited the extent to which I could engage with female respondents. As a 
result of this, women were significantly under-represented in the sample group. Whilst I was not seeking 
a statistically representative sample, this means that the nature of conflict-induced change in corruption 
set out in this thesis must be seen as in part the product of this gender dimension. Future research should 
address this gender dimension absent from this study and the wider literature on this relationship, 
drawing on the increasing body of evidence of such effects within the broader corruption studies 
literature and the study of conflict (Ionescu, 2014; Stensöta et al, 2015).  
 
Recommendation Five: Further analysis of conflict-induced change in corruption 
in Ghorahi and other sub-national contexts in Nepal should consider a broader set of 
occupational groups and backgrounds than those considered in this thesis. This is 
particularly relevant to coping-related effects, which depend in part on the alternative 
coping strategies available to those affected by conflict.  
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Recommendation Six: Future analysis of this relationship should consider the 
gender-dimensions of corruption and conflict, highlighted separately in the 
literatures related to each. This is particularly important in  Nepal, where gendered 
social structures are highly prevalent, and in which Maoist recruitment and ideology 
was focused on disempowered women.  
 
 Moving to recommendations for the literature in general, the contributions from this thesis have 
been driven in part by the distinct nature of the case I have considered. Whilst increasingly diverse, 
much of the literature is focused on the national level contexts, on the immediate conflict to post-conflict 
transition and on cases of state collapse or extensive international intervention. My focus on Ghorahi 
challenged this concentration in the literature, and through this has demonstrated conflict-induced 
change in corruption in diverse circumstances, and with elements spanning the four theories of this 
relationship present in the literature. To build on the findings and theoretical outcomes from this thesis, 
future research should engage with a greater diversity of sub-national contexts. 
 In addition to further comparative research in Nepal, as detailed in Recommendations One and 
Two, analysis of conflict-induced change in corruption in Indonesia could offer a particularly useful 
addition to the relationships discussed in this thesis. In contrast to the conflict in Nepal, the many 
instances of post-New Order conflict in Indonesia have been treated distinctly by the state, and have 
been driven by a blend of ethnic and territorial claims with economic grievances (Barron et al, 2009; 
Smith, 2014). Analysis across these instances of sub-national conflict would facilitate theoretical 
development around the impacts of state repression on long term trends in corruption, and allow the 
ethnic dimensions developed elsewhere in the literature on the sub-national level to be analysed 
alongside a broader array of factors. Doing so could further reduce the fragmentation of the four theories 
of conflict-induced change in the literature, building on the findings set out in this thesis.  
 
Recommendations Seven: Theoretical development on conflict-induced change in 
corruption would benefit from further diversifying the types of empirical cases 
considered, beyond cases of state collapse and international intervention. A 
comparative analysis of the numerous instances of post-New Order conflict in 
Indonesia could offer a particularly useful extension to the analysis undertaken in 
this thesis, alongside further comparative work in Nepal.  
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 As well as through a new and distinct case, the theoretical and empirical contributions of this 
thesis are a consequence of the constructivist grounded theory approach I adopted. This approach is 
particularly useful to the question of conflict-induced change in corruption because it allows for the 
simultaneous consideration of the multiple potential dynamics of this relationship evident in the 
literature, and remains open to the development of new theoretical categories. Further, as is increasingly 
common in the broader corruption studies literature (DeGraaf et al, 2010a), this approach focuses the 
researcher’s attention on how corruption is understood and experienced in context. Given the complex 
and multiple links from conflict to corruption and the contingency of corruption on social factors evident 
in the case of Ghorahi, I recommend this theoretical and methodological approach. 
 Constructivist grounded theory also has a number of practical benefits highlighted by this thesis, 
which are likely to benefit future analysis of conflict-induced change in corruption. The flexibility of 
this approach, and in particular the role of theoretical sampling, is well suited to the sensitivity of 
discussing conflict and corruption in any context. As an external researcher and visible outsider to the 
context I studied, this ability to continually refine the sample group and the questions I engaged was 
instrumental to the empirical analysis. This approach also lessens the impact of the adaptations 
commonly necessitated in researching sensitive topics, such as those which required me to abandon my 
study of Rolpa. This approach is therefore well suited to further empirical analysis and theoretical 
development around this relationship, and to the practicalities of research around these topics.  
 
Recommendation Eight:  Constructivist grounded theory is an ideal theoretical and 
methodological approach for future research on conflict-induced change in 
corruption at the local level. This approach is adaptable to the practicalities of 
research around this topic, and suited to the complex and multiple interaction 
between these phenomena.  
 
 My final recommendation relates to the broader corruption studies literature. As I argued in 
introducing this thesis, much of this broader literature does not explicitly consider conflict-related 
determinants of corruption. This is despite the concentration of corruption analysis in developing 
countries in which there is a history of conflict, albeit often many years before the period studied. This 
thesis demonstrates the changes which conflict can impart on corruption over a decade after the end to 
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conflict, even under conditions of stability and democratisation. These changes are not confined to the 
period of ongoing violence, but can impact corruption across a transition, and expectations for future 
change under conditions of stability. At a minimum, the legacies of conflict can therefore form an 
important aspect of the context to be considered in the analysis of other determinants of corruption.  
 
Recommendation Nine:  The impacts and legacies of conflict should become a 
mainstream component of analysis of the determinants of corruption in contexts with 
any recent history of armed conflict, particularly within the growing body of analysis 
at the sub-national level. 
 
Together, these nine recommendations provide an agenda for further research into conflict-
induced change in corruption. Given the fragmented nature of the literature which has emerged from the 
recent growth of attention to this relationship, it is one which requires new and expanded empirical cases 
and approaches sensitive to multiple and contested links. Further research in this area not only has 
significant theoretical potential, but also holds relevance to populations across a multitude of developing 
country contexts. As my analysis of Ghorahi has shown, conflict can remain a key driver of the extent 
and nature of corruption at the sub-national level, even where the contemporary reality is entirely apart 
from life during conflict.   
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Appendixes  
Appendix 4.1 – A summary of the literature on the types of corruption in Nepal 
 
Political and Elite Capture 
Use of development funds for political gain, and the capture of funds by political elites  
Political interference in the public procurement processes 
Government officials and political elites capturing the public procurement process 
Political and elite capture of infrastructure projects and public procurement 
Politically motivated appointments to key positions in the bureaucracy 
Politically motivated appointments to rural healthcare positions 
Capture and misuse of foreign aid by political party leaders at multiple levels 
The promotion of under-qualified people due to political connections 
Capture of awards and the status conferred through it by political parties in the education system 
Personalised control of the political process to the benefit of the political elite 
Capture of devolved power to forestry groups by local elites 
Rampant political lobbying in forestry management 
Politicised allocation of contracts for building and maintenance of infrastructure 
Politicised appointments to key hospital positions following a change in political power 
Collusions amongst contractors to extract development funds above costs 
Capture and illicit control of the block grant system of funding to the DDC and VDC level 
Channelling of aid money towards projects proximate to elites able to influence funds 
Capture of development aid through elite channels and for political gain 
Monopolisation of information at the local level to aid others in the capture of resources 
Fixing the procurement procedure to benefit contacts, including through bribes 
Reciprocal arrangements for financial extraction between officials and contractors 
Direct payments, elite bias and political interface in local conflict resolution 
Use of embezzlement as a means of expanding business interests and links with the state 
 
Bribery 
Bribery to access basic government services 
Bribes necessary to access basic services 
Daily experience of bribery across basic services, including customs, land revenue and judiciary 
Leaking of exam questions for medical students through bribery 
Informal payments required in receiving maternal care to access necessary services 
Demands for bribes by bureaucrats 
Bribery in the bureaucracy, but only as part of broader set of relations between parties 
Expectations of gifts in exchange for services in the bureaucracy 
Bribery internally as part of the recruitment and induction processes 
Bribes required to senior officials in order to secure promotion  
Allowing the release of suspects in exchange for bribes or favours 
Payment of a fixed sum in exchange for a favour regarding an appointment in the bureaucracy 
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Officials working in local public service demanding bribes 
Bribing officials to cancel contracts where there is the potential for a loss to be made 
Exchanging bribes for a better quality of water and electricity supply to a property 
Giving priority access to water tanks and taps to elements of the urban poor who pay more 
Gift taking as a common manifestation of corruption in the survey data 
Bribery is widespread, particularly amongst representatives of local bodies 
Bureaucratic bribery 
Use of cash bribes as a means of gaining employment in the local bureaucracy 
 
Financial Extraction 
Capture or misuse of social security funds at the DDC and VDC levels 
Capture of funds from development projects through the mismatch between contracts and realities  
Misappropriation of wage surpluses in development projects through (illegal) use of heavy 
equipment 
Misuse of maintenance funds for key local infrastructure, such as rural roads 
Corruption in materials for road building and other development projects through extraction 
Abuse of social security payments, including non-payment to beneficiaries 
Development and other funds used to the political and financial benefit of elites 
Capture of funds from development projects through the mismatch between contracts and realities  
Extraction of development funds at multiple levels of procurement and expenditure 
Capture and withdrawal of funds delivered to combatants in cantonment by the PLA leadership 
Extraction from contracts for development work in the cantonment period 
Pay for leadership being the extraction of funds at the local level 
The 'tributary state', in which resources are diverted and siphoned off from the top at each layer 
Capture of the first inflows of development aid in the 1950s by elites, little effect on poverty 
Embezzlement as a key means of earning, particularly for political leaders and high level 
bureaucrats 
Extraction of up to 40% of project budgets by the related ministry or authority 
Manipulation of costs of waste management due to the amount of equipment involved 
Artificially raising project cost estimates to facilitate extraction of funds and resources 
Fake bills for maintenance and fuel for municipal vehicles 
Setting of unrealistic budgets for extraction 
Capture of funds transferred from the central to the local by political party channels 
The need to pay a portion of budgets to local officials to conduct a development project 
Rent extraction from development projects 
 
Abuse of Power 
Threats of wrongful arrest in order to extract payments or favours 
Arresting of innocent or otherwise not charged individuals to extract payment 
Protecting the sex industry in exchange for payments or access 
Stealing from vendors and beggars under the threat of arrest 
Corrupt examiners demanding bribes, forcing engagement in corruption to repay fees 
Junior officers being used as slaves or servants for senior officers using state funds 
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Manipulation of metering and billing in the water supply system 
Demanding gifts from street and stall vendors during festival periods 
Lack of action against vendors who sell low quality products, including in food supply 
Misuse of authority as the dominant form of corruption in the survey data 
The signing of loss making contracts which ensure benefit to actors linked to officials 
Fixing of supply prices in the energy sector to benefit political connections 
Undue negligence, delay and harassment in order to invite bribery in public service 
Allowing smuggling in border areas through checkpoints and customs 
 
Patronage and Clientelism 
Clientelism in the land system due to the reliance on land in the highly agricultural economy 
System of patronage rather than meritocratic recruitment at all levels of government 
Patronage based recruitment and promotion processes 
Patronage and clientelism involving politicians and bureaucrats as patrons and brokers of benefits 
Political patronage, including the capture of aid funds to benefit elite-connected communities 
Political patronage 
Political patronage linking public and private sectors 
Land based political clientelism in the rural areas 
Transfer of elite patronage structures from the pre-1990 period into the post-1990 period 
Bureaucratic positions requiring the support of a patron 
Use of patronage as a means of giving lucrative jobs to contacts 
Patron client relations within the bureaucracy, connecting bureaucrats to politicians 
Political rent seeking 
Political patronage in layers of local administration 
The use of connections by the urban poor to gain access to basic services in response to corruption 
in other areas 
 
Favouritism 
Gift giving, favouritism, and solidarity networks  
Promotion of doctors without the necessary qualifications / experience due to connections 
Rigging of bids in procurement and contracting 
Nepotism in the bureaucracy 
Internal nepotism within political parties, rather than merit based selection 
The need for favouritism and 'source force' when dealing with the bureaucracy 
A government subsidised loan system designed for education only benefiting those with 
connections 
Distribution of resources and favours through personal relations 
Favouritism in the distribution of state resources 
Illegitimate access to the university system and other elements of education through connection 
Favouritism and 'Afno Manche' dominating across public and private everyday institutions 
The need to use influential people in order to access VDC and DDC funding 
Positions in the bureaucracy are allocated based on favouritism and connection not merit 
Use of personal connections to gain employment in the bureaucracy 
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Personal nature of appointments to the bureaucracy at the local level 
Local development contracts awarded on the basis of connections rather than objective criteria 
Allowing contractors to supply low quality food to officers in exchange for kickbacks 
Contracts being awarded in order to expand partnerships between officials and private operators 
 
Traditional' or 'Cultural' Mechanisms 
The favouring of one's own people (Afno Manche) 
Awarding of contracts and job positions through family ties over formal processes (Afno Manche) 
Chakari - cultivating favours through gifts and services or visiting public officials 
Creation of expectations for favours through the development of Chakari between unequal's 
Flattery and favouritism as expressed through Chakari relations 
Use of Chakari to gain positions in the bureaucracy 
Jagir - in modern times this is a system of payment for job transfers in order to capture rents 
Reciprocal and family-like relationships (kripabad) of exchange 
Role of source force in contacts with local officials across sectors and levels 
The use of contacts to navigate the bureaucracy and access to public services health, education) 
Source-force - the exercise of power based on kinship, business and political affiliation 
The need for favouritism when attempting to get promotion within the education service 
Exchange in kind as well as through cash based on relational networks with the bureaucracy 
Mass absenteeism amongst District officials during the Rana period 
Mobilisation of relatives and other connected persons to elites in dispute resolution 
 
Other 
CDO office, electricity, transport and water offices in the survey had >70% corruption incidence 
Concentration of corruption in the development contracting process 
Spending on teacher's salaries comprising large amounts of VDC grants, without justification 
Criminal groups exploiting lawlessness and identity based divisions 
Political and administrative sectors seen as the most corrupt in the survey data 
Ministers seen as the most corrupt of the central political agents in the survey 
Land registration office seen as the most corrupt institution in the survey, consistent with TI data 
Transport management office and the police department also seen to be major sites of bribery 
Forging of documents to gain access to grants, funded by international donors 
Fake certificates as amongst the most common forms of corruption reported to the CIAA 
Providing fake documents, particularly driving licences 
Forging of certificates dominant in the complaints handed to the CIAA 
 
 
 
256 
Appendix 4.2 – Example theoretical memo 
 
2018.01.16 09:46 - Relations between the population and with ex-combatants 
The 'easy' relationship between ex-combatant business owners and the wider business community is an 
interesting dynamic because it appears to contradict the experiences of many other countries. There is a 
widespread consensus that the ex-combatants who settled into the city after exiting cantonment became 
‘ordinary’, that no one obstructed them, and that there was only a limited degree of suspicion and fear. 
This is despite the extent of experiences of forced donation, violence, and the attack on the city.  
 
051 provides a comprehensive explanation of why this has occurred, focusing on the contrast between 
the political nature of the conflict in Nepal against the ethnic or religious nature of conflict elsewhere. 
What this emphasises is the extent to which ex-combatants remained under a shared identity, despite 
their involvement in the Maoist movement. It also emphasises the relative closeness of the Maoist army 
to the wider population, even for those in the city.   
 
"There is a difference between conflict in other countries and in Nepal. Generally, in other 
countries there is conflict because of religion or ethnic discrimination, things like that. This 
type of conflict results in massacres, and damages the society. But in Nepal it was a political 
conflict. The Maoists targeted the government, not the public. So, there were not massacres 
of the people. The public thought they were fighting for changes to the governance system, 
and for political change, not against the ordinary people. In the conflict time as well the 
Maoists were not so far from the public. They used to come to the people to get shelter and 
food, so they were regularly linked with the common people. So the people didn’t feel 
difficultly in accepting them, because they were regularly seeing them in the conflict. 
Seeing combatants was a normal thing." - 051 
 
054 provides a very similar picture of this, focusing on the impact of the political nature of the conflict 
on the good relations with Maoist ex-combatants in the city. This wasn't immediate, but seems well 
established now. Slightly different in his emphasis in the importance of the political resolution of the 
conflict, as well as the political nature of the Maoists and their relations with the people.  
 
"The difference is that the conflict in Nepal was a totally political conflict. In other 
countries there is religious and ethnic conflict, but here it was not because of problems 
between different ethnic groups and different communities. It was also politically resolved. 
After political resolution, no one felt that it was an uncomfortable situation." - 054 
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Appendix 4.3 – Full participant list 
 
Stage One 
1(06) - Human rights activist 
1(07) - Journalist 
1(08) - Journalist and social activist 
1(09) - Journalist and social activist 
1(10) - Landlord 
1(11) - Former PLA combatant 
1(12) - Journalist 
1(13) - Journalist & former PLA combatant 
1(14) - Social activist and former PLA combatant 
1(14) - Social activist and former PLA combatant 
1(17) - Journalist 
1(18) - District Peace Committee member 
1(19) - District Peace Committee member 
1(21) - Journalist 
1(22) - Nepali Congress District representative 
1(23) - Rastriya Prajatantra Party District representative 
1(24) - Human rights activist 
1(25) - Former senior business representative 
1(26) - Civil society organisation leader 
1(27) - Journalist and former PLA combatant 
1(28) - Senior police officer 
1(29) - Journalist 
1(34) - Journalist 
1(35) - Journalist 
1(36) - Journalist 
 
Stage Two 
2(02) - Journalist 
2(03) - Journalist and academic 
2(04) - Rastriya Janmorcha District representative 
2(06) - Senior business representative 
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2(07) - Journalist 
2(08) - Journalist 
2(09) - Journalist & gender rights activist 
2(10) - Nepal Communist Party District representative  
2(11) - Legal professional 
2(12) - Disability Rights Activist 
2(13) - Communist Party of Nepal Unified Marxist-Leninist District representative 
2(14) - Nepali Congress District representative 
2(15) - Tharu community representative 
2(16) - Journalist 
2(17) - Landlessness activist 
2(18) - Nepali Congress District representative 
2(19) - Communist Party of Nepal Unified Marxist-Leninist District representative 
2(20) - Journalist 
2(21) - Journalist 
2(22) - Legal professional 
2(23) - Magar community representative 
2(24) - Civil society organisation leader 
2(29) - Maoist Centre District representative 
2(31) – District government representative 
2(32) - Gender rights activist 
2(33) - Maoist Centre District representative 
2(35) - Tharu community representative 
2(36) - Tharu community representative 
2(37) - Tharu community representative 
2(38) - Agricultural business owner 
2(39) - Agricultural business owner 
2(40) - Agricultural business owner 
2(41) - Senior business representative 
2(42) - Factory owner 
2(43) – Hotel owner 
2(44) - Bookshop owner 
2(45) - Publisher 
2(46) - Auto business owner 
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2(47) - Furniture business owner 
2(48) - Dairy products business owner 
2(49) - Animal supplies business owner 
2(50) - Business community representative 
2(51) - Bookshop owner 
2(52) - Medical business owner 
2(53) - Electrical business owner 
2(54) - Senior business representative 
2(55) - Electronics business owner 
2(56) - Medical business owner 
2(57) - Grocer 
2(58) - Auto business owner 
2(59) - Auto business owner 
2(60) - Electronics business owner 
2(74) - Clothing business owner 
2(75) - Clothing business owner 
2(76) - Clothing business owner 
2(77) - Petrol station worker 
2(78) - Factory owner 
2(79) - Factory owner 
2(80) - Agricultural business owner 
2(81) - NGO representative 
2(82) - Bookshop owner 
2(83) - Bank clerk 
2(84) - Legal professional 
2(85) - Social activist 
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Appendix 4.4 – Example of an observational memo 
 
18th October 2017: Eastern Outskirts of Ghorahi (Towards Nawalpur) 
 
 
Conversation with LD whilst in the area: the project is significantly delayed, the contractor 
has often been unresponsive, and there is a widespread suspicion amongst the public that 
corruption has occurred. The project has been ongoing for approximately five years. There 
are signs of progress now – workers are present and there are materials and heavy 
equipment all along this section – but clearly this has fallen well below the time scale 
expected by the public. Questions to follow up include the level of awareness of the project 
amongst the population, perceptions of who has benefited from the project being delayed, 
actions taken by local government / media / civil society etc., and political connections for 
the contractors.  
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Appendix 4.5 – Extract from the ethical review provided to the University of Birmingham 
 
Risk analysis and mitigation strategy for fieldwork in Nepal, submitted to the University of Birmingham 
as part of the ethical review process.  
 
“Introductory Note 
The risk register given below is intended to cover the full scope of the foreseeable risks of the project. 
Inclusion in this risk register is not in any way indicative that such risks are likely to occur. At the time 
of writing, Nepal is not subject to any travel restrictions advised by the Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office, and the researcher has conducted comparable projects in this context without incident. Any 
potential risks of the project have also been discussed with a network of contacts with substantial 
research experience in Nepal, who support the manner in which the project is proposed to be conducted.  
 
Research Staff 
Risk 1: Risk of Harm from Participants and Others – There is a remote possibility, due to raising the 
sensitive topics of corruption and conflict, that participants could seek to harm the researcher, or 
encourage others to do so. Whilst this is highly unlikely, this could extend to members of the community 
forcing the researcher and translators involved to leave an area, involving the threat or use of violence.  
Minimisation - [1] The researcher will ensure that the difficult topics around which the research is 
centred are introduced in a manner which is appropriate for the person involved and the cultural context, 
as well as minimising the perceived risk the research is seen to pose to their position or status. This will 
include prior discussion with the translator and local experts. 
Management – [1] The researcher will inform a Nepali and UK contact as to their location and planned 
travel, and maintain regular contact, such that support with additional travel and logistics can be 
provided if necessary [2] The researcher will leave an area in response to any threat of violence, or 
warning from others of possible violence.  
 
Risk 2: Risk of Arrest – The Nepali police system is known to be affected by corruption and misuse by 
elites. If it is perceived by those in positions of power that the research is damaging to their interests, 
arrest (even where this does not result in charge) could be used as means of stopping or interrupting the 
research. Conditions in Nepali prisons and in police custody means that this poses a risk to the 
researcher, even if the likelihood is extremely low.  
Minimisation – [1] In addition to obeying all applicable laws and adhering to visa restrictions, the 
researcher will ensure that elites with the potential to pose risks in this area are informed of the research, 
and that the research is explained in a manner which minimises the perceived risk to their interests. [2] 
The researcher will ensure that their access and entry into remote areas in particular will be with the 
consent of elites connected to the area, and on the guidance of local experts. [3] The researcher will 
leave a locality (or if necessary the country) in the event of a threat of arrest which is deemed credible 
following consultation with local experts.  
Management - [1] Immediately seeking consular assistance and the support of Nepali contacts following 
arrest, and adhering to legal advice as provided.  
 
Risk 3: Risk of Natural Disaster – There is the potential for further earthquakes on the scale of that of 
April 2015, which could affect the areas in which the research is to take place. The nature of the fault 
line in Nepal makes this nearly impossible to predict, both in terms of timing and location.  
Minimisation – [1] To the extent that is possible given local conditions, the researcher will select 
accommodation which appears to be well built, and is not suffering from existing earthquake damage. 
 
 
262 
This is particularly significant in Kathmandu, where substantial numbers of earthquake damaged 
buildings remain standing. [2] The researcher will spend the minimum time necessary in the most remote 
areas, which are likely to be cut off from support in the event of a further major earthquake. [3] When 
in the most remote areas, the researcher will store a means of water purification and a small amount of 
food to minimise the other threats to life posed by earthquake. [4] Regularly informing local contacts of 
travel plans to ensure that, in the event of earthquake, support can be provided as effectively as possible.  
Management – [1] In the event of a significant earthquake affecting the area in which the researcher is 
present, the researcher will seek the support of Nepali contacts, consular assistance and assistance from 
insurance providers as is necessary.  
 
Risk 4: Additional Risks to the Translator – The above risks apply equally to any translators involved 
in the research, and are perhaps more significant due to the potentially lesser capacity of a translator to 
leave a locality in the case of threats of violence or arrest, and their continuing residence in Nepal 
following the termination of the project. Given that the translator is exposed to such risks as a result of 
the research, it is necessary to further manage this risk.  
Minimisation – [1] To ensure that the translator fully understands the nature of the research and the 
mitigation steps taken under each of the risks above. [2] Frequently review and discuss the research with 
the translator, to ensure potential issues are dealt with before they escalate. This will also have benefits 
for the safe conduct of the project by the researcher.  
Management – [1] Providing funds to the translator to allow them to flee an area if required, and to 
support themselves on a temporary basis following doing so. [2] Putting the translator in contact with 
those who have supported the project in Nepal who will be provide further advice.  
 
Risk 5: Illness – Nepal is exposed to several tropical and other diseases which are not prevalent in the 
UK. This risk is exacerbated by the lack of modern healthcare facilities outside of the Kathmandu Valley 
and Pokhara cities, which could delay access to diagnosis and treatment.  
Minimisation – [1] The researcher will have up to date vaccines as recommended by a health 
professional, [2] The researcher will have insurance which covers extraction from remote areas and the 
costs of treatment as required, [3] The researcher will maintain an awareness of outbreaks of illnesses 
which pose further risk (particularly cholera), and follow the advice of health professionals relating to 
this where applicable.  
Management – [1] The researcher will inform insurance providers and local sources of assistance as 
necessary.  
 
Risk 6: Political Instability – Since the termination of conflict in 2006, Nepal has suffered minor 
outbreaks of violence, particularly in the southern Terai area (although notably not affecting Dang 
District). These outbreaks have on occasion resulted in the death of bystanders, protestors and police 
officers. Whilst the risk of a full-scale return to conflict is very remote, there is therefore an outside risk 
that the researcher could be caught up in a lesser outbreak of violence.  
Minimisation – [1] Maintain awareness of local political conditions through news sources and contacts 
in Nepal, [2] Ensure distance from political and protest gatherings, which have typically been the starting 
of point of episodes of violence in the past, [3] Following local advice regarding potential escalations 
in tension.  
Management – [1] If possible, leave the area in which violence is taking place, entering neighbouring 
unaffected areas, [2] Maintain frequent contact with contacts in Nepal who will be able to provide advice 
and assistance in the event of emergency, [3] Following local advice regarding escalations in tension, 
including that provided by other members of research staff.  
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Risk 7: Crime – Whilst substantially safer for foreigners than many states of similar developmental 
conditions, both Kathmandu and the rural areas which the researcher is proposing to visit suffer from 
occasional crime. In addition to the risk of theft in urban areas, there have been a very isolated number 
of cases of violence targeted against foreigners in rural areas.  
Minimisation – [1] The researcher will take everyday precautions regarding possessions and the 
avoidance of crime hotspots which would be implemented in any urban setting, [2] The researcher will 
take the precautions listed under Risk 1 regarding the minimisation of the risk of violence, [3] The 
researcher will, to the maximum extent possible, avoid travelling alone at night in both rural and urban 
areas. [4] The researcher will follow the guidance of translators and local contacts.  
Management – [1] Appropriate insurance cover, [2] A network contacts which can be used for advice 
and assistance in case of emergency.  
 
Risk 8: Road Traffic Incident and Other Transport Risks – Incidents on the road are amongst the leading 
cause of death in Nepal, owing to the poor quality of road infrastructure, poorly maintained vehicles and 
the lack of adherence to basic driving standards. Domestic flights also have a particularly poor safe 
record, an issue exacerbated by the complex terrain and poor infrastructure.  
Minimisation – [1] The researcher will avoid travelling during periods of bad weather, particularly heavy 
rain, [2] The researcher will to the maximum extent that is practical favour the use of modern vehicles 
and those which appear well maintained, [3] The researcher will not travel by domestic plane services 
outside of emergency conditions in which no other option is available.  
Management - [1] Appropriate insurance cover, [2] A network contacts which can be used for advice 
and assistance in case of emergency. 
 
Research Participants 
Risk 1: Risk of Harm from Others – The discussion of corruption issues with the research staff could 
lead to those involved being targeted out of suspicion that they are involved in corrupt activity, or that 
they have alleged others are involved in such activity.  
Minimisation – [1] The researcher will ensure the maximum level of discretion around the topics of 
discussion, [2] The implementation of the conditions discussed under anonymity and confidentiality, 
such that the details of previous participants are not revealed by the researcher, [3] Maintaining the 
cooperation of elites connected to each community, such that the perceived threat is minimised.   
Management – [1] Cooperating with police enquiries as necessary, whilst maintaining the minimisation 
strategy discussed in Risk 2.  
 
 
Risk 2: Risk of Arrest – In a manner similar to that of Risk 2 above, involvement in the project poses an 
outside potential of participants being the subject of unwanted attention from the police. This is perhaps 
more significant than the risk posed to the researcher given that the management options offered could 
not be employed by the majority of likely participants.  
Minimisation – [1] The researcher will ensure the maximum level of discretion around the topics of 
discussion, [2] The implementation of the conditions discussed under anonymity and confidentiality, 
such that the details of previous participants are not revealed by the researcher, [3] Maintaining the 
cooperation of elites connected to each community, such that the perceived threat is minimised.   
Management - [1] Cooperating with police enquiries as necessary, whilst maintaining the minimisation 
strategy discussed in Risk 2 above. 
 
 
 
264 
Risk 3: Risk of Damage to Status – In addition to physical harm or arrest, there is also the small 
possibility that, through engagement in the research, suspicion of involvement in corruption by others 
leads to damage to the social status of those involved.  
Minimisation – [1] The researcher will ensure the maximum level of discretion around the topics of 
discussion, [2] The implementation of the conditions discussed under anonymity and confidentiality, 
such that the details of previous participants are not revealed by the researcher, [3] Maintaining the 
cooperation of elites connected to each community, such that the perceived threat is minimised.   
Management – [1] Discussing concerns with participants should they arise, and mutually agreeing action 
to be taken where this can be safely and suitably undertaken by the researcher.  
 
Risk 4: Risk of Loss of Employment – Whilst highly unlikely, it is possible that if an individual is 
suspected of corruption or otherwise perceived to be linked to inappropriate behaviour through the 
conduct of the research, the participant could lose his or her job. This is applicable both to those who 
hold formal positions within local government, and those whose income is reliant on positions on 
informal influence and social connectedness.  
Minimisation – [1] The researcher will ensure the maximum level of discretion around the topics of 
discussion, [2] The implementation of the conditions discussed under anonymity and confidentiality, 
such that the details of previous participants are not revealed by the researcher, [3] Maintaining the 
cooperation of elites connected to each community, such that the perceived threat is minimised.   
Management – [1] Any intervention on behalf on the researcher is unlikely to remedy such a situation 
should it arise, but the researcher would seek advice from local contacts should a situation arise.  
 
Risk 5: Risk of Uncovering Past Trauma – Whilst the research is not seeking information specific to the 
impacts of the conflict on the individuals interviewed, it is possible that through raising the topic of the 
impacts of conflict that memories of past trauma are triggered. Such  
Minimisation – [1] The participant will be encouraged and reminded of their right to skip or avoid topics 
of conversation, [2] Topics around the impacts of conflict will be introduced in a manner which is 
sensitive, and not specific to impacts on the individual, [3] The researcher will discuss and develop the 
interview schedule with the translator and local experts.  
Management – [1] Immediately suspending the interview if a participant appears distressed or in the 
event that they request the interview be suspended, [2] Signposting a participant to victim’s advocacy 
organisations where these are available and such a recommendation would be appropriate. 
 
Others Not Involved in the Research 
Risk 1: Damage to the Reputation of a Community – It is remotely possible that corruption allegations 
by elites could result in the damage in the reputation of others outside of the research. This risk could 
develop in through a breach of confidentiality  
Minimisation – [1] The researcher will ensure the maximum level of discretion around the topics of 
discussion, [2] The implementation of the conditions discussed under anonymity and confidentiality, 
such that the details of previous participants are not revealed by the researcher, 
Management – [1] Any intervention on behalf on the researcher is unlikely to remedy such a situation 
should it arise, but the researcher would seek advice from local contacts should a situation arise.” 
 
 
